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ABSTRACT 
 
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is a strategic issue. Yet, research in this area 
has primarily focused on establishing a link between CSR and financial performance, 
with significantly less attention given to the antecedents of CSR at the individual, firm or 
industry levels. Notably, despite popular anecdotal examples that link the personal values, 
beliefs or characteristics of business leaders to the socially responsible nature of their 
companies, very little is actually known empirically about the relationship between 
executive orientation and the corporate social strategy pursued by the firm.  
The empirical research study presented in this dissertation is designed to fill this 
important gap. First, I synthesize the vast literature in the general CSR domain into a new 
typology of corporate social strategy (CSS) that distinguishes a firm’s approach to CSR 
along its breadth and depth dimensions.  Then, using an upper echelon framework based 
in the strategic choice and strategic decision-making literatures, I examine the 
relationship between executive orientation and variances observed in firm responses to 
social and environmental issues over time. I argue specifically that an open executive 
orientation, as reflected in a CEO’s worldview, and variables such as functional 
background, educational specialization and international experience affect the selective 
perception, interpretation and therefore choice of the breadth and depth of a firm’s CSS. 
Furthermore, institutional theory is used to argue that the level of managerial discretion at 
the industry level as well as general industry norms will attenuate theses relationships.  In 
so doing, I develop a longitudinal, multi-level, mixed determinant model of the 
relationship between executive orientation and CSS.  
 iv 
 
Random coefficient modeling (RCM) is then used to test the CEO effect on CSS 
over time, by modeling the individual CSS growth trajectories of 349 firms from 1991-
2009 using HLM6 software. With 19 years of data, over 1,000 CEOs and 6,334 firm-year 
observations, this thesis represents the first longitudinal study to explicitly model the rate 
of adoption of aggregate corporate social strategy (ACSS), breadth of corporate social 
strategy (BCSS) and depth of corporate social strategy (DCSS) over the last two decades. 
This analysis yielded three important results at the CEO, firm and industry levels. 
First, the CEO effect on CSS ranges between 3-14% and evidence supports that some 
aspects of an open executive orientation are indeed important determinants of initial 
levels and rates of adoption of CSS over time.  The findings also reveal that the overall 
level of CSS has not grown substantively over the last two decades, with most firms in 
2009 still engaging in a Derivative (shallow/narrow) CSS. Furthermore, unlike previous 
studies that confound negative and positive CSR, this dissertation demonstrates that 
industry membership is not an important determinant of the strategic choice of positive 
CSS, nor are institutional pressures moderating factors in the executive orientation – CSS 
relationship. This thesis thus makes significant theoretical and methodological 
contributions to research in the upper echelons, CSR and institutional theory domains, as 
well as has important implications for practice. 
 
 
 
Key Words: Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), Corporate Social Strategy (CSS), 
upper echelons, executive orientation, CEO, institutional theory, multi-level, longitudinal, 
random coefficient modeling (RCM), hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) 
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1 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1   Motivation for Study 
News reports and headlines from around the world suggest that it is becoming 
increasingly risky for organizations to dismiss corporate social responsibility (CSR) as 
something that lies beyond the economic and legal duties of the firm. Businesses of all 
sizes (multinationals in particular) face a growing demand to become more actively 
involved not only in managing the negative externalities that they may cause as a direct 
result of firm operations, but also in addressing the world’s most pressing social problems 
such as climate change, human rights abuses, poverty and conflict (Margolis & Walsh, 
2003; Orlitzky & Swanson, 2008; Sharfman, Shaft & Tihanyi, 2004). For the last decade, 
popular management books with titles such as The Ethical Imperative (Dalla Costa, 
1998), Value Shift (Paine, 2003) and The Necessary Revolution (Senge, Laur, Smith, 
Kruschwitz & Schley, 2008) have been making the claim that the rules of the game are 
changing – businesses operating today face a new performance standard that goes beyond 
economic requirements to include ethical, social and environmental considerations as 
well. The argument is such that only companies that score well on both financial and 
ethical dimensions can hope to achieve sustained competitive advantage or superior 
performance in the long run (Paine, 2003).  
Despite increasing pressures, however, businesses have adopted very different 
strategies with regards to the call for an expanded social mandate (Googins, Mirvis & 
Rochlin, 2007). Several large multinational corporations are “developing new policies 
and practices aimed at promoting human rights, preventing violent conflict, and 
contributing to more peaceful societies” (Williams, 2008: I). Microsoft, for example, has 
2 
 
2 
actively pursued business strategies that aim to serve the world’s poorest people through 
investments, partnerships and programs designed specifically to solve issues such as 
access to education and alleviating poverty. Other firms, however, have continued to 
resist the push to engage in social issues, taking the perspective that “the only social 
responsibility of business is to increase profits” (Friedman, 1970). Rival Apple, for 
example, continues to face extensive criticism for its lack of transparency with regards to 
the social and environmental impact of its operations. 
A firm’s approach to CSR thus appears to be a matter of strategic choice, partially 
rooted in whether CSR is seen as a cost or as an opportunity (Sharma, 2000; Sharma, 
Pablo & Vredenburg, 1999). Indeed, the financial estimates regarding both the potential 
investments and returns of social and environmental initiatives for organizations seem 
immeasurable. For example, in the United States alone, businesses donated over $14.1B 
to charitable causes just in 2009, with corporate charitable contributions totalling over 
$100B in the last decade (Giving USA, 2010). Investments in environmental technologies 
such as water productivity improvements are forecast to cost between $50 and $60B/year 
for next twenty years (McKinsey Quarterly, 2010a). In the oil and gas industry 
specifically, the capital investments required to meet carbon emission reduction targets 
could amount to $26B/year for the next fifteen years (McKinsey Quarterly, 2010b).  
However, the potential gains to be realized from CSR initiatives appear equally as 
compelling. Studies have shown that firms that are above average philanthropists deliver 
greater long term value to their shareholders (Brammer & Millington, 2008) and that 
firms that invest in environmental programs such as waste prevention initiatives can also 
profit from substantial financial gains (King & Lenox, 2002). Similarly, since 2005, it is 
estimated that the world’s most ethical companies have delivered a 53 percent return to 
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shareholders, outperforming the S&P 500 that logged a 4 percent loss over the same 
period (Ethisphere, 2010). In several recent meta-analyses, the overall link between 
corporate social responsibility and corporate financial performance has been shown, on 
the whole, to be at least marginally positive (Margolis, Elfenbein & Walsh, 2007; 
Margolis & Walsh, 2003; Orlitzky, Schmidt & Rynes, 2003). 
Although economic contractarians continue to portray corporate social initiatives as 
a misallocation or misappropriation of funds (Friedman, 1970; Margolis & Walsh, 2003), 
how a firm chooses to address (or not to address) social and environmental issues can 
nonetheless have an important effect on firm financial performance, either through greater 
costs or greater revenues, both in the short and in the long-term. Further, regardless of 
where one falls on the cost vs. benefits of CSR debate, how a firm deals with social and 
environmental issues has become an important factor in the market for capital. As of 
2010, one in every eight dollars invested in the US was done so through socially 
responsible investment (SRI) funds, representing 12% of all assets currently under 
professional management and over $3.07 trillion dollars in capital (Social Investment 
Forum Foundation, 2010).  
The investments, rewards and access to capital associated with social and 
environmental initiatives thus render CSR a strategic issue and the decision to avoid or 
pursue CSR initiatives a matter of strategic choice. A strategic issue is defined as an 
emerging development that is likely to have a significant impact on a firm’s present or 
future strategies (Ansoff, 1980; Dutton, Fahey & Narayanan, 1983; Julian & Ofori 
Dankwa, 2008). Given the resource and revenue implications of CSR initiatives, 
especially in the long-term, this definition places a firm’s plans and actions with regards 
to social and environmental issues squarely in the realm of the strategic decision making 
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literature (Husted & Allen, 2007; Husted & Allen, 2011). In this regard, it then becomes 
essential for practitioners, researchers, investors and board of director members alike, to 
understand how and why firms differ with regards to strategic choices made around CSR 
issues. 
1.2   Research Questions 
One possible explanation for the variation in firm adoption of CSR initiatives over 
time lies with values, beliefs and cognitions of its senior executives. Research in the field 
of strategic issues has long studied the relationship between executive judgment and 
interpretations of emerging strategic issues (Julian & Ofori Dankwa, 2008), yet 
surprisingly, very little work has been done in the area of strategic leadership and CSR 
(Agle, Mitchell & Sonnenfeld, 1999; Laplume, Sonpar & Litz, 2008; Maon, Lindgreen & 
Swaen, 2008; Rose, 2007; Thomas & Simerly, 1994; Waldman et al., 2006a; Waldman & 
Siegel, 2008; Waldman, Siegel & Javidan, 2006b; Wood, 1991). These authors point out 
the paucity of research regarding the relationship between leadership and CSR, despite 
decades of work in the upper echelons/strategic leadership field that has established the 
important role of the CEO, Top Management Team (TMT) and Board of Directors (BOD) 
with regards to strategic decision making in general and firm performance in particular 
(Finkelstein, Hambrick & Cannella, 2009).  
The link between leadership and CSR, however, has great face validity. The popular 
press is replete with anecdotal examples that link the personal values, beliefs or 
characteristics of business leaders to the socially responsible nature of their companies 
(e.g. Anita Roddick of The Body Shop, Ray Anderson of Interface Carpets, Roy Vagelos 
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of Merck). Empirically, however, Waldman, Siegel and Javidan (2006b) summarize the 
importance of this research gap as follows: 
“The strategic use of CSR begs the question about the potential role of the 
CEO in determining the propensity of firms to engage in these activities. 
CEOs are charged with the responsibility of formulating corporate strategy 
and are often deeply involved in promoting the image of their respective 
firms through social responsibility. Furthermore, they may dramatically 
change the strategic direction of the firm, including decisions pertaining to 
CSR. ... given the above ... it is somewhat surprising that there has been 
virtually no systematic theoretical or empirical analysis of the relationship 
between characteristics of CEO leadership and CSR” (Waldman et al., 
2006b: 1704) 
 
As such, there is an opportunity to bridge the strategic leadership and corporate 
social responsibility literatures in order to build a more testable theory of this 
relationship. If one believes that the decision to invest in a CSR initiative is a strategic 
decision (Husted & Allen, 2011; Waldman & Siegel, 2008) and that executive orientation 
can drive strategic decisions (Finkelstein et al., 2009; Hambrick & Mason, 1984), then 
gaining a deeper understanding of executive orientations with regards to CSR should help 
explain some of the variance observed in firm responses to social issues over time (Agle 
et al., 1999).  In particular, this research is guided by the following questions:   
1. What is the relationship between executive orientation and the 
corporate social strategy pursued by the firm over time? 
2. How do firm and industry characteristics affect the relationship 
between executive orientation and the corporate social strategies 
pursued by the firm over time? 
 
To explore these questions, I draw on the upper echelon perspective as well as the 
strategic decision making literature to demonstrate how executive orientation affects 
strategic choice and uncover how executive orientation affects the nature (breadth and 
depth) of corporate social strategies (CSS) pursued by the firm. By executive orientation, 
I mean an executive’s psychological characteristics such as values, beliefs and 
6 
 
6 
worldviews which are often evaluated based on observable experiences such as functional 
and educational background (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). Executive orientation is often 
seen as a relatively fixed cognitive paradigm that encompasses one’s personal ideology 
about human nature, perceptions of one’s role in society and understanding of social 
reality (Tetlock, 2000), including “how the environment behaves, what options are 
feasible, and how the organization should be run” (Henderson, Miller & Hambrick, 2006: 
p. 448). Understanding variations in executive orientations thus holds promise to 
understanding variations in CSS. 
1.3   Thesis Structure 
This thesis is structured as follows:  
In Chapter 2, I begin with a review of the corporate social responsibility literature 
in order to develop my dependent variable of interest – corporate social strategy (CSS) – 
which positions a firm’s decision to invest in CSR issues as a matter of strategic choice. I 
then introduce and build a typology of CSS based on a firm’s breadth and depth of 
engagement in various social and environmental issues. Within the literature review, I 
also summarize upper echelon theory (Hambrick & Mason, 1984) and institutional theory 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) in a manner which ties executive orientation and institutional 
pressures to the choice of CSS pursued by the firm over time. 
In Chapter 3, I construct a set of testable hypotheses, beginning with the overall 
expected patterns of adoption of CSS by firms over time. I then discuss the executive 
orientation construct in detail, focusing on CEO ‘openness’ as a unifying disposition that 
can explain variations in strategic decisions about initial levels and rates of adoption of 
CSS. Here, hypotheses are built around the relationship between CEO worldview, 
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functional background, educational background, international experience and the 
aggregate, breadth and depth of corporate social strategy pursued by firms over time. I 
conclude by introducing two institutional level constructs – managerial discretion and 
industry norms – as potential moderators of the executive orientation and CSS 
relationship. 
Importantly, the hypotheses developed in this study take a longitudinal perspective. 
The large majority of the work in both the CSR (Shropshire & Hillman, 2007) and the 
strategic leadership fields (Henderson et al., 2006) has thus far been cross-sectional in 
design, allowing for only a static understanding of interesting correlations. However, the 
concept of corporate social responsibility and other similar constructs (e.g. corporate 
citizenship, business sustainability) has evolved over time (De Bakker, Groenewegen & 
Den Hond, 2005) as have societal expectations and managerial interpretations of these 
expectations. I therefore take a longitudinal approach to the research questions addressed 
herein to account for the dynamic nature of these strategic decisions. 
I then sum up, in Chapter 4, the literature review and hypotheses in a longitudinal 
multi-level model (Kozlowski & Klein, 2000) of executive orientation and CSS. Here, the 
CEO is nested within a firm and the firm within the industry, arguing that normative, 
regulative and coercive isomorphic pressures (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) also shape a 
firm’s response to difficult social issues. In so doing, I make explicit why some CEOs 
pursue a broader or deeper CSS than do their more constrained counterparts.   
Following the literature review and hypotheses development, in Chapter 5 I outline 
the methodology (data sources and collection, analytic method, operationalization of 
variables) used to test the relationships hypothesized in the model. Chapter 6 begins with 
descriptive and exploratory findings, as suggested by Singer and Willett (Singer & 
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Willett, 2003) and then presents the results of the hypotheses testing in detail, following 
the random coefficient modeling (RCM) approach recommended by Bliese and Ployhart 
(2002), among others.  
The focus in the theoretical development and methodological testing is thus 
primarily descriptive, exploring how individual, firm and industry level variables 
influence a firm’s level and rate of adoption of corporate social strategy over time.  
However, this dissertation also includes a discussion section, Chapter 7, which delves into 
some of the more interesting implications of the findings in more detail.  I wrap up with 
necessary limitations and directions for future research (Chapter 8), anticipated 
contributions to theory, methods and practice (Chapter 9) and a short conclusion (Chapter 
10). 
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CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 In this chapter, I review the literature on corporate social responsibility (Section 
2.1), including two primary approaches (aggregated and disaggregated) to 
conceptualizating CSR (Section 2.2) and illustrate how these two approaches can be 
combined into a new typology of corporate social strategy that centers on strategic choice 
(Section 2.3). I then follow by briefly introducing the upper echelon (Section 2.4) and 
institutional theory (Section 2.5) lenses that will be used to build my hypotheses in 
Chapter 3. 
2.1   Defining Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)  
The debate around what is and what is not CSR stems from a broader 
philosophical argument regarding the “appropriate” role of business in society (Swanson, 
1995). While some researchers believe that the only social responsibility of business is to 
increase profits (Friedman, 1970; Jensen, 2001; Karnani, 2011), others have argued for a 
broader interpretation of a firm’s responsibility to the societies it serves including not 
only its direct stakeholders (e.g., employees, customers, suppliers), but also broader 
interpretations of society as a whole (Freeman, 1984; Schwartz & Carroll, 2008), 
including the powerless, the environment and even the non-human (Laplume et al., 2008). 
To date, there is no general consensus of either the definition (Carroll, 1999) or 
the scope of corporate social responsibility (De Bakker et al., 2005). Many discussions, 
however, begin with some variation of Carroll’s (1979; 1991) four part classification of 
the obligations business has to society which include economic, legal, ethical and 
discretionary (philanthropic) activities. Others have adopted Wood’s (1991) definition of 
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corporate social performance (CSP) that includes "a business organization's configuration 
of principles of social responsibility, processes of social responsiveness, and policies, 
programs, and observable outcomes as they relate to the firm's societal relationships" (p. 
693). Overall, however, it is assumed that a business’ primary responsibility is to first 
make a profit and to obey the law (economic and legal duties) and that CSR and CSP 
encompass those activities which ‘go beyond’ these economic and legal duties, including 
being ethical and a good corporate citizen (McWilliams & Siegel, 2001). Even seminal 
work in stakeholder theory places the primary obligation of the firm in the economic 
rather than ethical domain (Walsh, 2005).  
Defining CSR has thus been complicated by these different interpretations of 
CSR, as well as a myriad of largely analogous concepts (Margolis & Walsh, 2003; 
Orlitzky et al., 2003; Schwartz & Carroll, 2008). To demonstrate, in addition to the term 
CSR, similar constructs are often used (sometimes interchangeably) to study the impact 
of business on society including:  CSP (Corporate Social Performance), CSR2 (Corporate 
Social Responsiveness), ESG (Environmental, Social and Governance programs), 
corporate citizenship, social issue management, stakeholder management, triple bottom 
line accounting, as well as broader terms such as business ethics, values-based 
management, moral management, ethical decision making, community relations and more 
recent terminology such as business sustainability, social innovation, positive social 
change activities, social entrepreneurship, creative capitalism, the enlightened profit 
motive, corporate moral responsibility and bottom of the pyramid strategies (BOP).  
Furthermore, there are entire streams of research on specific domains of CSR including 
corporate philanthropy, diversity, ethical and environmental issues.  
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This plethora of definitions of corporate social responsibility has led to an equally 
wide variety of operationalizations of the construct itself  (Peloza, 2009; Wood, 2010). In 
reviewing 127 studies on the relationship between corporate social performance and 
corporate financial performance (otherwise known as the CSP-CFP debate), Margolis and 
Walsh (2003) identified no fewer than 47 measures of CSP ranging from the more often 
used Kinder, Lyndenberg, Domini (KLD) index scores and Fortune reputation ratings, to 
more narrow interpretations of CSP such as the firms that make the “Working Mothers 
list of ‘Most Family Friendly’ companies”.  Many of these same variables have also been 
used to operationalize analogous constructs including corporate citizenship and 
stakeholder relations and reviews of the literature often overlap. Laplume et al. (2008), 
for example, state that “the most popular operationalization of stakeholder management is 
a multifaceted measure derived from the KLD index” (p. 1167), which is also one of the 
most popular operationalizations of CSR (Harrison & Freeman, 1999).  
Although Orlitzky et al. (2003) in their meta-analysis of 52 CSR studies conclude 
that this variety of measurement methods is irrelevant given that it serves to strengthen 
the overall positive relationship between CSP-CFP, the lack of construct validity is 
problematic for the advancement of theory in this area in general and more specifically to 
the analysis of antecedents and determinants of CSR. In addition, it leaves practicing 
managers and senior executives without a practical tool with which to assess the overall 
CSR profile of their firms; to wit, in a recent United Nations Global Compact (UNGC) 
survey, 31% of CEOs indicated that the different definitions of CSR were a major barrier 
to implementing an integrated and strategic company-wide approach to environmental 
and social issues. This number is up from 22% of CEO’s who made this same claim just 
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three years ago, indicating that the field is getting more, not less, confusing (UNGC & 
Accenture, 2010). 
2.2   Conceptualizing Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)  
Germane to this discussion then is how one conceptualizes CSR, as an all-
encompassing construct or as a very particular activity (e.g., corporate philanthropy). 
Very broadly, it can be argued that research in the field of CSR has generally taken one of 
two routes - either an aggregated or disaggregated approach. The fundamental difference 
between the two streams of research lies with how CSR is conceptualized, and therefore 
treated and measured. While the aggregated approach assumes that all activities that lie 
beyond a firm’s economic and legal responsibilities can be defined as CSR (McWilliams 
& Siegel, 2001), the disaggregated approach examines each of these activities as isolated 
CSR initiatives.   
In this section, I review each of these approaches in turn and then suggest that the 
aggregated and disaggregated perspectives can be combined into a new typology of a 
firm’s CSR initiatives, which I define as Corporate Social Strategy (CSS).  Because CSR 
is normally considered as the independent variable in social issue research (Margolis & 
Walsh, 2003), many of the studies reviewed here draw on the CSR-CFP debate. However, 
this discussion is then followed by a review of the upper echelon literature and how the 
values and cognitions of senior executives may affect strategic choices around CSR issues 
as a dependent variable. 
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2.2.1   CSR:  The Aggregated Approach 
The aggregated approach to defining and measuring CSR conceptualizes CSR as a 
basket of activities or initiatives that address a firm’s interactions with all of its 
stakeholder groups beyond the firm’s primary responsibility to shareholders. This 
approach treats any initiative not directly mandated by law or by the firm’s duty to 
maximize shareholder profits as analogous (e.g. corporate philanthropy, voluntary 
emission standards, work/life balance programs) and thus implicitly assumes that a broad 
array of CSR initiatives can be amalgamated into one total CSP score (Choi & Wang, 
2009; Mattingly & Berman, 2006). More than half of the studies reviewed by Margolis 
and Walsh (2003) in their analysis of CSP-CFP research, for example, took this 
aggregated perspective.  
In these studies, CSP is operationalized using measures such as the KLD index 
(Hillman & Keim, 2001), Fortune Reputation Rating (Thomas & Simerly, 1994), mutual 
fund screens (McWilliams & Siegel, 2000), or other surveys of social responsibility 
(Sharfman, Pinkston & Sigerstad, 2000). These amalgamated or composite scores often 
combine a firm’s total social and environmental performance - negative, neutral and 
positive - into a single CSP measure that includes varied initiatives ranging from the 
number of women on the board to production of military weapons. The underlying 
assumption is that a firm’s response to social issues as well as their participation in 
ethically controversial industries together “capture the domain of what management 
scholars consider to be CSR” (Waldman et al., 2006b: p. 1714). 
The difficulty with this approach, however, is three-fold. First, summing a firm’s 
CSP strengths and weakness within a single composite score (e.g., Waddock & Graves, 
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1997; Waldman et al., 2006b) can completely obscure the actual corporate social 
performance of the firm (Mattingly & Berman, 2006; Strike, Gao & Bansal, 2006). For 
example, if a firm scores a “1” in community relations, but a “-1” in human rights, its 
overall CSP score will be “0”, which is equivalent to suggesting a firm is in not engaging 
in any CSR initiatives when it clearly is; so not all zeros are zero. Second, the aggregated 
approach assumes that firms that are doing nothing lie on the same continuum as firms 
that have chosen to pursue one, some or many CSR initiatives.  However, if we accept the 
definition of CSR as those activities which lie beyond the economic and legal 
requirements of the firm (McWilliams & Siegel, 2001), it seems conceptually illogical to 
include firms that have chosen not to engage in any social, environmental or other 
stakeholder issues as having participated in any CSR; so zero is also not the same as one.  
On the other hand, if a firm has made the decision to include a CSR agenda in their 
overall strategy, a third difficulty with the aggregated approach is that it masks important 
nuances in the actual corporate social strategies pursued by the firm; in the end, not all 
one’s are equal.  
To illustrate, Table 2.1 provides the CSP ‘scores’ of six hypothetical firms using 
several typical KLD categories that have been used in a variety of aggregated studies 
(e.g., Agle et al., 1999; Berman, Wicks, Kotha & Jones, 1999). In the case presented 
below, one can easily see how firms with the same CSP score may actually be engaging 
in very different CSR initiatives. As can be seen in Table 1, each of the hypothetical firms 
in this study has earned a total CSP score of “6”, which is a sum of all of the strengths 
and weaknesses across CSR areas.  
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Table 2.1:  Mapping Corporate Social Initiatives 
Area 1 Area 2 Area 3 Area 4 Area 5 Area 6 CSP Score 
Firm Employee Relations Diversity 
Comm-
unity 
Relations 
Environ-
ment 
Human 
Rights 
Special 
Products Sum 
1 6 0 0 0 0 0 6.00 
2 6 6 0 -6 0 0 6.00 
3 0 3 3 0 0 0 6.00 
4 -4 4 2 2 0 2 6.00 
5 -2 4 4 -2 0 2 6.00 
6 1 1 1 1 1 1 6.00 
 
 Under aggregated models of assessing CSP, each of these firms would be deemed 
to have an equal CSP record.  However, this method clearly masks that these firms have 
indeed pursued very different corporate social strategies. First, some firms have both 
positive and negative ratings in different categories which do not get separately identified 
in the composite CSP score (Firms 2, 4 & 5). Second, even for firms that have only 
positive scores, these may be an amalgam of both strengths and concerns (e.g. Firm 3 
may actually have six strengths in the diversity category, but three weaknesses, thus 
rendering the net score for this area a +3). Lastly, strategic decisions regarding which 
stakeholder or social areas have seen investments and how deep these investments have 
been, are also hidden in the overall CSP score. Firm 1, for example, has focused all of its 
attention in one category (employee relations issues), while Firm 6 has taken a broader 
approach and invested in all six areas. Similarly, Firm 1 has also engaged in a deeper 
social strategy having earned six strengths in employee relations while Firm 6 has only 
earned one, thus engaging in a much shallower social strategy with regards to this 
particular area.  
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Yet, in most research that has assumed the aggregated approach (e.g., David, Bloom 
& Hillman, 2007; Deckop, Merriman & Gupta, 2006), the CSP of each of these firms 
would be treated equally; there is thus no objective way to discern which of these firms is 
actually engaging in the greatest amount of corporate social strategies, has the broadest 
range of CSR commitments or has invested the most against any particular stakeholder or 
social issue. The aggregated approach thus seems insufficient to address questions 
regarding the overall CSR strategy pursued by the firm from a strategic choice 
perspective.  
2.2.2   CSR: The Disaggregated Approach 
On the other extreme, the disaggregated approach to measuring CSR looks at only 
one of the specific categories of activities at a time in order to obtain a more ‘objective’, 
third-party assessment of a firm’s CSP ‘behaviours’ (Orlitzky et al., 2003). Here, CSP 
measurements might include items such as philanthropic donations (Galaskiewicz, 1997), 
levels of toxic emissions (Kassinis & Vafeas, 2006) or degrees of environmental 
responsiveness (Sharma, 2000). 
Research has shown, however, that each of these different measures may have a 
different impact on CFP. For example, Orlitzky et al. (2003) found that studies that used 
environmental performance as a proxy for CSR had an overall lower correlation with CFP 
than studies that used the more aggregated reputation or survey measures of CSR.  
Similarly, Gao (2008) found that corporate environmental performance (CEP) and CSP 
are distinct constructs that have different evolutionary trajectories, different managerial 
perceptions and therefore differential impacts on firm performance. In contrast, studies 
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that have used charitable contributions as a proxy for CSR have had some of the highest 
correlations with CFP (Orlitzky et al., 2003).  
This suggests that the disaggregated approach, while providing perhaps the most 
concrete and informative evidence for the relationship between CSP and CFP, 
nonetheless demonstrates that different initiatives will have a different impact on firm 
performance, without providing any indication of how these initiatives might affect firm 
performance when combined.  If charitable contributions are positively correlated with 
firm performance, and environmental performance less so, and a firm is pursuing both, 
what will be the overall affect of the two corporate social strategies on CFP? Further, 
these studies often include firms that have not engaged in any CSR initiative, thus also 
confounding firms with no CSP with firms that have some or more CSP. 
In summary, neither the aggregated nor the disaggregated approach appears to 
sufficiently capture the domain of corporate social strategy. Rather, both of these 
approaches in combination can be seen as two related dimensions of a firm’s overall CSS. 
The aggregate approach acknowledges that CSP is a multi-dimensional construct (Agle et 
al., 1999) and thus attempts to capture, to some degree, the breadth of CSR activities that 
a firm has chosen to pursue, from more narrow or focused strategies to a portfolio of 
more broad or diversified strategies. The disaggregated approach, on the other hand, 
focuses on the depth of commitment or engagement in a specific CSR activity (Brammer 
& Millington, 2008), from relatively shallow to very deep participation in various 
initiatives. In the following section, I outline how these two dimensions can be combined 
into a typology of corporate social strategies that incorporates the strengths of both the 
aggregated and disaggregated approaches to CSR measurement as well as demonstrate 
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how the absence of any social or environmental programs is also a strategic choice that is 
conceptually distinct from firms that choose to pursue even one CSP initiative. 
 
2.3   Corporate Social Strategy (CSS): Defining a New Typology 
Provided that the strategic leadership of the firm has decided to engage in CSR, the 
nature of a firm’s CSR portfolio can be evaluated with regards to two dimensions – 
breadth and depth of strategies deployed - which answer the following questions: (1) is a 
firm’s portfolio of social strategies focused on a specific narrow issue or diversified to 
address a myriad of social problems?; and (2) what is the firm’s depth of commitment to 
the specific initiatives in which they engage? I argue that the combination of these 
dimensions define the boundaries of a firm’s corporate social strategy (CSS) (Mazutis, 
2010).1
 
  The two dimensions of this construct are now explored in greater detail. 
2.3.1   Breadth of CSS (Narrow Strategies vs. Broad Strategies) 
The senior executives of a firm may choose to pursue either narrow or broad 
corporate social strategies. In distinguishing between CSR and CSP Barnett (2007:797) 
takes issue with the equivocation of terms and asserts that “firms are not imbued with a 
certain CSP state… Rather, firms make investments that, over time, aggregate into certain 
CSP postures. These investments are CSR.” Similarly, I argue that one can observe the 
decisions to invest in CSR over time as indicative of the firm’s overall corporate social 
strategy. Adopting the classification from traditional strategic analysis (Porter, 1980), 
firms with a narrow or focused corporate social strategy choose to invest in just one, or at 
                                                 
1 An abridged version of section has been published in the Academy of Management Proceedings for 2010 
(Montreal, QC). 
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least a very limited, number of stakeholder or social issues. This may be because this is 
where a CEO or TMT sees it can make the greatest impact, or it could be because the 
nature of the issue itself presents with a greater sense of urgency from more legitimate or 
powerful stakeholders (Mitchell, Agle & Wood, 1997). Regardless of motivation, firms 
with a narrow CSS are “built around serving a particular target very well, and each 
functional policy is developed with this in mind” (Porter, 1980: 38). For example, a CEO 
might choose to focus on its employee diversity policy, specifically investing in this 
narrow stakeholder target so as to more effectively or efficiently achieve some measure of 
positive outcomes with this particular stakeholder group.  
In contrast, leaders of firms with a broader corporate social strategy will invest in 
more than one stakeholder or social issue. McWilliams and Siegel (2001) suggested that 
"managers should treat decisions regarding CSR precisely as they treat all investment 
decisions" (p. 125); some will choose to commit to a narrow CSR strategy, while others 
will invest more broadly, funding initiatives that target multiple stakeholder and social 
issues. The CEOs and TMTs of these firms may be trying to gain an insurance-like 
benefit from addressing a range of stakeholder needs (Godfrey, Merrill & Hansen, 2009). 
Alternately, they may perceive their obligations to society as going beyond economic and 
legal mandates; trying to be both responsive to the social concerns of multiple 
stakeholders and also to mitigate the real and potential adverse effects of its business 
activities (Porter and Kramer, 2006). 
 Porter and Kramer (2006) summarize the strategic decision regarding the breadth 
dimension of CSS as follows: 
“For any company, strategy must go beyond best practices. It is about 
choosing a unique position – doing things differently from competitors in a 
way that lowers costs or better serves a particular set of customer needs. 
20 
 
20 
These principles apply to a company’s relationship to society as readily as 
to its relationship to its customers and rivals” (Porter and Kramer, 2006: p. 
91; emphasis added).  
 
A CEO’s choice of a narrow vs. broad CSS can therefore be viewed as a reflection 
not only of how he/she sees the firm’s relationship to its stakeholders specifically, but 
also to how the senior leadership sees the firm’s relationship to a broader society in 
general.  
 
2.3.2   Depth of CSS (Shallow Strategies vs. Deep Strategies) 
Similarly, “an adequate theoretical framework [of CSR] must distinguish not only 
the component relationships inherent in a firm’s overall social posture but also the 
relevant importance of each component” (Barnett, 2007: 812). Here I suggest that one can 
also assess a firm’s CSS by its depth of commitment to particular stakeholder and social 
issues. A CEO of a firm that engages in just one initiative targeted to one stakeholder 
group can be said to have a shallower depth of commitment to this issue than a CEO of a 
firm that has numerous initiatives aimed at the same stakeholder group or than the CEO 
that has numerous initiatives aimed at a broad array of stakeholder and social issues. A 
CEO who has engaged in no CSR related initiatives cannot be said to have either a 
shallow or deep commitment as the firm effectively has no commitment to CSR. 
In the CSR literature, this depth of commitment has often been portrayed on a 
continuum of social responsiveness as illustrated in Table 2.2 below (Carroll, 1979; 
Wood, 1991). Carroll (1979), for example, suggested that corporate managers have 
strategic choice with regards to fulfilling the economic, legal, ethical and philanthropic 
responsibilities to society and on how to respond to a wide variety of stakeholder and 
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social issues including consumerism, the environment, discrimination, product safety, 
occupational safety and shareholder concerns. For example, when facing either a 
stakeholder or a social issue which may fall beyond a firm’s economical or legal 
requirements, a leader can choose either to do nothing until mandated by law (reactive 
strategy), wait and bear the consequences (defensive strategy), acquiesce to consumer 
pressure (accommodating strategy) or seek to develop solutions that will address the issue 
before it arises (proactive strategy).  By inference, those CEOs adopting a reactive or 
defensive posture have a shallower depth of commitment to stakeholder and social issues 
than those CEOs that take a more accommodating or proactive stance. 
 
Authors 
Table 2.2:  Continuum of Corporate Social Responsiveness 
Do Less    Do More 
Carroll 
(1979) Reactive Defensive 
Accommo-
dating  Proactive 
Hunt & 
Auster (1990)  Beginner Firefighter 
Concerned 
Citizen Pragmatist Proactivist 
Aragon-
Correa (1998) 
Non-
compliance Compliance 
Compliance 
Plus Leading Edge Excellence 
Henriques & 
Sadorsky 
(1999) 
Reactive Defensive Accommo-dative  Proactive 
Buysse & 
Verbeke 
(2003) 
Reactive Prevention   Leadership 
Zadek (2004)  
Defensive, 
Compliance  
Managerial, 
Strategic Civil 
Googins et al. 
(2007) Elementary  Engaged Innovative 
Integrated, 
Transforming 
Maon et al. 
(2010) Diminishing 
Self-
Protecting,  
Compliance 
Seeking 
Capability 
Seeking 
Caring, 
Strategizing Transforming 
   
                           
Others have put forth alternate typologies regarding this continuum of corporate 
social responsiveness (Maon, Lindgreen & Swaen, 2010). For example, Zadek (2004) 
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suggested a firm’s path to social responsibility starts with a defensive posture and 
eventually moves through several stages including compliance, managerial, strategic and 
finally a civil strategy regarding stakeholder and social issues. Similarly, Hunt and Auster 
(1990) labelled these stages of CSR as beginner, firefighter, concerned citizen, pragmatist 
and proactivist. However, empirical research has not yet born out a stages approach to an 
overarching concept of CSR, as there are only a few examples of firms with the deepest 
level of commitment to CSR across all stakeholders groups which is postulated to exist at 
the right hand side of this continuum (Googins et al., 2007). 
Part of the problem, however, might be in the conceptualization of the CSR 
continuum as stages of a firm’s CSR development rather than as measures of its depth of 
commitment to particular stakeholder or social issues. For example, Googins et al. (2007) 
found that no single firm had achieved the “transforming” stage of CSR as engagement 
with different social and stakeholder groups are often at different stages of development 
(from elementary to engaged, innovative and, more rarely, integrated). As such, a firm 
may be deeply committed to a CSS that addresses a particular stakeholder issue (e.g. 
employee diversity programs), but not at all engaged in other social issues (e.g. recycling 
programs). Under traditional measures of CSR, it would be difficult to label the overall 
CSS of this firm as reactive, defensive, accommodating or proactive as it may be 
proactive in one area and reactive in another. Only select studies make use of the 
continuum as it relates to a particular CSR domain (Aragón-Correa, 1998; Henriques & 
Sadorsky, 1999) 
The stages problem has also been suggested to mask the fact that some firms can 
perform extraordinarily well with regards to some social issues and extraordinarily poorly 
with regards to others; paradoxically being both corporately socially responsible and 
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corporately socially irresponsible at the same time (Strike et al., 2006). As such, it is 
argued here that rather than attempting to classify a firm’s overall “stage” of CSR 
development as reactive, defensive, accommodating or proactive, a firm’s CSS is better 
assessed by understanding the depth of commitment of its CEO and TMT to strategic 
actions pertaining to specific stakeholder or social issues.  
In summary, I propose that a firm’s overall corporate social strategy (CSS) can be 
evaluated based on these two dimensions - breadth and depth - suggesting a simple 
typology as depicted in Figure 2.1 below (Mazutis, 2010).  The nature of the CSS chosen 
(broad or deep) can therefore be seen as a strategic decision along these two dimensions. 
 
Deep 
Figure 2.1:  Typology of Corporate Social Strategies 
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that are resisting greater societal pressures for broader corporate involvement and may 
only symbolically invest in specific CSR initiatives in order to appease more vocal 
stakeholders. Although firms with a Derivative CSS may have acquiesced to specific 
industry norms by implementing one or two CSR initiatives, overall, these firms do not 
have a particularly strong commitment to CSR in general. In contrast, firms that have a 
Dedicated CSS, may still focus on only one or two stakeholders or social issues, but yet 
do so with multiple initiatives with the specific goal of serving that stakeholder or social 
need well. 
If the CEO/TMT of a firm chooses to pursue a broader breadth of CSS, investing 
in a variety of different stakeholder or social issues, their commitment may still be either 
shallow or deep. A Diffuse CSS suggests that a firm is pursuing a broad breadth of 
stakeholder or social issues; however, its depth of commitment to any one issue is fairly 
shallow. These firms are engaging in very limited amount of initiatives targeting each 
issue, although the total number of issues addressed is large. In contrast, executives that 
are pursuing both a broad and a deep CSS, participating in a variety of different 
stakeholder and/or social issues with numerous initiatives in each category can be said to 
be following a Devoted CSS. These firms are committed to addressing the needs and 
demands of a broad range of stakeholders and/or actively participating in addressing a 
broad range of social issues. 
Importantly, CEOs and TMTs may also choose not to engage in any stakeholder 
or social issues at all and thus not fall into any of the above CSS categories. In these 
cases, I argue that the firms are considered to have a Disengaged CSS. The decision not to 
participate in any CSR activities is nonetheless a strategic decision and no activity is 
inherently conceptually different than some or lots of activity; one cannot evaluate no 
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activity in terms of its breadth or depth as both are zero. The decision not to invest in any 
corporate social strategies can therefore be seen as a strategic statement of a firm’s 
relationship with society (Porter & Kramer, 2006) and should be treated as conceptually 
and empirically different than firms who are actively pursuing CSS. 
The typology derived herein can thus be used to assess the nature of a firm’s CSS 
both at a particular point in time, as well as the nature of a firm’s CSS trajectory over 
time (Barnett, 2007). By incorporating the breadth and depth dimensions, the typology 
allows for the evaluation of organizational change in CSS as an adaptive process (Short, 
Ketchen, Bennett & du Toit, 2006) which may occur by either adding within a category 
(growing in depth) or expanding across categories (growing in breath) over time. In turn, 
these different growth trajectories may then be examined for different antecedents and/or 
different outcomes. 
Assuming that firms can and do vary with regards to the corporate social strategies 
they choose to pursue (disengaged, derivative, dedicated, diffuse or devoted), the question 
then turns to why the strategic leadership of some firms choose to pursue a greater breadth 
or a greater depth of corporate social strategies over time than do other leaders. As 
introduced in Section 1.1., a possible explanation for the variation in a firm’s CSS lies 
with the executive orientation of the firm’s CEO. As this typology is rooted in strategic 
choice, in the next section I review the upper echelon perspective drawing particular 
attention to how executive orientation impacts the strategic decision making process, 
including decisions regarding participation or resource allocation to social and other 
stakeholder issues. 
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2.4   Upper Echelon Theory 
Upper Echelon or strategic leadership theory posits that a firm’s strategic choices 
can be seen as a reflection of the values and cognitions of its CEO and top-management-
team (TMT) (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). Based on bounded rationality, the theory 
suggests that leaders at the top of the organization interpret external pressures through a 
set of cognitive lenses that limit their field of vision and affect the manner in which they 
perceive changing environmental situations (Finkelstein et al., 2009). These filters 
ultimately shape how CEOs and TMTs make strategic decisions, including how they may 
react to changing rules of legitimate firm behaviour.2
Managerial cognition thus encompasses the decision maker’s cognitive base as well 
as his/her values (Hambrick & Mason, 1984). One’s cognitive base includes 
knowledge/assumptions about future events, alternatives and the consequences of those 
alternatives, while one’s values are the “principles for ordering [these] consequences or 
alternatives according to preference” (Hambrick & Mason, 1984: 195). Traditionally, the 
terms managerial cognition and executive orientation have been used somewhat 
interchangeably in the upper echelon literature, consisting of some combination of 
psychological and demographic factors that, in addition to values, may include one’s 
 While understanding the 
relationship between top executive orientation and organizational performance is the 
ultimate goal of upper echelon theory, various observable experiences (e.g. demographic 
variables) are more often used as proxies for actual managerial cognitions in empirical 
investigations of selective perception (Carpenter, Geletkanycz & Sanders, 2004). 
                                                 
2 Note: The discussion on cognitive lenses is not meant to imply that this process is necessarily detrimental 
to the firm. In fact, in many situations (e.g., dynamic environments), selective perception can result in 
cognitive heuristics or shortcuts that allow for more efficient information processing and ultimately faster, 
more efficient strategic decisions.  
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cognitive model, cognitive style or personality as well as observable experiences such as 
age, tenure, formal education and functional background amongst others (Finkelstein et 
al., 2009). Figure 2.2 below depicts the model of strategic choice from the upper echelon 
perspective.  
Figure 2.2:  Strategic Choice Under Bounded Rationality 
 
Source: Finkelstein, S., Hambrick, D. C., & Cannella, A. A. 2009. Strategic Leadership: Theory and Research on 
Executives, Top Management Teams, and Boards. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 45 
 
 
Executive orientation is thus a complex construct, encompassing both psychological 
processes and observable demographic characteristics and has alternately been referred to 
as executive mindset (Geletkanycz, 1997), cognitive paradigm (Henderson et al., 2006) 
and managerial worldview (Tetlock, 2000). In all cases, however, the underlying 
assumption is that individuals embody a deep spectrum of values or beliefs – religious, 
political, philosophical, social and cultural – that can influence strategic decision making 
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in organizational contexts as much as in personal contexts (Finkelstein et al., 2009).  
Although subtle, executive orientation then differs from more malleable psychological 
constructs such as attitudes or leadership styles. Attitudes and leadership styles can 
largely be adapted to changes in external stimuli, while executive orientation will shape 
how external stimuli are perceived, interpreted and enacted (Finkelstein et al., 2009). 
Prior research on executive orientation has tended to focus on a limited subset of 
“cognitive factors” or a select few demographic proxies in order to explore possible 
relationships between CEO (or TMT) characteristics and specific strategic choices. 
Again, by strategic choice, I mean decisions regarding issues that have the potential to 
impact a firm’s strategy (Dutton & Duncan, 1987; Dutton et al., 1983; Thomas & 
McDaniel Jr, 1990). The manner in which strategic issues are diagnosed and interpreted 
at the top levels of the organization thus helps inform variances in the strategic decision 
making processes. Henderson, Miller and Hambrick (2006), for example, use CEO tenure 
(a demographic variable) as a proxy for a CEO’s cognitive paradigm (a psychological 
variable) and test how this affects firm performance under different degrees of industry 
dynamism.  Similarly, several studies have shown that longer tenured CEOs are more 
likely to engage in defender strategies characterized by stability and efficiency than 
shorter tenured CEOs who are more likely to undertake prospector strategies related to 
increased levels of innovation (Finkelstein et al., 2009). 
While informative, this demographic approach falls short of explaining the 
underlying nature of executive orientation and how this might affect strategic choice. 
Certainly not all long tenured executives share the same values, beliefs, worldviews or 
personal ideologies. To wit, research shows that top managers may construct very 
different interpretations of the same strategic issue even when exposed to the same 
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stimuli (Thomas & McDaniel Jr., 1990) and that top management commitment and 
support of CSR specifically will vary because of this (Henriques & Sadorsky, 1999). A 
key component of upper echelon theory then is that executive beliefs, values and 
cognitive structures as well as individual experiences, which together inform the 
construct of executive orientation, will influence the process of selective perception and 
interpretation thus influencing the choice of strategic response (Finkelstein et al., 2009), 
including strategic response to stakeholder and social issues. 
The dependent variables in most of the upper echelon studies, however, are more 
“traditional” strategic decisions such as investments in innovation (Bantel & Jackson, 
1989), research and development (Barker & Mueller, 2002) or acquisitions (Hitt & Tyler, 
1991). Some work has also been done to understand how cognitive factors such a CEO’s 
“commitment to the status quo” might affect strategic choices such as persistence and 
conformity to firm strategy (Geletkanycz, 1997). However, very little is known about 
how business leaders evaluate and navigate investment decisions with regards to broader 
stakeholder and societal issues (e.g., Waldman et al., 2006b).  In fact, Finkelstein, 
Hambrick and Cannella’s (2009) new compendium of strategic leadership research does 
not include a single mention of CSR, business sustainability, corporate citizenship or 
other analogous constructs. 
Of course, the upper echelon perspective is not limited to the values and cognitions 
of the CEO, but also posits that the TMT as a “dominant coalition” will also affect 
strategic decisions and organizational outcomes (Finkelstein et al., 2009). However, 
extant research has demonstrated that there is a significant homogeneity of TMT 
perceptions with regards to their organization’s environment (Sutcliffe & Huber, 1998) 
and that the beliefs of a focal upper echelon executive are related to the beliefs of other 
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members of the organization's upper echelon team (Chattopadhyay, Glick, Miller & 
Huber, 1999). Further, research suggests that CEO effects on firm-level outcomes are 
stronger than those of non-CEO members of the executive team (Bertrand & Schoar, 
2003). Jensen and Zajac (2004) went so far as to suggest that measuring the TMT as an 
aggregate unit of analysis can mask important relationships between individual elites, 
such as the CEO, and corporate strategy. Coupled with a myriad of other theoretical and 
methodological difficulties regarding measuring the executive orientation of the TMT 
(Cannella & Holcomb, 2005), the CEO specifically is considered the unit of analysis 
herein for the sake of logical simplicity.  
I now turn to a review of the work done in the field of institutional theory which has 
relevance to both discussions pertaining to corporate social responsibility as well as to the 
concept of managerial discretion in the upper echelons tradition; institutional theory will 
be used to argue for the moderating effects of industry norms and managerial discretion 
on CSS. 
2.5   Institutional Theory 
 Organizations are said to be limited in their strategic actions by external 
constraints and institutional pressures toward conformity (Oliver, 1991). The institutional 
argument centers on the idea that there are enduring institutions in social life that effect 
the thoughts, feelings and behaviors of individuals and collective actors (Lawrence & 
Suddaby, 2006). These institutions consist of the “cognitive, normative, and regulative 
structures and activities that provide stability and meaning to social behavior” (Scott, 
1995) which therefore affect the strategic, legal and ethical norms inherent in decisions of 
corporate social responsibility.  Due to mimetic, coercive or normative isomorphic 
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pressures to conform to taken-for-granted social rules, firms will tend to imitate the 
behavior of other firms in order to gain or maintain legitimacy and increase their chances 
for survival (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). For example, in a study of firms in the oil and 
gas, mining and forestry industries in Canada, Bansal (2005) found that institutional 
mimicry (e.g., conducting an environmental audit in response to industry norms) was 
positively associated with corporate sustainable development over time. 
 Legitimacy-seeking is therefore a central concept in institutional theory and is 
defined as what is “appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values 
and beliefs” (Suchman, 1995). At the individual level of the CEO, particularly salient is 
the notion of moral legitimacy which rests on judgments about whether an activity should 
or ought to be pursued (Suchman, 1995). Here, one could argue that regulatory, 
normative and cognitive institutional pressures constrain a CEOs ability to pursue 
strategies that might deviate from the norms of the industry lest he/she risk harming the 
firm’s legitimacy.  
 Laws, regulations and other structural characteristics of the industry will impose 
coercive isomorphic pressures on the firm to comply with accepted standards (DiMaggio 
& Powell, 1983). Once a firm is established, maintaining legitimacy involves choosing 
strategies that protect existing accomplishments (Suchman, 1995).  If the environment is 
turbulent or uncertain, mimetic isomorphic pressures will further push firms to copy the 
actions of successful organizations within their field.  Normative forces such as formal 
education and professional networks will further constrain organizational choice as 
organizations strive to ensure they provide similar benefits and services as other 
competitors in the industry (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).  
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 The institutional perspective and the upper echelon perspective are thus often 
positioned as opposing theories regarding the role of agency in driving strategic actions 
(Wasserman, Nohria & Anand, 2001). However, recent work has sought to marry the two 
perspectives to demonstrate that CEOs and TMTs have strategic choice with regards to 
how to deal with these institutional pressures (Nadkarni & Barr, 2008). Oliver (1991), for 
example, presented a typology of organizational responses to institutional pressures that 
ranged on a continuum from passive to active responses including: acquiescence, 
compromise, avoidance, defiance and manipulation.  The passive end of the spectrum can 
be seen as traditional responses to environmental pressures as explored by institutional 
theorists (imitation, compliance, accommodation) while the more active end incorporates 
a perspective that is closer aligned to strategic choice (e.g.: contesting rules and 
requirements). This is not dissimilar to Carroll’s (1979) original typology of firm 
responses to stakeholder issues discussed earlier in this chapter. The reactive and 
defensive end of the corporate social responsiveness continuum is informed by 
institutional theory while accommodating and proactive strategies are informed by 
strategic choice.   
 Most recently, Nadkarni and Barr (2008) demonstrated that managerial cognition 
at the upper echelon level mediates the relationship between industry level factors 
(velocity, or the speed and unpredictability of changes in the industry specifically) and the 
speed of strategic response to changing environmental conditions. The mediation 
argument was built around the logic that “top managers develop subjective 
representations of the environment that, in turn, drive their strategic decisions and 
subsequent firm action” (Nadkarni & Barr, 2008: 1395). The authors showed that top 
managers differed with regards to their attention focus towards external environmental 
33 
 
33 
factors, both the task environment (aspects of the environment that have a direct impact 
on the firm such as competitors, suppliers and customers) as well as the general 
environment (more macro level dimensions of the environment such as social, 
demographic, economic and political factors).  Given that social issues in particular are in 
the domain of the general external environment, it is therefore logical to deduce that top 
management will also develop different subjective representations of these issues which 
will impact the strategic decisions they make about how best to address these issues. 
Bridging institutional theory with the upper echelon perspective therefore, one can see 
how a CEO’s response to industry norms regarding corporate social responsibility will 
also vary.   
In the following section, I review the few studies that have looked at both 
psychological and demographic determinants of CSR in general (including analogous 
constructs such as corporate citizenship or stakeholder management) as well as 
disaggregated CSR initiatives (such as philanthropy, environmental stewardship or ethics 
programs). Further, I look at how industry level institutional pressures may impact this 
relationship. In the process, I build a set of hypotheses that link executive orientation to a 
firm’s preferred breadth and depth of corporate social strategy. The review is closely tied 
to the issue interpretation literature where “the beliefs, ideologies, personal investment 
and commitment form what we term the ‘values’ that managers hold, [which] play an 
important role in the issues management process, specifically in the evaluation phase of 
issues management” (Sharfman et al., 2000: p. 145). As such, the hypotheses build on a 
broad review of empirical work done on different aspects of the strategic decision making 
model and CSR. Yet, they also incorporate the element of time in a manner that goes 
beyond the existing literature. 
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CHAPTER 3: HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
 Building on the literature review presented in Chapter 2, in this chapter, I 
construct a set of hypotheses that begins with defining the expected trends in the 
dependent variable - corporate social strategy, specifically the expected patterns in the 
adoption of CSS by firms over time (Section 3.1). I then move to explain the variance in 
these different rates of adoption over time from the upper echelon perspective, focusing 
specifically on CEO openness as a predictive executive orientation (Section 3.2). I 
conclude by presenting the expected moderating effects of managerial discretion and 
industry norms (Section 3.3) on the relationship between an open executive orientation 
and CSS from the perspective of institutional theory. 
3.1   Patterns of Corporate Social Strategy over Time 
Before examining the link between executive orientation and the rate of adoption 
of corporate social strategy over time, two assumptions must be further developed: 1) that 
there is a discernable pattern in the overall levels and rates of adoption of CSS over time 
and 2) that there are significant variations between firms in their initial levels and rates of 
adoption of CSS that can potentially be attributable to executive orientation.  
Surprisingly, very little is known to date with regards to the role of time on the 
rate of adoption of CSS (Bansal, 2005; Barnett, 2007; Shropshire & Hillman, 2007). 
Rather, most studies of antecedents and outcomes of CSR, CSP or other like constructs 
remain cross-sectional in design, or use multiple year averages, thus implying that firm 
level CSS profiles are relatively stable over time (e.g., McWilliams & Siegel, 2000; 
Strike et al., 2006). This is not unlike broader research in strategic management that, until 
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recently, has often either neglected the role of time all together, or relegated it to ‘error’ 
when exploring firm level determinants of financial performance (Misangyi, Elms, 
Greckhamer & Lepine, 2006; Short et al., 2006), leaving many open questions about the 
function of time on patterns of strategic change. 
Moving beyond cross-sectional relationships, the focus herein is on the 
phenomenon of strategic change with regards to corporate social, environmental and other 
stakeholder related issues. By strategic change, I mean “a difference in the form, quality, 
or state over time in an organization’s alignment with its external environment” that 
involves significant changes in resource deployments (Rajagopalan & Spreitzer, 1997: p. 
49). Strategic change is an important construct in strategy research and fundamental to 
discussions of firm performance in so far as adapting to environmental changes is seen as 
a necessary condition of firm survival (Boeker, 1997; Porter, 1980). In the context of 
today’s hypercompetitive dynamic contexts, ensuring continual fit between strategy and 
environment becomes even more critical to competitive advantage (Wiggins & Ruefli, 
2005). 
Yet, consensus regarding how firms should manage stakeholder and social issues 
remains elusive such that firms and their top managers have been left to understand, 
interpret and choose a response to social and environmental issues without a clear 
understanding as to which initiatives are most likely to yield benefits to the firm (Husted 
& Allen, 2011). Historically, issues pertaining to CSR have been both complex and 
difficult to address (Bansal, 2003, 2005; Margolis & Walsh, 2003) and are therefore 
likely to illicit feelings of anxiety or uncertainty amongst some executives that enforce 
the status quo. Research has shown that individuals will perceive issues as highly 
ambiguous in situations where there is little access to information or where the 
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information is highly inconsistent (Dutton et al., 1983) as is often the case regarding 
information about CSR. In these instances, “uncertainty may repel rather than encourage 
broad and varied interest in issues” as it affects an individual’s personal assessment 
regarding the probability of being able to take action or to resolve an issue (Dutton & 
Webster, 1988: p.671). In contrast, the more certain the context of strategic decision 
making and the higher the perceived feasibility of strategic issue resolution the greater the 
breadth and the diversity of issue interest (Dutton & Webster, 1988). 
However, Rivoli and Waddock (2011) suggest that on the whole, over time, the 
ambiguity and uncertainty surrounding a social or environmental issue subsides as 
activities that would have once been considered ‘unheard of’, become normalized, 
expected and even required by organizations.  This temporal dynamism, they argue, 
follows the pattern of a public issue life cycle, where an issue (e.g. child labour) first gets 
put forth by an interest group, then gains media attention and awareness with the general 
public, building pressure on organizations until finally solutions get codified into practice 
(Rivoli & Waddock, 2011). Although at early phases in this dynamic process, firms have 
considerable amount of discretion in terms of their response to the social issue, as the 
importance of an issue or a stakeholder group gains power, legitimacy or urgency, the 
salience of the issue to the strategy-environment fit increases (Mitchell et al., 1997) and 
mimetic and normative isomorphic pressures induce more widespread institutionalization 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). 
Although this evolution may be very slow, especially around highly contested 
areas such as same sex partner employee benefits (Chuang, Church & Ophir, 2011) and 
environmental responsibility (Hoffman, 1999), on the whole, we would expect that both 
the overall levels of CSS as well as the rate at which firms adopt CSS should be 
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increasing over time (Bansal, 2005). First, the pressures on firms to address or redress 
negative externalities have grown over the last two decades  (Waddock, Bodwell & 
Graves, 2002); these have ranged from issues regarding exploitative labour practices in 
the early 90s to ethical collapses at major corporations such as Enron, WorldCom and 
Tyco in the early 2000s, from increased calls for environmental responsibility post Al 
Gore’s “An Inconvenient Truth” (2006) to the most recent progress on formal legislative 
equality for same sex couples. As such, the sheer breadth of social, environmental and 
other stakeholder issues that now face organizations is of a magnitude unforeseen even a 
decade ago (Paine, 2003).   
With the increased transparency that has accompanied the internet boom, the 
strength of stakeholder group pressure on firms to adopt CSR practices has also increased 
during this same time frame (Waddock et al., 2002). While a firm may have been able to 
keep their CSR profile relatively private in the early 1990s, by the mid-2000s, 
stakeholders began to associate silence in this domain with something to hide. For 
example, the sheer number of emerging global standards, codes and principles (e.g. the 
United Nations Global Compact, ISO 14000, Fair Labour Guidelines etc.) has created an 
expectation of corporate accountability and transparency in social, environment and other 
stakeholder issue reporting, strengthening the normative pressures on all firms to comply 
(Bansal, 2005; Matten & Moon, 2008; Waddock et al., 2002). 
This increased access to information and increased pressure from employees, 
suppliers, NGOs, communities and governments to be more socially responsible has 
progressed such that a new set of social, environmental and ethical rules has come to 
dominate discussions of the role of business in society (Googins et al., 2007; Paine, 
2003). As Barnett (2007) explains: “When expectations of CSR increase, the value of the 
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status quo necessarily declines” (p. 807). The increased value of positive stakeholder 
relations has also been reflected in the market for capital: investors are now more than 
ever looking to socially responsible investment (SRI) funds, with one in every eight 
dollars, or over $3 trillion currently invested with companies that have passed this screen 
(Social Investment Forum Foundation, 2010). Bird and colleagues (2007), for example, 
found that the market’s attitude toward CSR activities has changed over time, with an 
increased interest in diversity, employment and environmental issues in particular. In 
order to meet increased stakeholder demands and to maintain access to capital, it is 
logical to expect that, in general, the depth of commitment to social or environmental 
issues by firms will have increased over time. Given that both the scope and the scale of 
social issues facing the firm have grown over the last several decades, I hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 1: Corporate Social Strategy follows a linear increasing 
trajectory over time, such that (a) the aggregate corporate social 
strategy, (b) the breadth of corporate social strategy and (c) the depth of 
corporate social strategy pursued by firms, on average, will increase 
over time. 
However, despite overall increases in CSS over time, the individual response of 
organizations to the increasing pressures may nonetheless differ such that the overall 
levels and rates of adoption of social, environmental and other stakeholder programs 
varies both within firms and between firms and industries over time (Googins et al., 
2007).  Change within organizations is difficult (Hannan & Freeman, 1984), and change 
with regards to shifting stakeholder pressures may be even more so (Hoffman, 1999). As 
such, despite arguments that a great deal of homogeneity exists in firm’s responses to 
social and environmental issues, as noted in the introduction, some firms appear to have 
embraced expanded notions of corporate social responsibility, while others take the 
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perspective that the only social responsibility of business is to increase profits (Friedman, 
1970).  
Basu and Palazzo (2008) suggest various cognitive, linguistic and conative 
differences that can be observed in organizational sensemaking around CSR issues that 
can explain observed variations in a firm’s CSR ‘character’. For example, organizations 
have different identity orientations (individualistic, relational and collectivist) that will 
affect how they think, as an organization, about social and environmental issues.  
Similarly, Barnett (2007) suggests that firms develop varying capacities to deal with 
stakeholder issues which in turn will affect their CSR efforts over time. Further, research 
using the stages approach as detailed in Section 2.3.2, imply that at any point in time 
firms will differ with regards to the approach taken (e.g., reactive, defensive, proactive) 
to a variety of social and stakeholder domains (Maon et al., 2010). As such, it follows 
that: 
Hypothesis 2: Firms will differ significantly in their initial levels of (a) 
aggregate corporate social strategy, (b) breadth of corporate social 
strategy and (c) depth of corporate social strategy. 
Hypothesis 3: Firms will differ significantly in their rates of adoption of 
(a) aggregate corporate social strategy, (b) breadth of corporate social 
strategy and (c) depth of corporate social strategy over time. 
 
 One of the main drivers of this variance has been hypothesized to rest with the 
firm’s senior leaders (Waldman et al., 2006b; Wood, 1991). As such, I now turn to a 
detailed exploration of the relationship between executive orientation and CSS. 
40 
 
40 
3.2   The Effect of Executive Orientation on Corporate Social Strategies: The Role of 
CEO Openness 
 As introduced in the literature review, executive orientation is a complex construct 
that includes both psychological and social factors such as a CEO‘s values, beliefs, 
cognitions, attitudes, personality traits and worldviews as well as demographic proxies 
that reflect variations in executive life experiences, such as educational, functional and 
international background (Finkelstein et al., 2009). These factors combine to inform a 
CEO’s executive orientation which in turn shapes the process of selective perception, 
interpretation and construed reality that affects strategic decisions as depicted in Figure 
2.2 (Finkelstein et al., 2009; Hambrick & Mason, 1984).  
 I argue here that CEO openness in particular can be used as a unifying concept 
that combines a diverse set of research on both CEO cognitions as well as demographic 
proxies that have been shown to influence strategic choice in organizations.  Research on 
individual openness has a rich history in numerous disciplines, including psychology 
(Judge, Bono, Ilies & Gerhardt, 2002; Schwartz, 1996), sociology, organizational 
behaviour (e.g., Berson, Oreg & Dvir, 2008), political (Sowell, 1987) as well as ethical 
philosophy, where openness was first associated with the virtue of wisdom by the ancient 
Greeks (Peterson & Seligman, 2004). Furthermore, although not always explicitly 
classified as a value, trait or other cognitive disposition, CEO and TMT openness has 
been extensively invoked in the upper echelons and strategic change literatures as a 
predictor of strategic decisions in organizations (e.g., Datta, Rajagopalan & Zhang, 2003; 
Wiersema & Bantel, 1992).   
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 In this section, I begin by reviewing the research on openness in general – first as  
‘openness to change’ which has been shown to be a universal motivational value by 
Schwartz and colleagues (Schwartz, 1996; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987; Schwartz & 
Boehnke, 2004) amongst others, and second as ‘openness to experience’ which has been 
demonstrated to be one of the Big Five personality traits emerging out of the field of 
psychology (e.g., Judge, Piccolo & Kosalka, 2009). I then move into an exploration of 
various CEO characteristics that have shown to be reflective of an open executive 
orientation (liberal worldview, functional background, educational background and 
international experience)(Finkelstein et al., 2009), building a series of direct effect 
hypotheses linking an open executive orientation to the initial levels and rates of adoption 
of CSS by firms over time. I conclude with a discussion of possible moderators of the 
relationship between executive orientation and CSS. 
3.2.1   Openness to Change 
 Individual openness to change has been extensively studied as a motivational 
value that drives individual behaviour (Hitlin & Piliavin, 2004).  By motivational value, I 
mean desirable, transituational goals that serve as guiding principles in people’s lives 
(Schwartz, 1996:  p.2), exerting internal pressure for individuals, including executives, to 
behave in a certain way (Illies & Reiter-Palmon, 2008). Values are “enduring beliefs that 
a specific mode of conduct or end-state of existence is personally or socially preferable to 
an opposite or converse mode of conduct or end-state” (Rokeach, 1973) and “conceptions 
of the desirable that influence the way people select action and evaluate events” 
(Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987: p. 550). As such, values are important drivers of behavior and 
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can be prioritized in a hierarchical manner such that preference is given to certain values 
over others (Locke, 1991; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987). 
 Schwartz (1996) and his colleagues have identified and validated a set of ten 
universal values that can be found across a broad range of social, religious and cultural 
groups.  As depicted in Figure 3.1, these universal values are further distinguished along 
two axes: openness to change (stimulation, self-direction) vs. conservation (tradition, 
conformity, security) as well as self-enhancement (power, achievement, hedonism) vs. 
self-transcendence (universalism, benevolence). The circular structure of these values has 
been confirmed in various studies that support the finding that competing dimensions do, 
in fact, form polar opposites to each other (Bardi & Schwartz, 2003; Schwartz, 2005; 
Schwartz & Boehnke, 2004). This means that pursuing opposing values simultaneously is 
unlikely given competing motivational cores (Locke, 1991) -  for example, seeking 
excitement and novelty (pursuit of stimulation values) is likely to circumvent behaviours 
that restrain actions and inclinations (pursuit of conformity values) which lie on opposite 
poles of the structure (Schwartz, 1996: 4). 
43 
 
43 
Figure 3.1:  The Structure of Value Systems 
 
Source: Schwartz, S. 1996. Value priorities and behavior: Applying a theory of integrated value systems. In 
C. Seligman, J. M. Olson and M. P. Zanna (Eds.), The Ontario Symposium: Vol. 8. The psychology of 
values (p. 1-24). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, p. 4. 
  
 Unsurprisingly, the vast majority of the research that has looked into the 
relationship between individual values and some facet of corporate social responsibility 
or related construct focuses on the self-transcendence vs. self-enhancement poles. For 
example, the self-transcendence values of benevolence and universalism have been linked 
to ethical and socially responsible behaviour and attitudes (Crilly, Schneider & Zollo, 
2008; Fukukawa, Shafer & Lee, 2007; Illies & Reiter-Palmon, 2008; Shafer, Fukukawa & 
Lee, 2007), while self-enhancement values such as power and achievement, appear to be 
positively related to destructive decisions in scenarios involving bribery, coercion, 
deception, theft or discrimination (Fritzsche & Oz, 2007; Illies & Reiter-Palmon, 2008). 
Similarly, several authors have suggested that personal idealistic/altruistic motives or 
benevolence values need to be taken into account as managerial drivers of CSR initiatives 
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(Choi & Wang, 2007; Hemingway & Maclagan, 2004). Egri and Herman (2000) found 
that managers in the environmental sector in particular attributed higher importance to 
self-transcendence values as compared to managers in general. Agle, Mitchell and 
Sonnenfeld (1999) also argue that a CEO’s self vs. other direction values should help 
determine the strength of stakeholder salience in organizations.  
 Because values influence how people evaluate situations and make choices 
regarding these situations (Feather, 1995; Hitlin & Piliavin, 2004), it seems evident that 
individuals who are motivated by self-transcendence values will evaluate, interpret and 
make different decisions regarding CSR than individuals who are motivated by self-
enhancement motives.  Less clear, however, is how the opposite poles - openness to 
change vs. conservation values  - may affect individual perceptions and interpretations of 
corporate social responsibility (Crilly et al., 2008). Schwartz (1996) describes the 
opposing dimensions of openness vs. conservation as the “conflict between emphases on 
own independent thought and action and favoring change versus submissive self-
restriction, preservation of traditional practices and protection of stability” (p. 5). 
Openness to change thus encompasses self-direction and stimulation values while 
conservation values include security (safety, harmony and stability of society, of 
relationships, and of self), conformity (restraint of actions, inclinations, and impulses 
likely to upset or harm others and violate social expectations or norms) and tradition 
(respect, commitment and acceptance of the customs and ideas that traditional culture or 
religion provide the self) (Schwartz, 1996: p. 3). 
 In the few CSR/ethics related studies that have included the openness to change 
and conservation axes, associations between an individual’s openness and ethical, social 
and environmental decision making have been mixed: some have found no relationship 
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between openness/conservation and ethical decision making (Fritzsche & Oz, 2007), 
while others report both marginally significant negative relationships between traditional 
values (as part of the conservation construct) and support for corporate and environmental 
accountability (Fukukawa et al., 2007) as well as positive relationships between 
conformity and the importance of being ethical and socially responsible (Shafer et al., 
2007). 
 This may not be all together surprising, as CSR is an inherently ambiguous 
concept (see Section 2.1) and challenges traditional perceptions of the role of business in 
society (Friedman, 1970). As a result, no overarching consensus on how firms should 
manage stakeholder and social issues has emerged, rendering issues  related to CSS as 
both complex and difficult to address (Bansal, 2003, 2005; Margolis & Walsh, 2003). In 
this scenario, adoption of CSR policies may be perceived by some strategic leaders as an 
opportunity and by others, as a challenge to the existing status quo. For example, CSS 
may incorporate contested ‘new’ initiatives supporting a diverse workforce, including 
protection and promotion of women, visible minorities and gay/lesbian rights. CEOs with 
an open executive orientation may embrace the adoption of these initiatives, while others 
may perceive the pursuit of these policies to be in conflict with their conformity and 
tradition values.  “Leaders who possess strong security values focus on the creation and 
preservation of clear and explicit practices. To maintain stability and order these leaders 
are likely to employ set routines and to determine clear and strict rules and procedures” 
(Berson et al., 2008: p. 618-619) that serve to maintain the status quo. 
 The strategy literature is replete with examples that investigate both the 
determinants and the outcomes of senior leadership commitment to the status quo. 
McClelland, Liang and Barker III (2010) summarize a CEO’s commitment to the status 
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quo as a belief in the enduring correctness of current organizational strategies and 
profiles. As such, conservation values which are tied to security, conformity and tradition 
values may slow adoption of new CSR policies such that firms run by CEOs with a less 
open executive orientation may have narrower and shallower corporate social strategies. 
 For example, in a study of 35,000 European respondents, Schwartz found support 
that individuals driven by openness to change values were more likely than individuals 
driven by conservation values to support the statement that “gay men and lesbians should 
be free to live their own life as they wish” (Schwartz, 2005: p. 3-4). Similarly, expanding 
the firm’s mandate into the realm of environmental issues may also require openness to 
change. To wit, Egri and Herman (2000) found that environmental managers displayed a 
greater degree of openness to change than did other corporate managers.  
 The competing openness to change vs. conservation poles of the universal system 
of values thus has the potential to inform hypotheses regarding executive orientation and 
corporate social strategies. As openness to change implies a broader scope regarding the 
selective perception and hence interpretation process, an open executive orientation may 
affect both the choice of extending the depth of CSS in an area (e.g., adding gay/lesbian 
rights to existing diversity efforts) and expanding the breadth of CSS outside more 
traditional approaches to CSR (e.g., from a singular focus on philanthropy, to instigating 
environmental initiatives).  
3.2.2   Openness to Experience 
 Parallel to the discussion of openness to change as a motivational value, 
psychologists have recently converged on a five factor model of individual personality 
traits which include openness to experience. The Big Five personality traits, as they are 
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often called, are said to capture, on the whole, most of the salient dimensions of various 
existing personality inventories (Judge et al., 2002; Judge et al., 2009) and include: 
openness to experience, agreeableness, conscientiousness, extraversion and emotional 
stability.  Similar to individuals who are open to change, individuals who are open to 
experience are said to display curiosity, creativity and flexible thinking (Thoresen, Bliese, 
Bradley & Thoresen, 2004), tend to be imaginative, nonconforming, unconventional and 
autonomous (Judge et al., 2002) and intelligent, perceptive, tolerant, cultured and 
inquisitive (Judge, Thoresen, Pucik & Welbourne, 1999). Furthermore, “because of their 
broad interests, divergent thinking, and receptiveness to a wide range of stimuli, CEOs 
with high openness to experience are likely to develop broad fields’ of vision by 
considering multiple strategic perspectives” (Nadkarni & Herrmann, 2010: p. 1056). 
 Strategy researchers have long called for a more comprehensive use of personality 
theory in strategic leadership research (Cannella & Monroe, 1997), yet the area remains 
underdeveloped (Nadkarni & Herrmann, 2010).  Rather, the trait-based approach to 
leadership, which dates back to the 1930’s and 1940’s, fell out of favour with Stogdill’s 
(1948) influential review that concluded that there was little theoretical justification to 
link personality characteristics to effective leadership (Peterson, Smith, Martorana & 
Owens, 2003).  
 However, in a recent meta-analysis, Judge and colleagues (2002) found evidence 
that the Big Five personality traits are, in fact, to varying degrees, both determinants of 
leadership emergence and of leadership effectiveness in general (Judge et al., 2002). As a 
result, trait-based theories of leadership have recently seen a resurgence of interest, with 
new studies on the organizational effects of executive dispositions such as narcissism 
(Chatterjee & Hambrick, 2007) and hubris (Hiller & Hambrick, 2005) as well as direct 
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tests of CEO Big Five personality traits on various organizational outcomes. For example, 
Peterson et al. (2003) found that CEO openness was significantly related to TMT risk-
taking and intellectual flexibility, while Nardkarni & Herrmann (2010) demonstrated that 
it was related to strategic flexibility. At the manager level, openness to experience has 
been shown to be a key factor in risk tolerance (along with low risk aversion and 
tolerance for ambiguity) which was then found to be positively related to coping with 
organizational change (Judge et al., 1999).  
 The Big Five personality trait of conscientiousness also has some similarities to 
the motivational value of conservatism in that conscientiousness reflects the degree to 
which someone is committed to established rules (Peterson et al., 2003). As CEO’s high 
on conscientiousness “rely almost exclusively on known strategies and selectively ignore 
new and unique strategies that challenge their existing assumptions, they are likely to 
develop narrow fields of vision and selective perception bias that predisposes them to 
ignore environmental stimuli that do not match existing assumptions” (Nadkarni & 
Herrmann, 2010: p. 1053). Of all of the Big Five personality traits, CEO 
conscientiousness was the only disposition found to inhibit strategic flexibility at the firm 
level (Nadkarni & Herrmann, 2010). 
 Both openness to change and openness to experience are thus pertinent to the 
discussion regarding the degree to which a CEOs field of vision will include CSR as 
either an opportunity or a threat (Aragón-Correa & Sharma, 2003), in turn affecting 
strategic decisions both regarding the overall depth of commitment to CSS as well as the 
rate of adoption of social and environmental initiatives over time. For example, Sharma et 
al. (1999) demonstrated that the variance in environmental responsiveness strategies can 
be attributed to how managers interpret environmental issues. If managers perceive the 
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environmental issue as an opportunity, they pay more attention to information about the 
potential gains from environmental initiatives and develop a more proactive 
environmental strategy. In contrast, other managers “clearly expected a loss to accrue 
from issues having to do with the natural environment” (Sharma et al., 1999: p.100) and 
were therefore less open to pursuing deeper engagement on environmental issues.   
 In summary, research has suggested that executive openness to experience is an 
antecedent to strategic change and that one might expect individuals high on openness to 
experience, “in a strategy-making context, to be more prone than closed individuals to 
undertake proactive strategies whose outcomes are unknown” (Mullins & Cummings, 
1999:  p. 470). In what follows, I extend the link between openness and strategic change 
in organizational and institutional environments to decisions pertaining to social, 
environmental and other stakeholder issues. 
3.3   Openness as an Executive Orientation 
 Combining elements of openness to change and openness to experience, in the 
upper echelon literature, CEO openness is characterized as an executive orientation that is 
“a composite of such facets of CEO personality as awareness of multiple perspectives, 
valuing discourse and debate, and openness to new ideas” and has been described as “a 
virtual prerequisite for adaptability to changing circumstances” (Finkelstein et al., 2009: 
p. 149). Recently, CEO openness to change has been conceptualized as a combination of 
CEO age, tenure and education level (Datta et al., 2003) or age, tenure and functional 
background (Musteen, Barker III & Baeten, 2006). However, CEO openness has been 
effectively gauged by several characteristics of which the most pertinent to a discussion 
of CSS include: functional background, functional breadth, international experience and 
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educational specialization which are discussed in this section. I begin, however, by 
introducing a less studied characteristic that may be an even more direct reflection of 
CEO openness – CEO liberal worldview. 
3.3.1   CEO Liberal Worldview 
  A particularly salient, yet overlooked, line of inquiry with regards to individual 
openness originates in both the political science and psychology literatures. Here, an 
extensive body of research illustrates the sharp differences in issue perception and 
interpretation of individuals who embrace a liberal vs. conservative political worldview 
(Haidt & Graham, 2007; Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski & Sulloway, 2003; Thorisdottir, Jost, 
Liviatan & Shrout, 2007). According to motivated social cognition theory, individuals 
embrace a conservative worldview in a desire to avoid change, disruption and ambiguity 
(Jost et al., 2003; Thorisdottir et al., 2007).  Furthermore, a conservative ideology serves 
to reduce fear, anxiety and uncertainty and helps rationalize inequality amongst 
individuals. In contrast, people with a liberal ideology have been found to score higher on 
measures of ‘openness to experience’ and ‘uncertainty tolerance’ demonstrating different 
psychological needs that subsequently affect the management of uncertainty and threat 
(Fay & Frese, 2000; Thorisdottir et al., 2007). As such, the openness to change vs. 
conservation values divide has been explicitly likened to the liberal vs. conservatism 
chasm in the political and psychology literatures (Feather, 1995) and may be an important 
predictor of CEO interpretations of CSR issues as opportunities or threats.  
 With regards to understanding the variations in interpretations as they pertain to 
CSS in organizations, Tetlock (2000) found evidence that conservatives are more likely 
than liberals to endorse the dominant shareholder model of corporate governance over the 
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broader stakeholder model. Further, conservatives were more likely than liberals to 
support policies that boost profits but hurt racial minorities and the poor (Tetlock, 2000). 
These worldviews extended to employee evaluations of senior leadership as well. For 
example, he found that conservative employees “judged top management more 
favourably when it favoured a monistic accountability regime centered around 
shareholders” while egalitarians (liberals) attributed “the most positive traits to top 
managers who endorsed the pluralistic regime of accountability to stakeholders” (p.314). 
Tetlock (2000) concluded that the stand one took on the shareholder/stakeholder debate 
“reflected abstract political sympathies (property rights of well-capitalized principals 
versus human rights of economic underdogs)” (p.314) and that political ideology emerged 
in his study as a consistent predictor of “the value spins that managers placed on 
decisions” (p.293). 
 In this way, one can understand individual judgement and cognitive bias as 
stemming from deep epistemological and ideological world views (Tetlock, 2000: p. 296) 
that can, in turn, predict managerial reactions to a broad assortment of issues. Yet, 
surprisingly, the political science and psychology literatures on the subject of political 
ideologies have not hitherto been integrated into the upper echelon perspective. In fact, 
despite a rich history of assessing the political contributions of organizations in the 
strategy field (under the umbrella of non-market strategies)(Hillman, Keim & Schuler, 
2004), very little has been done to understand the nature of individual political 
dispositions of top executives (Burris, 2001). 
 However, following the logic of motivated social cognition theory described 
above, it could be argued that CEOs, who identify with a more conservative philosophy, 
are less likely to be open to embracing the changing nature of the social, ethical and 
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environmental demands being imposed on businesses at the turn of this century (Paine, 
2003). Despite calls for increased corporate social responsiveness, research has suggested 
that “between 1980-2000, goal ambiguity for publicly traded U.S. corporations [in fact 
has] greatly diminished…an emphatic culture of “shareholder value” emerged. In the 
past, a broad set of corporate objectives – such as increased size, stable employment, and 
corporate “citizenship” – had been viewed as plausible goals for firms to pursue…, but in 
more recent years the maximization of shareholder value became paramount” (Hambrick, 
Finkelstein, Cho & Jackson, 2004: p. 319). In this context, deviating from the shareholder 
primacy norm requires an individual openness to change, openness to new experiences 
and a tolerance for ambiguity and uncertainty. 
 I contend that this openness to change and tolerance for ambiguity is more likely 
found in CEOs with a liberal vs. conservative worldview. “The core ideology of 
conservatism stresses resistance to change and justification of inequality and is motivated 
by needs that vary situationally and dispositionally to manage uncertainty and threat” 
(Jost, 2003: 339). Fay and Frese (2000), for example, found that conservatives had more 
difficulty adapting to the “new requirements that evolve with tomorrow’s jobs” (p.171), 
including issues pertinent to CSR such as a woman’s right to work. In a meta-analysis of 
88 samples, across 12 countries which included over 22,000 cases, Jost et al. (2003) 
confirmed that several psychological variables including intolerance of ambiguity, 
uncertainty avoidance, fear of threat and loss all predict politically conservative 
worldviews.  
 Furthermore, it has been suggested that these psychological variables, especially 
political ideology, are fixed in theories of personality, epistemic and existential needs and 
ideological rationalizations (Jost et al., 2003) and are thus mostly ingrained and stable 
53 
 
53 
over time (Burris, 2001). From an upper echelon perspective, Henderson et al. (2006) 
went so far as to argue that “although a CEO’s paradigm may show some elasticity when 
faced with the need for change, it will be the rare executive who can greatly transform his 
or her mindset, aptitudes, and skills” (p.447). Given that an individual’s worldview, in 
particular his/her political ideology reflects differing degrees of openness, and therefore 
affects the selective perception and interpretation of external stimuli, a CEOs liberal vs. 
conservative worldview is likely to affect the overall scope, breadth and depth of a firm’s 
corporate social strategy. As such, I hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 4: Firms run by CEOs with a liberal worldview will have a 
higher initial level of (a) aggregate corporate social strategy, (b) breadth 
of corporate social strategy and (c) depth of corporate social strategy 
than firms run by CEOs with a conservative worldview. 
Hypothesis 5: Firms run by CEOs with a liberal worldview will have a 
higher rate of adoption of (a) aggregate corporate social strategy, (b) 
breadth of corporate social strategy and (c) depth of corporate social 
strategy than firms run by CEOs with a conservative worldview. 
 
3.3.2   Functional Background 
 It has been suggested that CEO’s openness to change in particular can also be 
ascertained by understanding their functional background (Musteen et al., 2006), with 
most research pitting CEOs from output functions (e.g., marketing, sales) against CEOs 
with a dominant career background in throughput functions (e.g., accounting, finance) 
(Finkelstein et al., 2009). Specifically, because careers in marketing or sales emphasize 
growth and require an openness to new product and market opportunities, executives with 
a dominant background in output functions are more likely to be open to initiatives that 
require risk and change, such as R&D (Barker & Mueller, 2002) or international 
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acquisitions (Matta & Beamish, 2008). In contrast, executives who have a dominant 
career history in throughput functions “have a more conservative stance toward change 
because of the emphasis that the throughput functional areas place on maintaining 
control, improving efficiency and adherence to planned targets” (Hambrick & Mason, 
1984; Musteen et al., 2006: p. 606) 
 Although there have been contradicting studies on the role of functional 
experience in selective perception (e.g., Dearborn & Simon, 1958; Walsh, 1988), there is 
enough evidence to suggest that executives from specific functional backgrounds are 
likely to rely on cognitive heuristics or shortcuts especially in cases where the strategic 
stimuli is ambiguous and executives have less time to consider it (Finkelstein et al., 
2009). As such, CEOs with a dominant functional background in throughput functions 
may specifically resort to established rules, regulations and procedures and are thus less 
likely to be willing to look at initiatives that broaden or deepen a firm’s commitment to 
CSR.  In fact, in the few studies that have looked at the relationship between functional 
background and CSP, it has been shown that firms that have scored high on CSP 
measures are more likely to be lead by CEOs with backgrounds in output functions such 
as marketing, research and product development vs. throughput functions such as 
engineering, accounting and finance (Slater & Dixon-Fowler, 2009; Thomas & Simerly, 
1994). 
 A CEOs career history is also determined by the variety of functions to which 
he/she has been exposed, with the greater the breadth of functional experience, the greater 
the exposure to different modes of thinking, problem interpretation and solution 
generation (Rajagopalan & Datta, 1996). The willingness to work at various different 
functional positions can also be seen as a direct reflection of an individual’s openness to 
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experience as well. With regards to CSP in particular, research has demonstrated that the 
breadth of a CEO’s functional background in ‘stakeholder’ functions (marketing, sales, 
operations, R&D, public relations, medical/education/government service) is, in fact, 
related to CSP strengths (Manner, 2010), while in the general management literature, 
Geletkanycz and Black (2001), found that functional diversity is negatively associated 
with commitment to the status quo (or positively associated with strategic change). A 
CEO’s breadth of functional background thus supports arguments regarding the 
broadening effects of job rotations on the receptivity to new ideas, new ways of thinking 
and operating which may be pertinent to expanding notions of a corporation’s role in 
society. 
 Interestingly, Beyer et al. (1997) found that functional background, while not 
necessarily related to an executive’s selective perception, is related to selective 
imperception concluding that “functional experience does not increase managers’ 
attention to related information but instead tends to restrict the areas of information to 
which they pay attention…managers’ functional experience tends to narrow their 
cognitive processing” (p.730). Functional conditioning can therefore serve to either 
broaden or restrict the areas to which one pays attention and thus the subsequent 
strategies one chooses to pursue; executives with a more diverse functional background 
will have a broadened field of vision thus perceiving and acting on a broader set of 
stakeholder or social issues. Executives with a less diverse functional background, on the 
other hand, may be prone to selective imperception, not perceiving the saliency of certain 
stakeholder or social issues and thus disengaging from corporate social strategies. This 
again, suggests that a CEO’s functional background may explain why some firms do, or 
do not, pursue stakeholder or social issues in varying degrees over time such that: 
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Hypothesis 6: Firms run by CEOs with dominant functional experience 
in output functions will have a higher initial level of (a) aggregate 
corporate social strategy, (b) breadth of corporate social strategy and (c) 
depth of corporate social strategy than firms run by CEOs with dominant 
functional experience in throughput functions. 
Hypothesis 7: Firms run by CEOs with dominant functional experience 
in output functions will have a higher rate of adoption of (a) aggregate 
corporate social strategy, (b) breadth of corporate social strategy and (c) 
depth of corporate social strategy than firms run by CEOs with dominant 
functional experience in throughput functions. 
Hypothesis 8: Firms run by CEOs with a greater breadth of experience 
in multiple functional areas will have a higher initial level of (a) 
aggregate corporate social strategy, (b) breadth of corporate social 
strategy and (c) depth of corporate social strategy than firms run by 
CEOs with a narrower breadth of experience in multiple functional 
areas.  
Hypothesis 9: Firms run by CEOs with a greater breadth of experience 
in multiple functional areas will have a higher rate of adoption of (a) 
aggregate corporate social strategy, (b) breadth of corporate social 
strategy and (c) depth of corporate social strategy than firms run by 
CEOs with a narrower breadth of experience in multiple functional 
areas. 
 
3.3.3   International Experience 
 A CEO that has lived or worked abroad has demonstrated, to a degree, openness 
to experience and research has shown that a CEO’s level of international experience can 
have a direct or indirect affect on firm level strategies including level of diversification 
and financial performance (Carpenter & Fredrickson, 2001; Carpenter, Sanders & 
Gregersen, 2001; Daily, Certo & Dalton, 2000; Finkelstein et al., 2009). For example, 
Carpenter and Fredrickson (2001) demonstrated that the international experience of the 
TMT is positively related to a firm’s global strategic posture which includes the 
proportion of foreign sales, foreign production and geographic diversity. Similarly, Roth 
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(1995) found that CEOs with international experience had a strong positive impact on 
firm performance in cases with high international interdependence (vs. low 
interdependence) and Herrmann and Datta (2002) found that CEO international 
experience was positively related to the strategic choice of full-control foreign market 
entry (greenfield investments or acquisitions) over shared-control entry (joint ventures, 
contractual agreements).  
 The logic behind these arguments is that CEO or TMT international experience 
brings with it increased skills and abilities to manage in different cultures and contexts 
that diminish the “idea of foreign” with regards to individual values and cognitive 
orientations (Herrmann & Datta, 2002). This reduces levels of uncertainty and broadens a 
CEOs perception of external stimuli (Finkelstein et al., 2009). “Executives often report 
that their international assignment experience has lasting impacts on their worldviews and 
how they manage their firms” and that “their perceptions and personality take on a more 
international orientation resulting in a global mindset as a result of exposure to different 
value systems and institutional environments” (Slater & Dixon-Fowler, 2009: p. 476). 
Slater and Dixon-Fowler (2009) suggest that international experiences may also lead to 
increased interest in world political and social issues, greater open-mindedness and an 
increased sense of responsibility and empathy that can lead to greater corporate social 
performance. Testing the relationship between CEO international experience and an 
aggregate score for CSP, Slater and Dixon-Fowler (2009) found support for this positive 
relationship. 
 As such, I argue that CEOs with international experience are better equipped not 
only to manage the financial challenges of competing in global markets, but also to 
address ambiguous and complex global social challenges such as human rights, the 
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environment, peace, conflict and justice. This increased cognitive ability will thus allow 
CEOs with international experience to better navigate distal, ambiguous, indirect, and 
unpredictable social and environmental issues. Having been exposed to business in an 
international environment, CEOs with international experience will therefore also have a 
broader selective perception and issue interpretation filter than CEOs with a purely 
domestic resume, allowing them to enact both broader and deeper corporate social 
strategies over time. As such, I hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 10: Firms run by CEOs with international experience will 
have a higher initial level of (a) aggregate corporate social strategy, (b) 
breadth of corporate social strategy and (c) depth of corporate social 
strategy than firms run by CEOs without international experience. 
Hypothesis 11: Firms run by CEOs with international experience will 
have a higher rate of adoption of (a) aggregate corporate social strategy, 
(b) breadth of corporate social strategy and (c) depth of corporate social 
strategy than firms run by CEOs without international experience. 
 
3.3.4   Educational Background 
 Various studies have suggested that an executive’s educational background will 
shape the nature of the strategies they choose to pursue and may thus also be important to 
strategic decisions pertaining to CSR. Educational background might refer to both the 
amount of formal education obtained (high school through to graduate school) as well as 
the nature of the degree obtained (e.g. law, business, engineering etc.). Studies often 
suggest that the greater the level of education obtained the greater an individual’s level of 
cognitive ability (Hitt & Tyler, 1991). For example, various authors have found that key 
strategic decision makers with higher levels of education are more willing to engage in 
complex resource allocation decisions such as investments in innovation (Bantel & 
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Jackson, 1989; Kimberly & Evanisko, 1981) or diversification (Wiersema & Bantel, 
1992). Datta, Rajagopalan and Zhang (2003), for example, argue specifically that CEO 
educational background is a key component of openness to change and found in turn this 
is negatively related to strategic persistence (a similar construct to commitment to the 
status quo). Similarly, Schwartz (2005) also found a direct negative correlation between 
greater levels of education and traditional conservation values which are diametrically 
opposed to openness to change. 
 However, we might expect to find a different relationship between the nature of 
the degree obtained and openness to change. Although cognitive ability may increase, 
certain specializations (e.g., MBA, JD/LLB) may in fact reinforce conservation values 
over openness to change values. In reviewing the effect of an MBA education on strategic 
choices in particular, Finkelstein et al. (2009) conclude that the behavior of MBA 
educated executives does in fact differ from executives without MBAs in that they are 
more likely to follow “financial textbook guidelines” to avoid big losses or mistakes. This 
seems to imply that an MBA education may influence strategic decisions such that these 
are more conformist to trends in the industry (Finkelstein et al., 2009: p. 110). 
 With regards to CSR in particular, scholars have suggested that business school 
agendas have contributed, in part, to the ethical and moral collapse witnessed in the early 
years of this century by promulgating an “ideology based gloomy vision” of the self-
interested profit-maximizing homo economicus and his/her role in society (Ghoshal, 
2005). The popular press mirrors this perspective in that executives with MBAs are 
assumed to pursue greedy or selfish wealth accumulation over a broader stakeholder or 
social issue participation approach to management. For example, in a recent editorial 
about the causes of the current financial crisis, the Economist scathed:  
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 “Most of the people at the heart of the crisis—from Dick Fuld at Lehman 
Brothers to John Thain at Merrill Lynch to Andy Hornby at HBOS—had 
MBAs after their name (Mr Hornby graduated top of his class at HBS). In 
recent years about 40% of the graduates of America’s best business schools 
ended up on Wall Street, where they assiduously applied the techniques that 
they had spent a small fortune learning. You cannot both claim that your 
mission is “to educate leaders who make a difference in the world”, as HBS 
does, and then wash your hands of your alumni when the difference they 
make is malign” (Economist, September 24, 2009) 
. 
 In a similar vein, research has shown that both undergraduate business students 
(McCabe & Treviño, 1995) and graduate business students are more likely to cheat than 
students in other disciplines (McCabe, Butterfield & Treviño, 2006). Similarly, a series of 
experiments in the area have demonstrated that economics students are more likely than 
other students to free-ride, keep more resources to themselves, defect in a prisoner’s 
dilemma game, donate less to charity, be more corruptible and make choices that benefit 
themselves rather than their companies (Ferraro et al., 2005).  Economics training 
emphasizes the assumption of self-interest as a predictor of how people will behave and 
thus also acts as a strong norm that in turn influences students to behave in a self-
interested manner (Daboub, Rasheed, Priem & Gray, 1995; Krishnan, 2008).  
 Having reviewed the extensive literature in the area, Ferraro et al. (2005) conclude 
that “the argument and empirical implication are straightforward: one effect of economics 
training is to strengthen beliefs in the pervasiveness, appropriateness, and desirability of 
self-interested behaviour, which, in turn, should lead to exhibiting more self-interested 
behaviour” (p.14).  Although economics training and MBA training differ, they share 
many of the same underlying assumptions about the nature of human behavior (Ghoshal, 
2005) such that enhancing shareholder value becomes more important for MBA students 
over the course of their training than does serving customers or employees (Pfeffer, 
2005). Ghoshal (2005) goes so far as to argue that the management theories espoused by 
61 
 
61 
business schools have actively “freed business students from any sense of moral 
responsibility” regarding the consequences of their strategic decisions on broader 
stakeholder groups and society as a whole. 
 Other research has corroborated this claim, showing specifically that MBA 
students, regardless of functional background (production, sales, marketing, finance etc.), 
tend to pay less attention to human resource (HR) issues (Beyer et al., 1997). Similarly, 
MBA students were less ethically sensitive to issues affecting societal issues than agent or 
principal issues (Simga-Mugan, Daly, Onkal & Kavut, 2005). Perhaps most shockingly, 
Williams, Barrett and Brabston (2000) found that TMTs with more MBAs moderated the 
relationship between firm size and corporate illegal activity, such that TMT with more 
MBAs had more Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) violations than TMTs with fewer MBAs. 
Finkelstein et al. (2009) therefore suggest that executives with MBAs may have a 
cognitive bias against the “softer” side of business, which includes HR, employee and 
other stakeholder issues. This is speculated to be related to the nature of the MBA 
curriculum which emphasizes the financial (aka “rational”) business imperatives over the 
people dimensions of business relations. Bertrand and Schoar (2003) demonstrated, for 
example, that “CEOs with MBAs appear to be on average more aggressive, choosing to 
engage in a higher level of capital expenditures, hold more debt, and pay less dividends” 
(p. 1204) than CEOs without MBAs.  
 In the end, Finkelstein et al. (2009) suggest that: “left unanswered in all this is 
whether the shareholder maximization ethic of MBA-educated executives affects the 
firm’s attention to other stakeholders, such as customers, employees, and communities” 
(p. 110). Given the above research however, it would be logical to propose that MBA 
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curricula do in fact emphasize shareholder maximization above all other responsibilities 
promoting the economic norm of self-interest as the dominant paradigm. As such, in a 
process of selective perception or imperception similar to that of continuous narrowing of 
focus related to functional background, executives with MBAs will be less likely to pay 
attention to stakeholder or social issues and therefore less likely to invest in broad or deep 
corporate social strategies. Given this research, I would expect that: 
Hypothesis 12: Firms run by CEOs with MBAs will have a lower initial 
level of (a) aggregate corporate social strategy, (b) breadth of corporate 
social strategy and (c) depth of corporate social strategy than firms run 
by CEOs without MBAs. 
Hypothesis 13: Firms run by CEOs with MBAs will have a lower rate of 
adoption of (a) aggregate corporate social strategy, (b) breadth of 
corporate social strategy and (c) depth of corporate social strategy than 
firms run by CEOs without MBAs. 
A similar argument can then be made for other degree programs that may also 
induce a conservative approach to dealing with stakeholder or social issues. Like the 
effects of functional background, specialization in a field such as law, may also affect an 
executives’ selective perception, interpretation and choice in the strategic decision 
making process (Hitt & Tyler, 1991). CEOs from these highly specialized educational 
backgrounds have gone through an educational process that ensures they will “view 
problems in a similar fashion, see the same policies, procedures and structures as 
normatively sanctioned and legitimated, and approach decisions in much the same way” 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983: p. 153). Although they belong to professional associations 
that mandate ethical behaviour, they nonetheless are subject to strong normative forces to 
maintain the status quo. As a result, they may be less open to change regarding social and 
environmental programs than CEOs from a less specialist educational background.  
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Although little empirical work has been done to distinguish the impact of 
particular specialist degrees on firm level outcomes, some research has shown that 
executive degree type will effect strategic choice (Hitt & Tyler, 1991) and that 
educational specialization heterogeneity among the TMT members is necessary for 
changes in corporate strategy (Wiersema & Bantel, 1992). In addition, Barker and 
Mueller (2002) found that CEOs with legal degrees were less likely to spend on R&D 
arguing in a footnote that legal programs are more likely to attract individuals that are 
less open to innovation in general. With regards to CSR, no research of which I am aware 
has looked at the impact of a law degree on the levels or rate of adoption of CSS. 
However, Manner (2010) found that CEOs with bachelors degrees in the humanities 
rather than in economics/management were more positively related to corporate social 
strengths, arguing that this type of educational background provides the broader 
perspective required to face stakeholder decisions. As such, I expect that: 
Hypothesis 14: Firms run by CEOs with law degrees will have a lower 
initial level of (a) aggregate corporate social strategy, (b) breadth of 
corporate social strategy and (c) depth of corporate social strategy than 
firms run by CEOs without law degrees. 
Hypothesis 15: Firms run by CEOs with law degrees will have a lower 
rate of adoption of (a) aggregate corporate social strategy, (b) breadth of 
corporate social strategy and (c) depth of corporate social strategy than 
firms run by CEOs without law degrees. 
 
 Having examined the individual CEO characteristics reflective of an open 
executive orientation and their relationship to CSS, I now turn to a discussion of potential 
moderators. 
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3.4   The Moderating Role of Managerial Discretion and Industry Norms 
 Despite the predicted direct effects between CEO openness and CSS, there are 
nonetheless moderating factors that may dampen the strength of these relationships. Here, 
I examine two such possible moderators: managerial discretion and industry norms. 
3.4.1   Managerial Discretion 
 There is long debate in organizational studies regarding the actual magnitude of 
the effect of strategic leaders on firm level outcomes, with one side arguing for the critical 
role of the CEO in shaping strategic decisions and the other claiming that leaders are so 
constrained by environmental factors that their effect on performance is almost trivial 
(Finkelstein et al., 2009; Wasserman et al., 2001). In seeking to bridge the gap between 
the strategic choice perspective and more deterministic organizational theories such as 
institutional theory, Hambrick and Finkelstein (1987) introduced the concept of 
managerial discretion which they define as the “latitude of options top managers have in 
making strategic choices” (Finkelstein & Boyd, 1998: p. 179). This latitude of action is 
then said to vary by industry, explaining differences in the effect of strategic leadership 
on organizational outcomes given that CEOs operating in particular environments may 
have to make choices in contexts that have inherently more constraints than others. For 
example, some industries, such as banking, insurance, diversified finance, transportation, 
utilities and pharmaceuticals, are de facto more highly regulated than others (Burris, 
2001). A firm’s actions in these industries will, by definition, be more constrained than 
firms in less regulated settings. 
The degree of managerial discretion is derived from three sources: (1) individual 
level characteristics (e.g. tolerance for ambiguity, internal locus of control), (2) 
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organizational level factors (e.g., firm size, age, capital intensity) and (3) environmental 
determinants such as product differentiability, market growth and demand instability 
(which are predicted to be positively associated with discretion) as well as industry 
structure, quasi-legal constraints and powerful outside forces (which are posited to be 
negatively associated with managerial discretion) (Finkelstein et al., 2009). By 
understanding these multi-level sources of constraint researchers are better poised to help 
explain why CEOs might “matter” more in some contexts and less so in others 
(Finkelstein et al., 2009).  
Most research on managerial discretion, however, has focused on individual (e.g., 
Buchholtz, Amason & Rutherford, 1999) or firm level determinants of discretion (e.g., 
Finkelstein & Boyd, 1998; Geletkanycz, Boyd & Finkelstein, 2001; Shropshire & 
Hillman, 2007), thus largely neglecting the role of industry level constraints on 
managerial discretion (Dutta & Beamish, 2009; Wasserman et al., 2001). For example, 
Finkelstein and Boyd (1998) use multiple firm-level dimensions including sales growth, 
R&D intensity, advertising intensity, sales growth volatility and capital intensity to 
measure managerial discretion and its effects on CEO compensation finding a positive 
correlation. Similarly, Geletkanyz, Boyd and Finkelstein (2001) controlled for managerial 
discretion using only the firm level variable of capital intensity, also finding a positive 
relationship to CEO compensation. Within the CSR literature, research supports that 
firms are much more likely to experience large-scale shifts in stakeholder management 
strategies when afforded greater latitude in decision making by these same firm level 
factors (Shropshire & Hillman, 2007). 
 However, these studies do not adequately address how managerial discretion is 
shaped by the degree to which  a firm’s operating environment  allows for variety and 
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change at the firm level and the degree to which the organization itself is amenable to an 
array of possible actions (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987: p.379). Yet, research has 
demonstrated that industry level determinants such as opportunity scarcity and resource 
availability can constrain the level of CEO impact on firm performance as well as other 
firm-level outcomes (Hambrick & Abrahamson, 1995; Wasserman et al., 2001). For 
example, Dutta and Beamish (2009) recently found support that the environmental 
determinants of managerial discretion (industry level product differentiability, market 
growth, demand instability and industry structure) will effect a multinational manager’s 
choice of foreign market entry mode (joint venture or wholly owned subsidiary), while 
Wasserman, Nohria and Anand (2001) found that the degree of the “CEO effect” does in 
fact vary by industry, concluding that in some contexts, such as communications 
equipment manufacturing, CEOs have a lot more impact on firm performance than they 
do in other industries, such as electric power generation. This research suggests that 
industry level managerial discretion should not be treated just as a control variable, but 
rather as an important determinant of firm behaviour.  
This has also been demonstrated in the corporate social responsibility literature, 
where research has found that institutional constraints will limit managerial discretion 
over corporate social responses (Greening & Gray, 1994).  In some industries, the level of 
managerial discretion is high, and thus managers have greater latitude of action with 
regards to stakeholder and social issues. In other industries, this discretion will be low 
(Phillips, Berman, Elms & Johnson-Cramer, 2010). Despite the general tendencies within 
the industry, studies have shown that top management commitment to social and political 
issues allows the firm to adopt policies to address these issues even within the 
institutional constraints imposed by the environment (Greening & Grey, 1994). Similarly, 
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Aragon-Correa and Sharma (2003) suggested that reactive environmental investments 
may be driven by regulatory pressures but that proactive approaches to environmental 
strategy will “involve firm initiatives based on managerial discretion” (Aragón-Correa & 
Sharma, 2003: p.74). Characteristics of the environment such as uncertainty, complexity 
and munificence will influence the “latitude of options” a CEO will have in the 
development of the firm’s strategy vis-à-vis a particular stakeholder or social issue.  
The varying degrees of managerial discretion at the industry level have some 
natural parallels to the literature on individual behaviours under strong vs. weak situations 
(Mischel, 1977). “Strong situations are those in which most actors construe the situation 
in the same way, most draw similar conclusions as to appropriate responses, and most are 
motivated and able to respond” while “weak situations…are those in which there is 
ambiguity about the meaning of the situation and the appropriateness of various 
responses, where incentives for any particular response are unclear, and where 
individuals’ ability to respond may vary”  (Mullins & Cummings, 1999: p. 464). Mullins 
and Cummings (1999) outline multiple industry level antecedents to situational strength 
that include traditional measures of managerial discretion such as environmental 
uncertainty and industry structure, suggesting that situational strength moderates the 
relationship between executive’s openness to experience and proactive changes in the 
firm’s strategy. The Mullin and Cummings (1999) model is not dissimilar to the one 
proposed here where managerial discretion will moderate the relationship between 
different measures of executive orientation and corporate social strategy. 
In summary, even though the general level of managerial discretion may vary by 
industry, the individual CEO will still have some degree of choice of strategic response to 
stakeholder and social issues. If the level of managerial discretion in an industry is high, 
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the impact of the CEO on corporate social strategies will be greater than if the level of 
managerial discretion in the industry is low and there are thus greater institutional 
constraints limiting executive action. Hambrick, Finkelstein, Cho and Jackson describe 
this mechanism as follows: 
“In the face of increased discretion, executives make decisions on the 
basis of their own personalized interpretations of the situations they face, 
rather than by simply conforming to industry norms and conventions. 
Managerial dispositions will play a larger role in determining the actions 
and profiles that emerge from organizations. When this occurs, executive 
characteristics (either psychological or demographic) become 
significantly stronger predictors of organizational outcomes” (Hambrick 
et al., 2004: p.339) 
Given the above, I hypothesize that managerial discretion at the industry level will 
moderate the strength of the relationship between CEO openness and CSS such that: 
Hypothesis 16: The relationship between the executive orientation and 
the initial status of (a) aggregate corporate social strategy, (b) breadth of 
corporate social strategy and (c) depth of corporate social strategy will 
be stronger in industries characterized by higher levels of managerial 
discretion. 
Hypothesis 17: The relationship between the executive orientation and 
the rate of adoption of (a) aggregate corporate social strategy, (b) 
breadth of corporate social strategy and (c) depth of corporate social 
strategy over time will be stronger in industries characterized by higher 
levels of managerial discretion. 
 
3.4.2  Industry Norms 
 Similar to the degree of managerial discretion, or latitude of action, at the industry 
level, I argue that institutional pressures will also moderate the relationship between 
executive orientation and corporate social strategy. Research suggests that CEOs may 
become attached to the status quo as dictated by industry central tendencies around 
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industry strategic norms (Carpenter, 2000; Haynes & Hillman, 2010) such that coercive, 
mimetic or normative isomorphic pressures may also influence strategic decisions 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). 
 Recently, Campbell (2007) put forth an institutional theory of CSR which spelled 
out many of the conditions under which some firms are likely to behave in more socially 
responsible ways than others including economic conditions such as the overall health of 
the economy and institutional conditions such as state regulations, industry-self regulation 
practices, pressure from Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) or other social 
movement organizations and norms within professionalized settings. The central premise 
here is that “firms are embedded in a broad set of political and economic institutions that 
affect their behavior” (p.948) including the institutionalization of the shareholder primacy 
norm. Campbell (2007) goes so far as to suggest that “the imperative of maximizing 
profit and shareholder value is the root cause that may prevent corporations from acting in 
socially responsible ways” (p. 952). Normative pressures in this regard imply that 
“managers seek to act in ways that are deemed appropriate by other managers and 
significant actors in their environment” (p. 958). If the norms in the industry are thus to 
favor shareholder profit maximization over a stakeholder approach to management, it will 
be more difficult for executives to choose to participate in broader or deeper CSS. 
 The norms of a particular industry around stakeholder management and social 
issue participation may thus serve to constrain strategic choice. For example, if not a 
single firm in an industry has adopted a proactive environmental policy, being the first 
firm to do so carries with it significant risk, both in terms of legitimacy, but also with 
regards to a potential loss of competitive advantage. Because corporate social strategies 
involve financial commitment, choosing to pursue a stakeholder or social initiative has 
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implied trade-offs and opportunity costs. Deviating from industry norms is therefore 
fraught with difficulty. 
 At the industry level, institutional theory would thus seem to suggest that the 
corporate social strategies of firms within that industry would be relatively similar to one 
another given coercive, mimetic and normative isomorphic pressures. For example, 
Shropshire and Hillman (2007) found that when an industry as a whole experienced a 
shift in stakeholder management practices, firms within that same industry where 1.5 
times more likely to also enact a significant change in their own stakeholder management 
practices, demonstrating mimetic isomorphism. Other research supports that firm level 
social performance is at least, in part, influenced by the industry in which they operate 
(Brammer, Pavelin & Down, 2006; Garcia-Castro, Ariño & Canela, 2010).   
 As such, we might observe that particular industries share similar CSS profiles 
(disengaged, derivative, dedicated, diffuse or devoted). This aggregate similarity of CSS 
will then serve to constrain the behavior of individual firms and the strategic choices of 
individual CEOs.  I argue here that a CEOs executive orientation will still affect the 
strategic choice of CSS. However, the industry level of CSS will serve to attenuate the 
relationship between executive orientation and CSS such that: 
Hypothesis 18: The relationship between executive orientation and initial 
status of (a) aggregate corporate social strategy, (b) breadth of 
corporate social strategy and (c) depth of corporate social strategy will 
be stronger in industries with higher mean levels of CSS. 
Hypothesis 19: The relationship between the executive orientation and 
the rate of adoption of (a) aggregate corporate social strategy, (b) 
breadth of corporate social strategy and (c) depth of corporate social 
strategy over time will be stronger in industries with higher mean levels 
of CSS. 
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Having argued for the direct effects of CEO executive orientation on CSS, as well 
as the moderating effects of managerial discretion and industry norms, I now present the 
multi-level model before moving on to measurement and testing of the hypotheses. 
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CHAPTER 4: A LONGITUDINAL, MULTI-LEVEL MODEL OF EXECUTIVE 
ORIENTATION AND CORPORATE SOCIAL STRATEGY 
 
 In the previous sections, I reviewed the literature on CSR, upper echelons and 
institutional theory building hypotheses regarding the relationship between an open 
executive orientation and a firm’s corporate social strategy. What emerges then is a 
longitudinal, mixed determinant, multi-level model of the relationship between executive 
orientation and corporate social strategy over time. 
 Both Wood (1991) and Clarkson (1995) argued that the work conducted under the 
broad umbrella of CSR has not been careful in ensuring the use of proper levels of 
analysis. This multi-level model starts with the individual level drivers of CSR by 
articulating the demographic factors inherent in the established construct of executive 
orientation, specifically as it relates to CEO openness to change and experience. This 
open executive orientation is then linked to CEO selective perception, interpretation, 
construed reality and ultimately strategic choice of CSS (Finkelstein et al., 2009; 
Hambrick & Mason, 1984). At the firm level, through the mechanism of selective 
perception (or imperceptions), executive orientation will affect a company’s choice of 
breadth and depth of CSS ultimately resulting in disengaged, derivative, diffuse, 
dedicated or devoted CSS profiles. At the industry level, institutional norms will attenuate 
the relationship between the executive orientation and CSS. Given the multiple levels of 
analysis, a mixed determinant, cross level model is appropriate (Kozlowski & Klein, 
2000). Figure 4.1 visually depicts the mixed-determinant model, specifying these 
multiple-level predictors of a single-level outcome.  
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Figure 4.1:   A Longitudinal, Multi-Level Model of Executive Orientation and CSS 
 
 
The organizing principle behind the model, therefore, is that executive orientation, 
through the process of selective perception, affects the strategic choices pursued by the 
firm and therefore the total aggregate, as well as the breadth and depth of corporate social 
strategy in which the firm engages.  Importantly, this model explicitly includes change, in 
that executive orientation is also predicted to affect a firm’s rate of adoption of CSS. To 
date, no other model in the CSR domain, of which I am aware, does this.  
It is critical in longitudinal, multi-level models to be very clear about the units of 
analysis (Ployhart & Vandenberg, 2010). Here, despite a focus on the CEO, the unit of 
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Figure 4.1:  A Longitudinal, Multi-Level Model of Executive Orientation and CSS 
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analysis is nonetheless the firm given that the outcome variables occur at the firm level. 
As such, I am interested in both the intra-unit change over time in CSS (within firms) as 
well as the inter-unit differences in change over time between firms and the inter-unit 
difference in change over time between industries.  As depicted in the model, I suggest 
that an open executive orientation, as captured by a liberal worldview, output functional 
background, greater breadth of functional experience, educational specialization and 
international experience, can help predict both initial firm levels of CSS as well as the 
change in CSS over time. Further, the model differs from extant research in this domain 
as it is meant to highlight that CEOs of firms make choices regarding the corporate social 
strategy they pursue; not only is the total CSS important, but the breadth and depth of 
CSS pursued over time may also vary significantly.  
Although multi-level theories and models are complex, there has been an increased 
call for their use in the study of organizations (Hitt, Beamish, Jackson & Mathieu, 2007). 
Theoretically, several authors have already attempted multi-level theories of CSR and like 
constructs (Starik & Rands, 1995). For example, Aguilera, Rupp, Williams and Ganapathi 
(2007) put forth a multi-level model of CSR which focuses on different motives for CSR 
at the individual, organizational, national and transnational (intergovernmental and NGO) 
levels. The role of the CEO and TMT in this model is also to direct strategic decisions 
with regards to CSR as upper echelons have “the most direct power to influence the 
firm’s engagement in CSR by developing corporate strategy and allocating resources to 
different firm programs and practices” (Aguilera et al., 2007: p. 845). However, Aguilera 
et al. (2007) do not incorporate the process of selective perception in this strategic choice. 
Rather, they argue that “first and foremost, managers will implement CSR initiatives 
when these align with their instrumental interests of enhancing shareholder value and 
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increasing firm competitiveness and profitability so that managers can ensure firm 
survival and raise their compensation packages, which are generally tied to profitability” 
(p.847).  This suggests that CEOs will only act if they see an instrumental value to 
themselves of the proposed CSS. In contrast, rather than speculate on motives, I argue that 
an open executive orientation will affect the selective perception and interpretation of 
stakeholder and social issues which will in turn affect strategic choice. 
Aguilera et al.’s (2007) model does, however, account for some field level 
motivators such as governments and NGOs in determining a firm’s propensity to engage 
in CSR (although it neglects the important role of industry norms). Bamberger (2008) 
specifically points out the need for increased multi-level theorizing that includes context 
theorizing, so that one can understand how firms are influenced by the phenomena in 
which they are nested. Context theorizing requires researchers to build situational 
conditions directly into theory, as I have done here. A multi-level model of strategic 
leadership and corporate social strategies thus answers numerous calls for increased use 
of multilevel theorizing in strategic management (Bamberger, 2008, Hitt et al. 2007, 
Kozlowski & Klein, 2000).  
In the next section I turn to the methodology used for testing the model and the 
hypotheses. 
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CHAPTER 5: METHODOLOGY 
 
 This chapter outlines the choice of research method (Section 5.1), the research 
design and analytic method (Section 5.2), sample creation (Section 5.3) and the 
measurement of dependent, independent and control variables (Sections 5.4 – 5.6). 
Decisions with regards to data lag-structures are also discussed (Section 5.7) before 
moving on to the analysis of the data and findings in Chapter 6. 
5.1   Choice of Research Method 
Chief executives are “notoriously unwilling to submit themselves to scholarly 
poking and probing” (Hambrick, 2007: 337) limiting the number of appropriate research 
methods available for inquiry. For example, several studies that cross the upper 
echelon/CSR streams have used survey methodology (e.g., Agle et al., 1999; Dennis, 
Buchholtz & Butts, 2009; Sharfman et al., 2000) or experimental designs (e.g., Rose, 
2007). However, response rates for both of these methods are usually low (Cycyota & 
Harrison, 2006)3
                                                 
3 For example, Agle et al.’s (1999) survey of CEO values and stakeholder salience had an n=80 (13.6% 
response rate); Sharfman et al.’s (2000) survey of CEO economic, legal, ethical and philanthropic values in 
the chemical industry had an n=129 (22% response rate); Dennis et al.’s (2009) survey of CEO’s attitudes 
towards philanthropy had an n=84 (17% response rate). Similarly, Rose’s (2007) experiment using board of 
directors was limited to an n=34. 
 which limits not only reliability, but also specificity as one cannot 
adequately test for industry effects. There are further difficulties with survey research, 
specifically as it relates to the study of social responsibility which is likely to illicit 
positive response bias, and to experimental designs using student samples which may or 
may not be representative of actual executive behaviours (e.g., Beyer et al., 1997). 
Nadkarni and Barr (2008) summarize the issue by stating that: “measuring top managers’ 
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cognition is a difficult task; cognitive structures cannot be measured directly and the very 
act of asking individuals to reveal their beliefs can change them” (p.1404). In light of 
these limitations, survey and experimental methodologies were ruled out for this study. 
Given the difficulty in obtaining access to top executives as well as the difficulty 
in directly observing executive orientation, archival analysis is often the preferred method 
for upper echelon research (Hambrick, 2007). Although there has not been much research 
into the link between strategic leadership and CSR, those studies that are most closely 
related to this one have used archival analysis (e.g., Manner, 2010; Slater & Dixon-
Fowler, 2009; Thomas & Simerly, 1994). Furthermore, archival analysis has been 
extensively used in strategy research (Finkelstein et al., 2009) and, most importantly, to 
measure many of the independent variables used in this study including functional 
background, educational background, international experience and tenure (Finkelstein et 
al., 2009). These constructs are therefore well established in the literature, rendering 
archival analysis an efficient and effective method to test the hypothesis. Lastly, archival 
analysis is the only method that explicitly allows for an objective study on the adoption of 
corporate social strategies over time.  
5.2   Research Design and Analytic Method 
The research design is therefore a quantitative study based on longitudinal 
archival data collected from various sources (detailed in the following sections). Given 
that the model is cross level, including a time varying dependent variable that is affected 
by covariates at different levels, the research design calls for statistical testing using a 
multilevel growth model (Bliese & Ployhart, 2002). Because of the repeated yearly 
observations of the dependent variable (total, breadth, depth of CSS) which are nested 
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within firms within industries, traditional regression analyses are inappropriate as they 
violate certain conditions required for testing (Hoffman, Griffin & Gavin, 2000). 
Specifically, OLS regression requires that observations are i.i.d. (independent and 
identically-distributed random variables). In this study, the data violate the assumption of 
independence of observations in two ways: First, because a longitudinal data set was 
built, consisting of up to 19 years of data for each firm, one cannot assume that the firm-
year observations are independent of each other. By definition, a firm’s prior year social 
performance will be related to next year’s social performance. Similarly, over the 19 year 
period, each firm has several CEOs which are also not independent of the firm. 
Second, the hypotheses regarding industry norms clearly indicate that a firm’s 
choice of corporate social strategy will be influenced by the overall approach to CSS in 
the industry and thus observations within industries are also related. This can be assessed 
by evaluating the Intra-class Correlation (ICC) which measures group-level variance. 
Clarke and Wheaton (2007) explain that “when there is little group dependency (ICC < 
.2), single-level (ordinary least squares [OLS]) regression can yield unbiased estimates of 
the fixed effects, but as the ICC increases, standard errors from OLS estimated 
coefficients are biased downwards…making multilevel modeling the preferred method.” 
(p. 314). In this study, the variance related to CSS at the firm level needs to be treated 
separately from the variance in CSS at the industry level and hence both OLS and GEE 
approaches can be problematic.  
As such, a random coefficient modeling (RCM) strategy was used to test the 
hypotheses. RCM is also commonly referred to as linear mixed modeling (LMM) or 
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hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) (Hofmann, 1997; Hofmann, Griffin & Gavin, 2000)4
The use of multi-level RCM in strategy research in general is a relatively new 
(e.g., Holcomb, Combs, Sirmon & Sexton, 2010; Misangyi et al., 2006; Short et al., 
2006). However, RCM is being used with increasing frequency in organizational 
behaviour to study, amongst other relationships, the impact of leadership on individual 
performance (Day, Sin & Chen, 2004), the role of the big five personality traits on 
individual sales growth (Thoresen et al., 2004), the effect of various predictors of initial 
newcomer performance on group performance improvement (Chen, 2005), and to model 
the determinants of variations in unit-level absenteeism over time (Hausknecht, Hiller & 
Vance, 2008). 
 
and, when used with longitudinal data, also referred to more generally as growth curve 
modeling (Ployhart & Vandenberg, 2010; West, Welch & Galecki, 2007). As a 
methodology, RCM allows for the explicit modeling of the overall change in the 
dependent variable(s) over time as well as the modeling of predictor variables and cross-
level interactions as required by this study’s hypotheses (Short et al., 2006). Put 
differently, RCM allows for both descriptive and explanatory longitudinal research in that 
it can be used to illustrate how a phenomenon has changed over time as well as to model 
the determinants of this change process through tests of theoretical predictor variables 
(Ployhart & Vandenberg, 2010). Furthermore, because the relationships are modeled 
independently at each level, the structure of the data does not rely on the i.i.d. assumption. 
In the field of CSR, the use of multi-level RCM is still rare, but not without 
precedent. For example, Martin et al. (2007) tested managers’ propensity to bribe using 
                                                 
4 Many authors use HLM to describe the overall methodology when, in fact, HLM is better described as a 
statistical package used for RCM. 
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HLM methods, arguing for the need to partition the variance between firm and country 
level predictors of behaviour. Similarly, Kassinis and Vafeas (2006) used HLM to assess 
the toxic emissions of manufacturing plants suggesting that one could not assume that 
plants within counties and counties within states are independent. Both of these studies, 
however, remain cross-sectional.  No research to date, of which I am aware, has used an 
RCM methodology to assess the role of individual, firm and industry effects on the initial 
levels and growth trajectories of corporate social strategy over time, although there have 
been calls to apply RCM methods to the study of CSR (Short et al., 2006).  
Because the steps involved in an RCM analytic method are quite detailed, the 
specific models tested are introduced alongside the findings in Chapter 6.  This is done 
after the data, sample and variables are explained in the next sections. 
 
5.3   Sample Creation  
Data from the Kinder, Lyndenberg, and Domini (KLD) index was used to construct 
the initial sample of firms for this thesis. The KLD database is acknowledged as the most 
commonly used (Deckop et al., 2006; Waldman et al., 2006b), most complete (Hillman & 
Keim, 2001) and the best source for information about firm level social performance 
(Sharfman, 1996; Waddock, 2003). KLD analysts evaluate corporations on more than 280 
data points to arrive at a ratings system designed to provide a snapshot of the company’s 
environmental, social and governance related performance every year providing ratings 
for every firm along seven different categories including: community, corporate 
governance, diversity, employee relations, environment, human rights and product.  
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Within these categories, KLD tracks a variety of CSR items that it considers either 
areas of strength or concern and assigns these items a binary measure of either “1” or “0” 
to demarcate either the presence or absence of the area of strength or concern. For 
example, for the Community Relations category, KLD assigns a “1” or “0” to firm level 
actions that demonstrate strengths in this area including charitable giving, innovative 
giving, non-US charitable giving, support for housing, support for education, indigenous 
peoples’ relations, volunteer programs and other. Areas of concern under the community 
relations category include investment controversies, negative economic impact, problems 
with indigenous peoples' relations, tax disputes and other. Technically, a firm can 
therefore earn up to seven “strengths” in community relations as well as five “concerns”.5
 The KLD data used in this dissertation cover the period from 1991-2009, 
however, the number of firms rated each year has varied. Prior to 2001, KLD focused on 
firms listed in the S&P 500 or the Domini 400 Social Index. However, since 2001, KLD 
has added CSR ratings for all firms belonging to the Russell 1000 Index and since 2003, 
all companies on the Russell 2000 Index such that the most recent KLD data include 
social performance information for the 3,000 largest US firms by market capitalization.  
 Given the longitudinal nature of the research question in this study, the sample 
construction proceeded in various steps. First, to construct the initial population, the 
corporate social performance information for all firms measured by KLD was 
consolidated for the entire 19 year period from 1991-2009.  To ensure enough within-firm 
   
                                                 
5 KLD also provides scores on six ‘exclusionary’ screens which are comprised of concerns related to 
industry-based involvement in “controversial business issues” such as alcohol, gambling, firearms, military, 
nuclear power and tobacco. Although some researchers have used these screens as evidence of social issue 
participation (Hillman & Keim, 2001), they are not categories that are representative of the CSR choices 
facing firms in most industries and are thus often excluded from aggregated measures of CSP (e.g., Agle et 
al, 1999). 
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time variability (to model the growth trajectories), this data was then sorted such that only 
firms assigned social ratings for fifteen or more years were kept in the sample. This 
preliminary screening for longitudinal data yielded a sample of 365 firms and 6,647 firm 
year observations. In the second step, the financial information for these 365 firms was 
obtained from COMPUSTAT and merged with the corporate social responsibility data 
from KLD. This dataset was then manually inspected to ensure data compatibility in 
terms of company name, ticker and other key identifiers that may have changed over the 
study period. Of the initial 30 unmatched firms, data on 15 companies were ultimately 
found in COMPUSTAT, thus only reducing the sample by 15 firms or from 365 to 350 
companies. As a last step, the CSR and financial data was merged with CEO 
identification information obtained through COMPUSTAT’s Execucomp database. If the 
CEO information was not available through Execucomp, missing data was obtained 
through other sources as detailed in the measures section below.  At this stage, only one 
additional firm needed to be eliminated given incompatible data leaving a final data set of 
349 firms. 
The final sample is thus an unbalanced panel, where the number of firms 
measured in each year varies from a low of 303 in 2009 to a high of 347 in 1995, 
resulting in 6,334 firm year observations.  Although the design was intended to capture 
only firms with 15 or more years of data, in the end, observations per firm range from 12 
years to 19 years with the average number of years of data per company at a robust 18 
years. Within each firm, on average, the number of CEOs over the 19 years is 2.9 so that 
the final data set includes information for 1,008 CEOs. The clustered longitudinal design 
for the first industry is visually depicted in Figure 5.1. 
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The 349 firms were then assigned an industry classification based on the 4 digit 
SIC code as defined by COMPUSTAT. As done in previous research in the CSR area 
(Surroca, Tribó & Waddock, 2010; Waddock & Graves, 1997), the industry 
classifications were then reduced to 12 primary sectors using their 2 digit SIC. Although 
alternate methodologies exist for industry classification (e.g. 5 sectors, 1-digit NAICS 
code), the final industry classification used herein was selected in order to best replicate 
the most cited study in this area (Waddock & Graves, 1997). Furthermore, this 
methodology continues to be used in recent studies (Surroca et al., 2010). The final 
breakdown of the number of firms in each industry classification is detailed in Table 5.1 
below. 
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Figure 5.1:  Structure of the Clustered Longitudinal Dataset 
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Industry 
Table 5.1:  Industry Classification 
SIC # of Firms # of Firm Years 
# % # % 
Mining/Construction 100-1999 16 4.6% 288 4.5% 
Food/Textiles/Apparel 2000-2399 24 6.9% 444 7.0% 
Forrest/Paper/Publishing 2400-2799 32 9.2% 580 9.2% 
Chemicals/Pharma 2800-2899 38 10.9% 696 11.0% 
Refining/Rubber/Plastic 2900-3199 7 2.0% 126 2.0% 
Steel/Heavy Manufacturing 3200-3599 41 11.7% 759 12.0% 
Computers/Auto/Aero 3600-3999 62 17.8% 1128 17.8% 
Transportation 4000-4799 11 3.2% 202 3.2% 
Telephone/Utilities 4800-4999 26 7.4% 474 7.5% 
Wholesale/Retail 5000-5999 38 10.9% 675 10.7% 
Financial 6000-6799 33 9.5% 580 9.2% 
Hotel/Entertainment/Services 6800-9799 21 6.0% 382 6.0% 
Totals   349 100.0% 6334 100.0% 
 
Various archival sources were used to gather data related to the firm and CEO 
independent variables. These, as well as the measures for the dependent variables, are 
detailed in the following section. 
 
5.4   Dependent Variables 
Corporate social strategy was measured in three ways: Aggregate CSS (ACSS), 
Breadth of CSS (BCSS) and Depth of CSS (DCSS) using KLD strength measures. As 
introduced in Section 5.2, the KLD database has been used extensively as a measure of 
CSR, however, no consensus has emerged to date with regards to the appropriate 
operationalization of the construct (Margolis & Walsh, 2003). To illustrate, Appendix A 
provides a snapshot of over thirty different studies that have taken advantage of the KLD 
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database; although early studies converged on a simple sum of strengths and weaknesses, 
the heterogeneity of subsequent operationalizations is evident.  
Recent studies, however, have demonstrated that CSR and CSiR (Corporate Social 
Irresponsibility) are in fact two separate and distinct constructs (Strike et al., 2006) and 
that summing KLD strengths and weaknesses therefore masks important information 
about a firm’s CSR posture (for example, a firm can score a +2 in diversity, and a -2 on 
the environment and thus end up with a CSR score of zero). As such, there have been 
recent calls for all new CSR analysis to treat the two constructs separately (Mattingly et 
al., 2006). This approach has face validity given that the strengths measures capture 
specific firm-level decisions to engage in different types of CSS which are therefore a 
more direct measure of strategic choice than a combined strengths/weaknesses score, 
where weaknesses are often measured as fines or penalties. The use of KLD strengths 
separately has therefore become the preferable methodological treatment of KLD data 
(Godfrey et al., 2009; Kacperczyk, 2009) and is the approach taken in this study. 
 Aggregate CSS (ACSS). In order to assess the overall trends in CSS over time, I 
begin with an aggregate score of CSS which includes the KLD strengths in six 
dimensions: diversity practices, employee relations, community relations, the 
environment, human rights and the product quality categories (a proxy for consumer-
focused initiatives). As is common in prior research, the corporate governance dimension 
is not included as the items measured are not deemed to reflect strategic choices regarding 
CSS initiatives.  A list of the individual items measured in each dimension can be found 
in Appendix B. 
An important consideration in longitudinal studies is to ensure that the underlying 
construct being measured is operationalized in a consistent manner over time (Ployhart & 
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Vandenberg, 2010). Within the KLD database, the total number of CSS initiatives in each 
category has varied over the years as social and stakeholder issues have become more or 
less salient to the underlying notion of corporate social responsibility. For example, the 
total number of CSS initiatives measured by KLD in 1991 in the six areas was 27 and 
included items such as no lay-off policies in the employee category (dropped in 1994) and 
positive operations in South Africa in the Human Rights category (dropped in 1995). On 
the other hand, as other issues grew in importance (e.g., progressive gay/lesbian policies 
which were added to the diversity score in 1995) these were incorporated into the KLD 
measures such that the total number of initiatives in the six areas recorded had grown to 
34 by 2009. As such, a simple count of the total number of CSS initiatives over time 
might artificially capture changes in measurement rather than actual changes in growth in 
CSS participation.  As such, a firm’s ACSS is measured as a percentage of CSS initiatives 
the firm participated in out of the total possible CSS score for that year. In this manner, 
ACSS is able to capture the relative strength of engagement in CSS as well as model the 
growth of a firm’s engagement in ACSS over time. 
 Note that while some studies apply a weighting scheme to the different 
dimensions of CSR (e.g., Waddock & Graves, 1997), a more common approach is to give 
each dimension equal importance (e.g., Bouquet & Deutsch, 2008; Garcia-Castro, Arino 
& Canela, 2008; Hillman & Keim, 2001). Given the focus on assessing the overall growth 
of CSS over time, there is no a-priori rationale to suggest prioritizing particular sub-
categories over others. Furthermore, research has demonstrated that there are no statistical 
differences in results obtained with weighted or un-weighted measures (Hull & 
Rothenberg, 2008). 
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Breadth of CSS (BCSS).  As with ACSS, simple count data could mask underlying 
changes in measurement rather than actual changes in the breadth of a firm’s CSS. As 
such, I created a measure of CSS dispersion based on Palepu’s (1985) entropy measure of 
diversification. The entropy measure for BCSS was constructed as follows.  Consider a 
firm has decided to participate in N CSS areas. Let Pi be the share of the ith area in the 
total number of areas in which the firm participates. Then: 
    N 
Breadth of CSS = ∑ [Pi  ln(1/Pi)] 
    i=1 
 
where Pi is the share of total strengths in area i and ln(1/Pi) is the weight of each 
area i (the logarithm of the inverse of its share). This measure, therefore, takes into 
consideration two elements of CSS: (i) the number of stakeholder and/or social issue 
areas in which a firm participates, and (ii) the relative importance of each area in terms of 
total number of strengths. The entropy measure can therefore range from 0 to 2 where the 
closer the score to 0, the narrower the breadth of CSS (with 0 indicating perfect 
concentration in one area, or no dispersion). While novel to the area of CSR, the entropy 
measure has been extensively used and validated in the corporate diversification literature 
in a manner conceptually similar to the one used herein (Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson & 
Moesel, 1993; Palepu, 1985). 
Depth of CSS (DCSS). To assess a firm’s depth of CSS, the concept of a 
‘specialization ratio’ was also borrowed from the diversification literature, where the ratio 
is the score for the industry sector with the greatest amount of sales divided by a firm’s 
total sales (Hoskisson et al., 1993). Here, the specialization ratio for DCSS is calculated 
as the area with the greatest amount of strengths divided by the total possible number of 
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strengths in that area.  Shallow CSS and Deep CSS are then defined on a continuum 
ranging from 0 to 1 where the closer the score to ‘1’ the greater the depth of CSS.6
The following table illustrates how this decomposition will be used to map the 
overall aggregate level of CSS (ACSS), the breadth of CSS (BCSS) and the depth of CSS 
(DCSS). 
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ACSS (Total 
Strengths/Total 
Possible 
Strengths) 
BCSS 
(Entropy 
Measure) 
DCSS 
(Special-
ization  
Ratio) 
1 6 0 0 0 0 0 6.00 36 16.7% 0.00 1.00 
2 1 5 0 0 0 0 6.00 36 16.7% 0.45 0.83 
3 0 3 3 0 0 0 6.00 36 16.7% 0.69 0.50 
4 0 0 2 2 2 0 6.00 36 16.7% 1.10 0.33 
5 1 1 1 2 1 0 6.00 36 16.7% 1.56 0.33 
6 1 1 1 1 1 1 6.00 36 16.7% 1.79 0.17 
 
As can be seen, each of the hypothetical firms in this “study” has earned a total of 
six ‘strengths’. Under traditional methods of assessing CSP that rely solely on a count of 
the total number of strengths (e.g. Strike et al., 2006), the CSP of each of these firms 
would be equal. This is conceptually similar to the method used to measure ACSS, 
however, ACSS has been adjusted by the total number of possible strengths which varies 
by year. By adding BCSS and DCSS, this study highlights the nuances in breadth and 
                                                 
6 Note: I did not use the formula: strengths in the CSS area with the greatest amount of strengths divided by 
a firm’s total strengths as this was not deemed to accurately capture the depth construct. If a firm only has 
one strength in one area, this formula would grant the firm a specialization score of 100%. Dividing the 
greatest amount of strengths by the total number of possible strengths in an area was therefore considered a 
more representative measure of depth of CSS.   
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depth within the different corporate social strategies. Firm 1, for example, has focused all 
of its attention in one category - employee relations issues, while Firm 6 has taken a 
broader approach and invested in all six areas. Similarly, one can see that Firm 1 has also 
engaged in a deeper CSS having earned six strengths in employee relations while Firm 6 
has only earned one, thus engaging in a shallow CSS with regards to this particular area. 
With regards to the typology presented in Chapter 2, therefore, Firm 1 is likely to fall into 
the quadrant of dedicated CSS, while Firm 6 would fall under the quadrant of diffuse 
CSS.  Although not formally hypothesized, the overall nature of the CSS of each firm can 
therefore be assigned to a particular quadrant every year, a topic that will be revisited in 
the discussion section.   
 
5.5   Independent Predictor and Moderator Variables 
Data for all of the demographic variables were sourced first from COMPUSTAT’s 
Execucomp database (name, age, tenure), with functional, educational and international 
experience coded primarily from biographies published in the Who’s Who in America 
database available through Lexis/Nexis Academic Online people search. This search also 
yielded information from Dun and Bradstreet’s Reference Book of Corporate 
Management as well as Standard and Poor’s Register of Corporations, Directors and 
Executives. When biographies were not available in any of these databases, the 
demographic coding was supplemented with searches on Thompson One Banker and 
Mergent Online’s directory of corporate executives, as well as biographies available in 
the public domain including BusinessWeek, Fortune, Forbes and the obituaries of various 
online trade publications and newspapers. In this manner, each of the CEO demographic 
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variables was cross-checked in numerous datasets thus increasing the reliability of the 
data. 
5.5.1   Independent Predictor Variables 
CEO liberal worldview. I construct a new proxy for CEO worldview based on the 
extensive research in both political science and psychology discussed in Section 3.3.1 that 
has confirmed the existence of a liberal vs. conservative continuum (Tetlock, 2000; 
Thorisdottir et al., 2007). Although Tetlock (2000) used a battery of items in a scenario 
based survey of middle managers to measure ideological worldview, I will use a 
simplified measure specifically related to his findings about the shareholder/stakeholder 
divide that attempts to capture these “abstract political sympathies” by evaluating the 
political orientation of individual CEOs. 
In one of the only studies of which I am aware, Burris (2001) found that individual 
CEO political contributions are different from their own firm PAC contributions and 
follow a different logic; corporate PACs are concerned with non-market strategies while 
individual donations are concerned with supporting particular candidates that follow the 
true political preferences of the executive. Further, firm PACs are almost entirely 
motivated by economic issues, while individual capitalists are unable to disregard a 
candidate’s position with regards to social issues such as abortion, school prayer or civil 
liberties (p.378).  Ansolabehere, de Figuieiredo and Snyder (2003) also argue that 
“individuals give because they are ideologically motivated, because they are excited by 
the politics of particular elections, because they are asked by their friends or colleagues 
and because they have the resources necessary to engage in this particular form of 
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participation” not because “they receive direct private benefits” from political giving 
(p.188). Burris (2001) concludes: 
“Like other citizens, capitalists tend to develop not just political 
preferences but political identities as either Democrats or Republicans. 
This is reflected in the fact that three-fourths of individual capitalists 
contributed 90 percent or more of their campaign contributions to a single 
party, compared with less than one-seventh of corporations. Party 
identifications of this type tend to be formed early in life, often through 
transmission from parent to children, they are relatively stable over the life 
course, and they are not reducible to a simple matter of agreement or 
disagreement with specific policy positions of the parties in a given 
elections.” (p.378, emphasis in original) 
 
 
Although the individual contributions of CEOs are not usually large in terms of 
absolute numbers (under $5,000 in Burris’ sample) due to legislated maximums under the 
Federal Election Campaign Act (Ansolabehere, De Figueiredo & Snyder Jr, 2003), they 
nonetheless reflect a personal commitment to an established political ideology that is 
pertinent to the measurement of executive orientation and a possible relationship to CSS. 
As such, I sourced individual CEO political contributions from the non-partisan research 
institute, Center for Responsive Politics (www.opensecrets.org), which consolidates the 
information from the Federal Election Commission (FEC). The FEC provides complete 
data on the campaign contributions of all American citizens, including CEOs. The 
contribution record for each CEO was first identified by using their given name, then 
cross-checked with the CEO’s middle name, address and employer information to ensure 
that the record clearly belonged to the CEO under investigation. 
In order to construct the worldview variables, I first recorded the total amount of 
donations made by each CEO to every senatorial, congressional, or presidential candidate 
or party for every year each CEO was in the database. These numbers were then 
translated into the relative percentage of contributions going to either Democratic or 
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Republican candidates (contributions to independents and corporate/industry PACS were 
also captured, but not used in this analysis unless explicitly affiliated with Democratic or 
Republican candidates). Because of the longitudinal nature of the dataset, it was possible 
to assess the stability of a CEO’s contributions over time as the data was being gathered. 
Contrary to Burris (2001), I found that many CEOs gave inconsistently to both parties, 
suggesting that not all donations may be purely ideologically driven. For example, CEO 
Fred Smith of FedEx donated heavily to the Democratic Party while they were in power, 
but then switched the majority of his contributions to the Republicans when they took 
office. A worldview variable based on majority contributions alone was therefore deemed 
to be not entirely reliable. 
As such, to measure CEO liberal vs. conservative worldview, I created a 7 point 
scale based on research in psychology on individual political identity (Graham, Haidt & 
Nosek, 2009). Here, political identity is often measured across a continuum anchored on 
each end by strongly conservative and strongly liberal with moderate at the midpoint. In 
coding the CEO political contributions, I employed a -3 to +3 scale as follows:  
 
(-3) strongly conservative CEO donated more than $10K to the Republican Party 
or self-identified as Republican 
(-2) moderately conservative CEO donated consistently to Republican Party over the 
years in the dataset 
(-1) slightly conservative CEO donated minimal amounts intermittently to the 
Republican Party over the years in the dataset 
(0) neutral CEO either donated to the Republican and Democratic 
parties equally, donated only to company or industry 
PACs or did not donate to any political party ever 
(+1) slightly liberal CEO donated minimal amounts intermittently to the 
Democratic Party over the years in the dataset 
(+2) moderately liberal CEO donated consistently to Democratic Party over the 
years in the dataset 
(+3) strongly liberal CEO donated more than $10K to the Democratic Party 
or self-identified as a Democrat 
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CEO functional background.  Following previous research, I capture both the 
primary functional areas in which a CEO has served as well as the breadth of this 
functional experience (Beyer et al., 1997; Chattopadhyay et al., 1999; Geletkanycz & 
Black, 2001). As is common practice (Herrmann & Datta, 2002; Michel & Hambrick, 
1992; Thomas & Simerly, 1994), I code CEOs with backgrounds in marketing/sales, 
research and product development or entrepreneurship as having served in output 
functions and CEOs with backgrounds in accounting/finance, law, administration/HR, 
production/operations, engineering or data processing/information systems as having 
served primarily in throughput functions.  With regards to breadth of functional 
experience, I follow previous research (Bigley & Wiersema, 2002; Geletkanycz & Black, 
2001) and measure the number of functional positions held by the CEO across his/her 
entire career. This is a continuous variable where the higher the score, the greater the 
breadth of functional experience; at the lowest end, 1 thus represents an entire career 
spent in just one functional area.7
CEO international experience.  Following previous research in this area, CEO 
international experience was captured by a dichotomous variable as either ‘0’ or ‘1’, for 
either the absence or presence of international experience, where ‘1’ represents 
experience in an international function or in a function with international responsibilities 
(Roth, 1995; Slater & Dixon-Fowler, 2009) and/or that the CEO was born outside the 
United States (Matta & Beamish, 2008).  
  
                                                 
7 Although some studies of CEO characteristics that have employed a survey design (e.g., Musteen, Barker 
& Baeten, 2006) have used Blau’s index of heterogeneity to measure CEO functional diversity, the data 
sources used for this project did not allow for coding of the length of time spent in each functional position. 
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CEO educational background. As is common in the upper echelon literature, when 
measuring CEO educational background, I looked at both the overall level of education 
obtained as well as the CEO’s area of specialization. Similar to Wiersema and Bantel 
(1992), Carpenter and Fredrickson (2001) and Herrmann and Datta (2002), I first coded 
the highest educational degree obtained by the CEO using a seven point Likert-type scale 
(0-some high school, 1-high school, 2-attended college, 3-undergraduate degree, 4-
attended graduate school,  5-master's degree, 6-attended doctoral program, 7-doctorate). 
However, given that my hypotheses revolve around the “MBA mindset” and “Law 
mindset” in particular, I then coded educational background for CEOs who hold an MBA 
degree with a ‘1’ on this attribute (Geletkanycz & Black, 2001; Slater & Dixon-Fowler, 
2010) and CEOs who hold a JD or LLB degree as ‘1’ on this attribute (else ‘0’). 
Reliability of Measures. Appendix C contains a table with a representative sample 
of studies that have used the above measures to capture the independent variables of 
interest, thus speaking to the reliability of these measures. Further, because multiple 
sources were used in the gathering of the demographic information, reliability was 
iteratively cross-referenced during data collection. Lastly, Roth (1995) compared his 
survey results for functional and international experience with archival data available 
from the Reference Book of Corporate Management and Who’s Who volumes and found 
that the data was consistent with the self-reported information. As such, these archival 
measures are deemed reliable to assess executive orientation.  
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5.5.2   Moderating Variables 
Industry norms. To capture the affect of industry norms on CSS, I used the means 
of the CSS measures for each industry (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1990). Specifically, I 
measured the average aggregate CSS, average breadth of CSS and average depth of CSS 
for each industry in my database, aggregated at the 2 digit SIC code level.  
Managerial discretion. In line with institutional arguments that the characteristics 
of a firm’s operating environment will affect the level of executive discretion, Hambrick 
and Finkelstein (1987) introduced the construct of managerial discretion to account for 
the affect of environmental factors such as product differentiability, market growth, 
industry structure, demand instability, quasi-legal constraints and powerful outside forces 
on a CEO’s latitude of action. Although often measured as a firm level construct (e.g., 
Shropshire & Hillman, 2007), the appropriate level of analysis here is the industry level 
(Boyd & Gove, 2006; Hambrick & Abrahamson, 1995; McClelland et al., 2010).  
Although there is a lack of consensus regarding the appropriate operationalization 
of managerial discretion at the industry level (Keegan & Kabanoff, 2008), common 
measures include some combination of industry level capital intensity, sales growth, 
R&D intensity, advertising intensity or other similar measures such as industry 
munificence and dynamism (see Boyd & Gove, 2006, for a review).  Several studies have 
relied directly on Hambrick and Abrahamson’s (1995) ratings of managerial discretion 
(e.g., Abrahamson & Hambrick, 1997; Adams, Almeida & Ferreira, 2005) which were 
based on an expert panel and correlated with many of the above observable industry 
characteristics. Others have used these ratings more indirectly to sample industries in high 
or low discretion environments. For example, McClelland et al. (2010) chose firms in the 
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textile, furniture and primary metals industries to exemplify low-discretion environments, 
while computer equipment and electrical components were selected as examples for high 
discretion industries. 
To classify firms into low vs. high discretion industries, I followed the process 
outlined in Adams, Almeida and Ferreira (2005) who take Finkelstein et al.’s (2009) 
expanded list of the managerial discretion ratings of seventy different industries and 
average these measures by two digit SIC code. Those industries that fell at the top 50% of 
the distribution were rated as a high discretion industry (coded ‘1’) and those at the 
bottom 50% as low discretion industries (coded ‘0’).8 For those industries where 
managerial discretion ratings were not available, the high/low categorization was based 
on the industry average capital intensity score, with lower scores indicating greater levels 
of managerial discretion.9
 
  
5.6   Control Variables: Firm and CEO Level Determinants of CSS 
5.6.1   Firm Level Control Variables 
Data for all firm-level control variables was sourced from the COMPUSTAT 
database for each firm in the sample for the years 1990-2009 (An additional year of data 
was necessary for the past performance measure). 
                                                 
8 Note that Adams et al. (2005) used the top and bottom 40%, excluding industries in the middle 20% as 
these were deemed more difficult to classify as either high or low discretion industries. Although this may 
be a legitimate concern, not wanting to lose data for entire industries, I split the sample above and below the 
median discretion score of the averaged ratings, which was 5.05. 
9 To assess if this was an appropriate process, I compared the means of the capital intensity scores for the 
high vs. low discretion industries already established. The mean capital intensity for high discretion 
industries was 67.2, while the mean capital intensity for low discretion industries was 276.6, which was 
statistically significant in a t-test comparison of means (p<0.000). After categorizing the remaining 
industries as either high/low, these numbers remained virtually unchanged (63.2 and 278.2). 
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Firm size. Prior research has shown that firm size will affect a firm’s CSR ratings 
(McWilliams & Siegel, 2000). Specifically, studies have shown that larger firms are more 
likely to engage in the ‘people’ dimension of CSR, which includes community donations, 
the hiring of women and minorities and the treatment of employees, but are less likely to 
perform well in the ‘product’ dimension of CSR which includes product/service quality 
and a firm’s stance toward the natural environment (Johnson & Greening, 1999). Strike et 
al. (2006) also found that larger firms will show higher levels of both CSR and CSiR 
(Corporate Social Irresponsibility) and Shropshire and Hillman (2007) found explicitly 
that larger firms are more likely to experience significant shifts in stakeholder 
management programs than smaller firms. I therefore control for firm size, measured as 
the natural log of total assets. Note that although Waddock and Graves (1997) also 
include both total sales and total number of employees as proxies for firm size in their 
model of CSP-CFP, these variables were found to have extremely high variance inflation 
factors (VIF >29) which indicate high degrees of multicollinearity. As such, only the log 
of total assets was retained as a proxy for firm size in this analysis. 
Past performance. Waddock and Graves (1997) also found that a firm’s previous 
financial performance positively affects the firm’s subsequent social performance and this 
finding has been substantiated in a recent meta-analysis (Orlitzky et al., 2003). As such, 
following previous studies, I control for past performance by accounting for the return on 
assets (ROA) lagged by one year.  ROA is considered an appropriate measure of firm 
performance here given that it captures the profitability of the firm based on the strategic 
use of the resources, or assets, under its control (Hull & Rothenberg, 2008).  
Firm risk. Because investing in CSR issues may be associated with either 
potential savings (e.g., waste reduction) or possible incremental costs (e.g., pollution 
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control equipment), a firm’s risk profile may influence the adoption of CSS. In line with 
previous studies (McWilliams & Siegel, 2000; Waddock & Graves, 1997) therefore, I 
control for firm risk by including the ratio of long term debt to total assets. 
R&D intensity.  McWilliams and Siegel (2000) argue that R&D intensity should 
be included as a control variable in all future CSR studies. Although this argument rests 
on R&D expenditures as an explanatory variable in firm financial performance (not social 
performance), recent studies have nonetheless demonstrated a strong relationship between 
R&D intensity and CSP (Hull & Rothenberg, 2008; Padgett & Galán, 2010). Consistent 
with these findings, I therefore include R&D intensity as a control variable.  
Because this variable is notoriously plagued with missing data issues10
 
, I follow 
previous research by creating three separate measures to capture R&D Intensity: (1) total 
R&D expenditures divided by total sales, (2) total R&D expenditures divided by total 
sales where all missing values for R&D expenditures are treated as zero and (3) an R&D 
missing dummy variable where missing values are coded 1, otherwise 0 (Henderson et al., 
2006). Because measure (1) greatly reduces the number of observations, models using 
measures (2) and (3) in combination, allow the total number of observations to be 
preserved, yet remove any bias that may be associated with the assigning of zero values to 
missing data (Henderson et al., 2006). 
                                                 
10 If a company spends an insignificant amount on R&D (e.g. financial companies), they are not required to 
report this amount in financial statements captured by COMPUSTAT and are thus recorded as missing. 
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5.6.2   CEO Level Control Variables 
Data for all CEO-level control variables was sourced from the COMPUSTAT 
Execucomp database for each firm in the sample for the years 1991-2009. In those cases 
were data was missing, the information was sourced as detailed in Section 5.5. 
 CEO tenure. Research has shown that CEOs who have served within a firm or an 
industry for an extended period of time are more likely to conform to the norms of the 
industry and less likely to deviate from industry conventions (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 
1990; Hambrick, Geletkanycz & Fredrickson, 1993). For example, several studies have 
shown that longer tenured CEOs are more likely to engage in defender strategies 
characterized by stability and efficiency than shorter tenured CEOs who were more likely 
to undertake prospector strategies related to increased levels of innovation (Finkelstein et 
al., 2009).  Similarly, tenure has also been found to be negatively related to organizational 
change, with shorter-tenured CEOs willing to take more strategic risks, yet longer tenured 
CEOs demonstrating a greater commitment to the status quo (Miller, 1991). Geletkanycz 
and Black (2001) found that the longer an executive has spent in a particular functional 
track, the greater his/her commitment to the status quo, suggesting that CEO perspectives 
and views become increasingly narrow and fixed rendering the ability to conceive of new 
alternatives or solutions difficult.  
However, despite the fact that the impact of CEO tenure on different aspects of 
firm performance has been extensively studied (Finkelstein & D’Aveni, 1994), few 
studies have looked at the relationship between CEO tenure and any measure of CSR. 
Only Thomas et al. (1994) found that CEOs who have a longer tenure in the role and 
CEOs who have spent more years in the organization prior to the attainment of their 
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current position were more likely to score higher on measures of corporate social 
performance (CSP) than CEOs with shorter organizational tenures (Thomas & Simerly, 
1994).   
Taking these diverse perspectives into account, CEO tenure may have a complex 
relationship to CSS.  On the one hand, longer organizational tenures should be associated 
with higher measures of social performance (Thomas et al., 1994). On the other, CEOs 
with long tenures are less equipped to adjust to ambiguous and complex changes in the 
operating environment, thus rendering them “stale in the saddle” (Miller, 1991) or 
“obsolete” (Henderson et al., 2006). The relationship between CEO tenure and CSS thus 
appears to be contingent on organizational experience such that CEO tenure in the firm 
may be negatively related to CSS in that the longer a CEO has served in his/her position 
the more committed they are to the status quo, yet tenure in the role may be related to 
organizational change such that the shorter the time as CEO, the more likely they are to 
instigate change. As such, I control for CEO tenure both as tenure in the role (Henderson 
et al., 2006; Herrmann & Datta, 2002) as well as tenure in the organization (Thomas & 
Simerly, 1994).  
 CEO age. Hambrick and Mason (1984) argue that a CEO’s age can influence 
his/her attitude toward risk, with older managers being more risk-averse than younger 
ones. Similarly, Bertrand and Schoar (2003) found that executives from earlier birth 
cohorts were, on average, more conservative, than executives from later birth cohorts. If 
the adoption of CSS policies is considered risky or requires a more liberal worldview 
(i.e., especially programs in contested areas such as the adoption of formal policies to 
promote gay/lesbian employees), age could affect CSS.  Thus, I controlled for CEO age 
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(measured in years) as is the norm in upper-echelon research (Musteen, Barker III & 
Baeten, 2010), 
CEO gender. Lastly, there is some limited research that suggests that gender may 
play a role in determining a firm’s propensity to engage in CSS. Williams (2003), for 
example, found that women on corporate boards are strongly linked to both the total 
amount of firm philanthropic contributions, as well as the type of charity supported 
(community services and the arts). Barnett and Karson (1989) found that women are 
significantly more likely than men to chose the ethical over the economic option in a 
presentation of various work-related ethical dilemma scenarios. More recently, Simga-
Mugan et al. (2005)  also found support that women are more ethical than men in 
scenarios in which respondents had responsibility towards agents such as employees (e.g. 
demotion after maternity leave) concluding that the difference may be in the cognitive 
rules (knowledge structures) accessed by the different genders:  “Females are argued to 
typically utilize ethics of care, which emphasizes social virtues and caring for others. On 
the other hand, males are found to utilize ethics of justice, emphasizing equal treatment 
and playing by the rules” (p. 150).  Building on the large body of work that suggests 
women are more ethically sensitive than men, I control for CEO gender by coding female 
CEO’s as 1 and males as 0. 
5.7   Other Data Considerations:  Data Lag Structure 
An important consideration for the analysis of longitudinal information regards 
assumptions about the underlying lag structure of the data (Ployhart & Vandenberg, 
2010). While the common assumption in upper echelon models is that it takes time for the 
CEO effect to be reflected in firm performance measures (Hambrick & Mason, 1984), 
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there is no theoretical reason to believe that this is the case for social performance 
measures.  For example, it is logical to argue that any changes that a CEO makes to 
typical strategy investments (capital intensity, R&D, …) in year t, will likely only show 
material effects on firm performance (e.g., ROA) in year t+1.  However, the CSS 
measures employed here do not automatically imply that a lag structure is required. 
Rather, the CSS of each firm in a given year is scored by KLD analysts at the end of 
every year, reflecting the social performance choices of that year (e.g., generous giving, 
pollution prevention programs, progressive policies towards gay and lesbian employees).  
There is no theoretical rationale for assuming that the CEO effect on CSS is not 
contemporaneous. 
Yet, treatment of data lags in this area has varied widely. For example, Agle et al. 
(1999) treat CEO values and CSP contemporaneously as do Manner (2010) and Slater 
and Dixon-Fowler (2010). However, still others have implemented a one year lag 
between CEO characteristics and CSR measures (e.g., Fong, 2010). Deckop et al. (2006), 
for example, found that CEO compensation (short vs. long term) in year t is related to 
CSP in year t+1 and Waldman et al. (2006) found that CEO intellectual stimulation in 
year t can positively predict the propensity of firms to engage in CSR activities (product 
quality and environmental measures) in a subsequent time period. Similarly, Shropshire 
and Hillman (2007) found that owner manager controlled firms in year t are less likely to 
engage in broad shifts in stakeholder management programs in year t +1. 
The difficulty in estimating the appropriate lag structure is further complicated in 
that all of the aforementioned studies employ variations of cross-sectional designs. In 
longitudinal data analysis, however, the building of growth curve models already 
incorporates the role of time into the models themselves and as such, issues of 
103 
 
103 
endogeneity and causation are not pertinent (Schonfeld & Rindskopf, 2007). Furthermore, 
a recent meta-analysis demonstrated that the relationship between CSR and CFP is just as 
likely to be concurrent as it is to be lagging or leading (Orlitzky et al., 2003) and 
simultaneous estimation methods have therefore been used in several subsequent studies 
(Mattingly & Berman, 2006). I therefore build the latent growth curve models without a 
lag structure and remit a further discussion about lagged explanatory variables to the post-
hoc robustness analysis reported in section 6.5. 
 In addition to decisions regarding the data lag structure for independent variables, 
there is also some debate with regards to including a lagged dependent variable (LDV) in 
longitudinal models of change.  LDVs are often incorporated in cross-sectional designs in 
order to ensure the effect of time is adequately captured as well as to reduce questions of 
endogeneity. Furthermore, LDVs are often used as a control when autocorrelation is 
suspected in the dependent variable (Strike et al., 2006). However, the random coefficient 
modeling technique employed herein explicitly accounts for the variance components 
among time periods, shedding light on how individual units change over time (Holcomb 
et al., 2010).  Because data pertaining to the dependent variable in growth curve modeling 
is already explicitly modeled every year, adding a LDV thus risks over-parameterizing 
the models. Achen (2000) also cautions that while including an LDV may help improve 
overall model fit, it can also collapse the coefficients of theoretical interest to 
“implausibly small and insignificant values”. 
 The practice of including a LDV in CSR research is relatively scarce. Only 
Waldman et al. (2006) included such a measure (albeit a lagged 5 year average DV) and 
their regression tables suggest that indeed there is a high correlation between past social 
performance and current social performance (Pearson correlations between 0.68 and 0.76 
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and highly significant). Yet, none of the relationships of interest (e.g., CEO charisma and 
CSR) in the Waldman et al. study were found to be significant; it is possible then, that 
including LDV measures may have actually suppressed the importance of these and other 
predictors as suggested by Achen (2000). 
 Given that the primary purpose of this research is to tease out the CEO effect on 
CSS, and the RCM analytic method used explicitly models the role of time (Schonfeld & 
Rindskopf, 2007), the use of lagged ACSS, BCSS or DCSS as autoregressive control 
variables is deemed inappropriate. While I return to the discussion of LDVs in the 
robustness analysis (Section 6.5), there is no a priori rationale for including these in the 
hypotheses testing. 
Having introduced the choice of research methodology, the research design, the 
data and sample creation as well as defined the operationalization of all variables of 
interest, I now turn to an assessment of the findings. The presentation of results proceeds 
in two parts. First, I provide a general overview of the data through a descriptive analysis 
of the relationships of interest. I then move on to the RCM analysis introduced in this 
chapter. 
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CHAPTER 6: FINDINGS 
 
 The findings are presented as follows: I begin with general descriptive statistics 
(Section 6.1) as well as some preliminary testing of the patterns of change (Section 6.2) 
as recommended by Singer and Willett (2003). This is then followed by formal tests of 
the hypotheses using a random coefficient model (RCM) building technique (Sections 
6.3), post-hoc tests (Section 6.4) and robustness tests of the data (Section 6.5). I conclude 
with a summary of the results of the hypotheses tests (Section 6.6) before engaging in a 
discussion of the findings in Chapter 7. 
6.1   Descriptive Statistics 
 A summary of the variables used in this study, including the operationalization, 
means, standard deviations, skewness and kurtosis as well as any transformations 
necessary to ensure normality can be found in Table 6.1. Of note, the mean score for the 
overall level of corporate social strategy (ACSS) across all years, all firms and all 
industries is 8.9%, suggesting that out of all of the possible strengths firms could earn, the 
mean ACSS of corporations is still relatively low. However, the standard deviation is 
high (8.5), indicating a wide variability in the adoption of corporate social strategies over 
time, across firms and industries. Although some firms continue to “do nothing” (13 firms 
maintained an ACSS score of 0 throughout the 19 years measured), the maximum ACSS 
in the sample belongs to IBM, that had adopted 61.8% of all possible corporate social 
strengths in 2009.  
 The average breadth of corporate social strategy (BCSS) across all years, all firms 
and all industries is also a modest 0.49 (st. dev 0.50), with a minimum of 0 and a 
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maximum of 1.63. As BCSS is an entropy measure of breadth, this suggests that most 
firms in this study are engaging in approximately one CSS category (community, 
diversity, environment, employee relations, product quality or human rights); only 
Motorola, scoring the maximum BCSS score of 1.63, has adopted CSS practices across 
all six categories. In comparison, the average depth of corporate social strategy (DCSS) is 
0.25 (st. dev 0.18), with a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 1, suggesting that for the 
category in which a firm is most deeply engaged, firms adopt on average 25% of all of the 
CSS policies/programs in this category. For example, while the high score of 1 (100%) 
can be attributed to several firms that scored 1/1 in the human rights category in 1996, the 
depth of commitment to particular areas can still be seen in many firms such as Hewlett-
Packard, that adopted 88% of all CSS in the diversity category in 2004 under CEO Carly 
Fiorina or Honeywell that adopted 83% of all CSS in the employee category in 2005 
under CEO David Cote. 
 The descriptive statistics in Table 6.1 also provide some preliminary information 
about the 1,008 CEO’s in the dataset. The CEOs in this sample are on average 57 years 
old (minimum 30, maximum 90), male (98%), moderately conservative (-0.77) and have 
spent an average of 8 years as CEO, largely in throughput functions (64%) across 
approximately 2.7 functional areas. Of these CEOs, 39% hold an MBA degree, 11% hold 
a legal degree and 25% have international experience. These figures are similar to 
descriptive statistics of age, tenure, functional and educational background as well as 
international experience reported in previous studies suggesting the sample is both 
representative and generalizable. 
 The average firm size as measured by total assets was $26,798.80 (st. dev. 
$96,722.53), with the smallest firm being Time Warner in 1991 (total assets of only $8.0) 
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and the largest firm, Bank of America, holding total assets of $2,223,299.0 in 2009.11 
This firm size measure was skewed and highly kurtotic and thus transformed using its 
natural log. The average past financial performance measured by ROA was 0.06 (st. dev 
0.08). Although kurtotic, skewness was acceptable. As such, the ROA measure is left 
untransformed as recommended by Tabachnic and Fidell (2007).12
                                                 
11 Note: Total assets are reported in millions of USD. The 1991 Time Warner total asset figure seemed 
small, so the Compustat figure was cross-referenced with the financial statements available on Mergent 
Online and was found to be accurate. 
 The average for firm 
risk was 0.19 (st. dev 0.14) which was normally distributed. The R&D Intensity measure 
(with zeros) indicated an average R&D expenditure/sales ratio of 0.03 (st. dev. 0.05) 
which was transformed using its square root. 
12 A robustness test using a Windsorized past performance variable is discussed in Section 6.5. 
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Variable Operationalization N
Missing 
Data
Min Max Mean St.Dev Skewness Kurtosis
Aggregate CSS
Total KLD strengths/Total possible KLD 
strengths (x100)
6334 0.0% 0 61.76 8.89 8.48 1.39 2.47
Breadth of CSS Entropy measure of breadth 6334 0.0% 0 1.63 0.49 0.50 0.39 -1.28
Depth of CSS
Specialization ratio (Highest total 
proportional score in one area)
6334 0.0% 0 1 0.25 0.18 0.65 0.48
CEO liberal worldview
3 strongly liberal
2 moderately liberal
1 slightly liberal
0 neutral
-1 slightly conservative
-2 moderately conservative
-3 strongly conservative
6334 0.0% -3 3 -0.77 1.70 0.40 -0.53
CEO functional 
background
Output (1): sales, marketing, product 
R&D, entrepreneurship; Throughput 
(0): production, operations, 
accounting, finance, law, process R&D
6334 0.0% 0 1 0.36 0.48
Count of the number of different 
functional areas
6334 0.0% 0 6 2.70 0.90 0.25 0.47
CEO educational CEO holds an MBA degree 5982 5.6% 0 1 0.39 0.49
background CEO holds a law degree 5982 5.6% 0 1 0.11 0.31
CEO international 
experience
Experience in an international function 
or in a function with international 
responsibilities, studied abroad, born 
abroad
6334 0.0% 0 1 0.25 0.43
Moderating Variables
Industry norms Average ACSS/Industry 349 0.0% 0.89 20.50 8.89 2.44 0.28 2.86
Average BCSS/Industry 349 0.0% 0.00 1.12 0.49 0.18 -1.30 0.94
Average DCSS/Industry 349 0.0% 0.00 0.46 0.25 0.06 -0.15 2.24
Managerial discretion Industry ratings: Low/High(0/1) 349 0.0% 0.00 1.00 0.50 0.50
Control Variables
CEO age Age in years 6334 0.0% 33 90 57.16 6.84 0.31 1.44
CEO gender Male (0)/Female (1) 6334 0.0% 0 1 0.02 0.14
CEO tenure Years as CEO 6334 0.0% 0.3 48.0 8.06 7.95 1.96 4.08
Years employed at firm 6334 0.0% 0.3 60.6 21.65 12.78 0.08 -0.97
Firm size Total Assets 6315 0.3% 8 2223299 26798.80 96722.53 9.70 128.96
(Log Transformed) (6315) (0.3%) (.90) (6.35) (3.75) (.722) (.253) (.138)
Past Performance ROA 1 year lag 6321 0.2% -1.09 0.95 0.0579 0.08 -0.91 27.09
Firm risk Ratio of long term debt/total assets 6298 0.6% 0 1.07 0.19 0.14 0.92 1.87
R&D Intensity R&D Expenditures/Sales 3600 43.2% 0 0.7439 0.05 0.06 2.96 16.61
(Log Transformed) (3136) (50.2%) (-3.25) (-0.13) (-1.53) (0.49) (-0.25) (-0.11)
R&D Expenditures/Sales (all n/a=0) 6334 0.0% 0 0.7439 0.03 0.05 3.69 23.96
(SQRT Transformed) (6334) (0.0%) (0.0) (0.86) (0.099) (0.13) (1.27) (1.21)
Dependent Variables: 
  
Independent Variables: 
 
Table 6.1:  Descriptive Statistics 
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 Table 6.2 presents the correlations between the variables included in the study 
based on pooled observations. Of note, Table 6.2 provides some preliminary evidence in 
support of several hypotheses. First, with regards to the aggregate level of CSS, the 
correlation matrix suggests that CEO’s with a liberal worldview (Hypothesis 4), with a 
dominant functional background in output functions (Hypothesis 6), with a greater 
breadth of functional experience (Hypothesis 8) and with international experience 
(Hypothesis 10) are significantly and positively related to ACSS. Interestingly, the 
correlations between the educational background variables are also significant, yet while 
the legal mindset hypothesis (Hypothesis 14) is in the predicted direction (r=-.049, 
p<0.000), the hypothesis around the MBA mindset (Hypothesis 12) is significant, but in 
the direction opposite of that predicted (r=.039, p<0.01).  
 Several control variables are also significantly correlated to a firm’s ACSS. At the 
individual level, CEO age (r=-0.058, p<0.000) and tenure as CEO (r=-0.095, p<0.000) are 
negatively related to ACSS while CEO gender (r=0.086, p<0.000) and CEO tenure at the 
firm (r=0.049, p<0.000) are positively and significantly related to ACSS.  At the firm 
level, size (r=0.461, p<0.000) and R&D Intensity (r=0.225, p<0.000) are both positively 
and significantly related to ACSS, while firm risk, and past financial performance do not 
appear to be related to ACSS. 
 The correlation patterns are much the same for BCSS and DCSS with the 
following notable exceptions. A CEO’s liberal worldview appears to be positively related 
to depth of commitment, yet not to the breadth of corporate social strategies pursued. In 
contrast, CEOs with an MBA are positively related to breadth of corporate social 
strategies, yet not with depth.  The positive, significant correlations for CEOs with output 
functions, greater functional breadth and international experience hold for BCSS and 
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DCSS, as does the negative association with a legal mindset. The control variables also 
show similar patterns, although past financial performance becomes significantly related 
to depth of CSS and firm risk is positively associated with the breadth of CSS suggesting 
some interesting nuances in the data. 
 Given that no inter-factor correlations are above the recommended level of .70 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007), multicollinearity is not likely to bias the data. However, I 
nonetheless formally tested for multicollinearity by running a pooled OLS regression with 
ACSS as the dependent variable and found no variance inflation factor (VIF) higher than 
1.6, well below the accepted maximum of 10 (Paetzold, 1992).13
 
 Hence, multicollinearity 
is not considered an issue in this study. 
                                                 
13 The pooled OLS regression also revealed some interesting positive relationships between the predictor 
variables and the dependent variables, with the CEO executive orientation factors adding approximately 4% 
to the ACSS baseline control variable model with an R2 of 31.1% (n=5,942).  Further, many of the 
hypothesized relationships between CEO executive orientation and CSS were supported. For ACSS, CEOs 
with a liberal worldview (β=0.203, p<0.000), functional background in output roles (β=1.617, p<0.000), 
with a breadth of functional experience (β=0.238, p<0.05) and international experience (β =1.149, p<0.000) 
were positively and significantly related to ACSS as predicted. This omnibus test, however, failed to 
provide support for the hypothesized negative relationship between a CEO’s MBA mindset and ACSS, 
although a legal mindset is negatively and significantly related to ACSS (β =-0.953, p<0.000). The pooled 
OLS regressions were also run for BCSS and DCSS as dependent variables; while the hypothesized 
relationships held for DCSS, there were in general, less significant relationships between the executive 
orientation variables and the breadth of CSS than there were for depth, suggesting there may be variations 
in the determinants of these two dimensions of CSS. 
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
1 ACSS 1.000
2 BCSS .820** 1.000
3 DCSS .866** .629** 1.000
4 Political .029* 0.009 .046** 1.000
5 Output Function .098** .061** .100** -.025* 1.000
6 Functional .127** .105** .126** -.039** -0.020 1.000
7 MBA .039** .038** 0.022 -.093** -0.006 -.034** 1.000
8 JD/ LLB -.049** -.037** -.040** .094** -.182** .103** -.195** 1.000
9 Int. Experience .190** .127** .177** 0.020 .111** .110** .101** -.079** 1.000
10 Tenure as CEO -.095** -.077** -.087** -0.015 .106** -.151** -.102** .026* -.138** 1.000
11 Tenure at firm .049** .056** .031* -.054** .062** -.073** -.075** -.038** -.068** .462** 1.000
12 Age -.058** -.041** -.063** -.037** 0.000 -.084** -.111** .107** -.093** .517** .425** 1.000
13 Gender .086** 0.010 .100** .099** .090** .028* -.067** -0.020 .044** -.028* -.097** -.049** 1.000
14 Size .461** .360** .374** -.053** -.118** .181** .032* .036** .112** -.138** .031* -0.003 -.079** 1.000
15 Past Performance 0.023 0.018 .030* -.040** .083** -.044** 0.019 -.038** .025* .091** .074** 0.007 .029* -.159** 1.000
16 Risk 0.022 .032** 0.014 .088** -.028* .085** 0.006 .059** .050** -.097** -.056** -0.013 -0.024 .147** -.264** 1.000
17 R&DIntensity .225** .230** .160** -0.022 .132** .037** .077** -.050** .222** -.083** -.099** -.094** 0.004 -.027* .147** -.184** 1.000
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Correlations
Table 6.2:  Correlations 
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6.2   Preliminary Testing: Patterns of Change 
 As suggested by Singer and Willett (2003), before beginning the formal model 
testing, I first explored the patterns of change present in the longitudinal dataset visually. 
Figure 6.1 depicts the mean ACSS of all companies in the dataset over time, without 
regard for the nesting of the firms within industries. One can see from figure 6.1 that the 
mean aggregate CSS rate appears to start at around 5% in 1991 and grow to just over 12% 
by 2009, more than doubling over the 19 year time span. Further, there appears to be a 
slight deceleration in the rate of growth in the early 2000’s, followed by a steeper 
trajectory post 2004. 
 
Figure 6.1:  Mean ACSS from 1991-2009 
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 The patterns of change for BCSS and DCSS also appear linear and increasing over 
time, with a similar acceleration in the rate of change after 2004 more apparent for BCSS 
than DCSS as shown in Figure 6.2. 
 
Figure 6.2:  Mean BCSS and DCSS from 1991-2009 
 
 
 In order to visualize if the increases in mean ACSS vary by industry, the mean 
ACSS was plotted against year by industry grouping. There appears to be some variance 
in the initial status and growth slopes by industry as illustrated by Figure 6.3. For 
example, it appears that the Refining/Rubber/Plastic industry has consistently 
outperformed other industries, while the chemical/pharmaceutical industry has shown the 
steepest adoption curve. While some industries have much flatter growth curves (e.g. 
wholesale/retail), consistent with Figure 6.1 above, on the whole it appears as though 
aggregate CSS has been growing over time. 
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Figure 6.3:  Mean ACSS from 1991-2009 by Industry 
 
 Depth and breadth appear to follow a similar pattern, although there seems to be a 
greater degree of heterogeneity in the pattern of mean BCSS by industry over time as 
illustrated in Figures 6.4 below. 
 
Figure 6.4:  Mean BCSS and DCSS from 1991-2009 by Industry 
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 These visual tests, however, still do not tell us if the overall patterns of change 
over time are linear or significant as predicted in Hypothesis 1. To explore the overall role 
of time very generally, I first ran a series of simple models where corporate social 
strategy was regressed on time as recommended by Bliese and Ployhart (2002).  As can 
be seen in Table 6.3, the results show that time has a small, yet positive and significant 
relationship with the aggregate level, breadth and depth of CSS.  When looking at the 
aggregate level of CSS, the mean ACSS score at the initial point of data collection 
(time=0) was 5.62%, growing approximately 0.37%/year; the initial breadth was .368, 
growing approximately .013 units/year and the initial depth was 0.179 increasing at only 
0.008/year. 
 
DV 
Table 6.3:  Ordinary Least Squares Model Regressing CSS on Time 
Intercept (S.E.) Beta  
(S.E.) 
R2 
ACSS   5.622*** (0.200) 0.366*** (0.019) .054*** 
BCSS 0.368*** (0.012) 0.013*** (0.001) .020*** 
DCSS 0.179*** (0.004) 0.008*** (0.000) .052*** 
  
 These very simple, illustrative models however, do not provide any information 
with regards to the variance in growth trajectories between industries or between firms, 
nor do they tell us anything about within-firm changes in initial status or growth of CSS 
over time. The most significant limitation with these regression models, therefore, are that 
they assume that all firms start at the same initial level of CSS and grow at the same rate 
(that is, they are fixed-effects models).   
 To illustrate, Figure 6.5 depicts the relationship between time and the total 
aggregate level of firm CSS, paneled by industry for ease of visualization. As can be seen, 
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the intercepts (the initial level of CSS) as well as the growth trajectories (the slope of 
CSS) appear to vary by industry. For example, the mean ACSS at the initial point of data 
collection (time=0) for the mining/construction industry is close to 2.5%, while the initial 
status for the refining/rubber/plastic industry appears to be closer to 10% – both of which 
differ significantly from the total sample mean which was 5.6%, as established above. 
Similarly, the rate of change in ACSS also appears to vary by industry with the adoption 
of ACSS occurring most rapidly in the chemical/pharmaceutical industry (steeper OLS 
curve), in contrast to very little change in transportation or wholesale retail industries 
(flatter OLS curves).  
Figure 6.5:  Relationship Between Time and ACSS by Industry 
 
 It appears, therefore, that the industry level CSS intercepts and growth trajectories 
follow a similar overall linear pattern, yet the differences would justify a random 
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industry-specific time slope as well as a random industry-specific intercept (West et 
al., 2007).  I found these trends to be similar for both the breadth of CSS and the 
depth of CSS measures over time as well as seen in Figures 6.6 and 6.7, although 
BCSS growth curves on the whole appear to be flatter than DCSS, and even negative 
in one case - the wholesale/retail industry. Although preliminary, these growth charts 
demonstrate that BCSS and DCSS could explain differences in strategic approaches to 
CSS, with some industries focusing on growing through breadth and others through 
depth, a nuance not discernable through a focus on ACSS only. 
Figure 6.6:  Relationship Between Time and BCSS by Industry 
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Figure 6.7:  Relationship Between Time and DCSS by Industry 
 
 These illustrations, however, also do not shed any light with regards to the 
variances in growth rates between firms within each industry. Taking the 
chemical/pharmaceutical industry as an example, Figure 6.8 below illustrates that 
although the ACSS growth trajectory appears to be increasing over time (as indicated 
by the thick black line), there are nonetheless significant variances in both the initial 
level of ACSS as well as the growth of ACSS for each firm within this industry over 
time, with some firms starting high, yet adding very few ACSS initiatives over time, 
while other firms have started with a lower level of ACSS, but made greater progress 
in adopting ACSS practices over time.  
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Figure 6.8:  Relationship Between Time and ACSS for firms in the 
Chemical/Pharmaceutical Industry 
 
 Interesting patterns also emerge for BCSS and DCSS. The BCSS of the 
chemical/pharmaceutical industry as illustrated in Figure 6.9, for example, while still 
showing an overall positive, linear growth trajectory over time, demonstrates significant 
variance in the intercept and slope of individual firm growth trajectories over time, with 
some notable and significant negative trajectories such as for Company ID 127 (H.B. 
Fuller, that went from an entropy measure of 1.1 to 0.0 between 1991 and 2009) and 
Company ID 67 (Calgon Carbon Corporation, that went from 0.69 to 0.00 over the 19 
years).  The ACSS, BCSS and DCSS growth trajectories by industry are included in 
Appendix A. 
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Figure 6.9:  Relationship Between Time and BCSS for firms in the 
Chemical/Pharmaceutical Industry 
 
 
Figure 6.10:  Relationship Between Time and DCSS for firms in the 
Chemical/Pharmaceutical Industry 
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 These preliminary tests of relationships and growth patterns suggest that there is 
some initial support to Hypothesis 1-3 that predicted that there will be an overall linear 
growth rate of (a) aggregate corporate social strategy, (b) breadth of corporate social 
strategy and (c) depth of corporate social strategy over time and that firms will differ 
significantly in both their initial levels and rates of adoption of CSS over time.  These 
tests, however, do not formally test the significance of these relationships.  As such, I 
now turn to formal model building and hypotheses testing using a random coefficient 
modeling (RCM) approach as introduced in Section 5.8 and detailed in the following 
sections. 
6.3   Hypotheses Testing 
In order to test the hypotheses, a longitudinal, multi-level growth model was built 
using the sequential “step-up” or “model comparison” strategy as recommended for RCM 
- Random Coefficient Modeling (Bliese & Ployhart, 2002; Hox, 2010; Ployhart, Holtz & 
Bliese, 2002; Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002; Singer & Willett, 2003; Tabachnick & Fidell, 
2007). With this method, one begins with a simple regression framework that partitions 
the variance in the dependent variable between hierarchical levels and then builds 
progressively towards more complex models, testing for increased model fit using 
deviance statistics or likelihood ratios. The five main steps in this sequential procedure 
are outlined in Table 6.4 below.14
 
  
                                                 
14 Note that existing applications of the model comparison approach in RCM vary somewhat with regards to 
the steps, sequence and emphasis placed on each component of this procedure. For example, Thoresen et al. 
(2004) bypass Step 1b, while Holcomb et al. (2010) and  Mysangi et al. (2006) emphasize this step, yet 
omit Step 2.  Table 6.4 thus presents a composite of existing procedures that is aimed at completeness. 
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Model Building Steps 
Table 6.4:  Sequence of Steps in Building Longitudinal, Multi-Level Growth Models 
Interpretation 
1. Define the Null Models:  
a) Estimate an unconditional means 
(random intercept) model 
Estimate ICC - how much variability in 
CSS can be attributed to within vs. 
between firms and between industries; 
Decide whether a multi-level model is 
warranted 
 
b) Estimate an unconditional linear 
growth model with fixed effects 
 
c) Estimate an unconditional linear 
growth model with random effects 
Estimate how much variability in CSS can 
be attributed to year effects specifically 
 
Significance test of parameters to 
determine if variances in intercept, slope 
and intercept/slope covariance are 
statistically significant over time 
 
Differences in likelihood ratio for overall 
fit compared to unconditional means 
models 
2. Determine the function of time:  
Estimate the shape of CSS over time (is 
it linear, quadratic, cubic or another 
higher order polynomial model) 
Significance test of parameters 
Differences in likelihood ratio for overall 
fit compared to unconditional linear 
growth models. 
3. Estimate the error structure 
(homogeneous, auto-correlated etc.) 
Differences in likelihood ratios  
4. Add time-variant predictors of 
variability in initial-status and growth of 
CSS to the final Level 1 model 
Significance test of parameters & 
Differences in likelihood ratios  
5. Add time in-variant predictors of 
variability to the Level 2 model and/or 
Level 3 models 
Significance test of parameters & 
Differences in likelihood ratios  
Adapted from: Bliese & Ployhart (2002), Singer & Willet (2003) and Holcomb et al. (2010) 
 
6.3.1   Step 1: Defining the Null Models 
The first step in the model comparison approach is to build a series of null models 
beginning with a basic unconditional means model and basic unconditional growth 
models to partition the outcome variance first across firms without regard to time (the 
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unconditional means model) and second, across both firms and time (the unconditional 
growth models)(Singer & Willett, 2003). These simple models are also commonly 
referred to as null models (Peugh & Enders, 2005), empty longitudinal models (Hoffman 
& Stawski, 2009), random intercept and random slope models (Bliese & Ployhart, 2002) 
or variance components models (West et al., 2007), and serve not only as baselines 
against which subsequent models can be compared, but also to establish if there is 
sufficient systemic variation in the outcome measures (ACSS, BCSS, DCSS) to warrant 
further multi-level analysis.   
I follow the notation for three-level longitudinal model-building using RCM from 
Raudenbush and Bryk (2002), Peugh and Enders (2005), Bliese and Ployhart (2002) and 
Luke (2004), which are most similar to the notations commonly used in three-level 
studies of organizational change such as Chen (2005), Holcomb et al. (2010) and 
Mysangi et al. (2006).15
t= 1, 2, ….. Tij time periods within firm i in industry j;  
 The subscripts t, i, and j denote time, firm and industry 
respectively where there are:  
i = 1, 2, …….Ij firms within industry j; and  
j = 1,2,……..J industries. 
 
6.3.1.1   The Unconditional Means Model 
The unconditional means model for a three-level analysis partitions the variation in 
the dependent variable (ACSS, BCSS, DCSS) among three levels: (1) within-firms across 
                                                 
15 Note: Notations used by various researchers/disciplines differ only in the symbols used to represent the 
variances and error terms at each level and are substantively equivalent. For example, Singer & Willet 
(2003) use ζ to denote the Level 2 random effect rather than r. 
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time, (2) between-firms (nested within industries) and (3) between-industries, such that 
the equations read as follows: 
 
Level 1 (within-firms):           Ytij = π0ij + etij  (1) 
Level 2 (between-firm):                   π0ij = β00j + r0ij  (2) 
Level 3 (between-industries):                    β00j = γ000 + u00j (3) 
 
At Level 1 (within-firms across time), the null model predicts CSS at each time 
period as a function of an intercept (firm mean CSS) plus a random error. Ytij is the 
dependent variable (ACSS, BCSS, DCSS) for time period t of firm i in industry j; π0ij is 
the mean of Y for firm i in industry j (across time) and etij is a random “time effect”, that 
is the deviation of Y for time period t of firm i in industry j. It is assumed that etij is 
normally distributed with a mean of zero and a variance of σ2 (Holcomb et al., 2010; 
Misangyi et al., 2006).  
At level 2 (between firms nested within industries), the mean CSS of each firm over 
time (π0ij) is assumed to vary randomly around each industry’s mean CSS.  β00j is the 
mean of Y for industry j in time period t and r0ij is the random “firm effect” or the 
deviation of Y for firm i in industry j over time. It is assumed that r0ij is normally 
distributed with a mean of zero and a variance of τπ. 
At level 3 (between-industries), the intercept β00j is modeled as a dependent variable 
that varies randomly around the grand mean of CSS (γ000) and u00j is the random “industry 
effect”, or the deviation of Y for industry j over time. Here, it is assumed that u00j is 
normally distributed with a mean of zero and a variance of τβ. 
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The unconditional means model is therefore able to partition the variance in CSS 
into three components: σ2, within firms (across time periods), τπ, between firms within 
industries and and τβ, between industries. Based on the estimates of these variance 
components it is therefore possible to calculate the proportion of variance that resides at 
each level – also known as the Intraclass Correlation Coefficient (ICC)(Singer & Willett, 
2003). If this measure is significant, the ICC demonstrates that the dependent variable 
differs within firms across time, between firms within industries and between industries 
and thus confirms that a multi-level model is warranted. High values of the ICC also 
suggest that there is a nontrivial degree of non-independence of observations, thus 
justifies the use of RCM or another multi-level analytic method that does not rest on the 
i.i.d. assumption necessary in traditional OLS regression (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). 
The three level ICC is calculated as follows: 
 
Level 1 (proportion of variance within firms across time):   σ2/ (σ2 + τπ + τβ) 
Level 2 (proportion of variance between firms within industries):  τπ / (σ2 + τπ + τβ) 
Level 3 (proportion of variance between industries):   τβ / (σ2 + τπ + τβ) 
 
 The results for Step 1, the unconditional means (or random intercept) models for 
ACSS, BCSS and DCSS are shown in Table 6.5.16
                                                 
16 In all cases and throughout this thesis, robust standard errors are reported as these automatically correct 
for any departures from the assumptions of the variance-covariance matrix (Raudenbush et al., 2004). 
 As can be seen, the unconditional 
means model for ACSS (Model 1a) indicates that 68.2 % of the variance in ACSS is 
between firms within industries, while 30.1 % of the variance in ACSS is within firms 
(both significant at the p<0.000 level). In contrast, only 1.7% of the variance in ACSS is 
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between industries. As can be seen in Models 1b and 1c, these patterns were also similar 
for the unconditional means models for BCSS and DCSS (with the industry level variance 
insignificant in the DCSS model).  
 Because the between industry variation is very small in all models, and the 
reliability estimates for the Level 2 random coefficients, β00j, are also very low across all 
three models (ACSS: 0.384, BCSS: 0.558, DCSS: 0.201), a two-level model may be 
advisable.17
  
 The reliability estimates capture the systemic portion of variance available to 
be explained by industry level factors in a 3 level model and hence are an early indication 
that accurately estimating the predictors for the majority of the variance between 
industries will be difficult (Russell, 2001). At this stage, however, the model building 
continues at three levels for exploratory purposes. 
 
                                                 
17 Note: In order to ensure that the small industry variance was not due to the chosen method of coding for 
industry, Models 1a-c were also run with firms nested in their original 4 digit SIC codes as well as their 2 
digit SIC codes. Although the 4 digit SIC is often used in organizational research (e.g. Misangy et al., 
2006), this operationalization likely violates power requirements for multi-level modeling as some 4 digit 
SIC’s may only contain one firm (as is the case in my sample). As such, this model failed to run. Nesting 
the firms within their 2 digit SIC, rather than the 1 digit SIC, yielded near identical results with regards to 
the variance components estimated in Step 1. Furthermore, the industry variance in this specification was 
insignificant across all dependent variables. As such, the original operationalization for industry was 
retained at this point for theoretical and methodological comparisons to Waddock & Grave’s (1997) 
seminal work in the field. 
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Table 6.5:  Results for Unconditional Means Models for ACSS, BCSS and DCSS 
Para-
meter Model 1a: ACSS Model 1b:  BCSS Model 1c:  DCSS 
Fixed Effect   Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) 
Grand Mean (Intercept) γ000 8.753*** (0.503) 0.476*** (0.034) 0.247***  (0.009) 
Random Effects   Variance  (SD) Variance  (SD) Variance  (SD) 
Level 1               
   Temporal variation  etij 
21.285*** (4.614) 0.098*** (0.312) 0.014*** (0.117) 
   (within-firm variation of CSS over time)          Level 2               
   Between firm variation in intercept  
rij  
48.280***  (4.948) 0.144*** (0.379) 0.020*** (0.142) 
  (variation in initial CSS between firms within 
industries)          
Level 3               
   Between industry variation in intercept uj  
1.175* (1.084) 0.008* (0.098) 0.000 (0.014) 
   (variation in mean CSS between industries)          Variance Decomposition by Level   % by Level % by Level % by Level 
Level 1 (within-firm over time)   30.1% 39.4% 41.2% 
Level 2 (between-firms within industries)   68.2% 57.8% 58.8% 
Level 3 (between industries)   1.7% 2.8% 0.0% 
Goodness of Fit     pm   pm   pm  
Deviance   38655 4 4399 4 -8049 4 
Reliabilities            Reliability Estimate of Random Level 1 Coefficient  π0ij 0.976 0.964 0.963 
Reliability Estimate of Random Level 2 Coefficient β00j 0.384 0.558 0.201 
n= 6,334 observations, nested within 349 firms, nested within 12 industries           
*** p< .001               
** p< .01               
* p< .05               
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 Note that the unconditional models report a deviance statistic based on -2 Log 
Likelihood (-2LL) which are estimated using Full Maximum Likelihood (FML) rather 
than Restricted Maximum Likelihood (REML). FML and REML will usually produce the 
same results for the level-1 residuals in large sample data sets, however, FML is the 
appropriate method for overall model fit testing as it accounts for different sets of fixed-
effect parameters (West et al., 2007).  The deviance statistics of the null models reported 
in Table 6.5 have no meaning on their own, yet the deviance statistics of subsequent 
models can be directly compared to these reference models by subtracting the -2LL of the 
nested model from the reference model and using an overall chi-square test to gauge 
improvements in model fit. Under REML estimation, on the other hand, only the 
differences in the random part of the models can be compared using the chi-square tests 
(Hox, 2010) rendering REML estimation inappropriate in the context of testing 
hypotheses about fixed effect parameters (West et al., 2007).18
 
  
6.3.1.2   The Unconditional Linear Growth Models 
 The second null model to be estimated is the unconditional linear growth model 
which is also a direct test of Hypotheses 1-3 in that the unconditional growth model can 
test if CSS follows a linear increasing trajectory, on average, over time (H1a-c) and 
whether there are significant differences in firms’ initial levels (H2a-c) and rates of 
adoption of CSS over time (H3a-c). Holcomb et al. (2010) suggest that one fit two types 
                                                 
18 FML is also a methodological constraint imposed by the HLM6 software for 3 level models 
(Raudenbush, S., Bryk, A., Cheong, Y. F., Congdon, R., & Du Toit, M. 2004. HLM 6: Hierarchical Linear 
and Nonlinear Modeling. Lincolnwood, IL: Scientific Software International, Inc.). 
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of unconditional linear growth models – one with fixed effects at all levels, followed by 
an unconditional linear growth model with random effects at all levels.  
 The benefit of first estimating the unconditional growth model with the fixed 
effects at all levels, is that it allows you to isolate the effect of the year variable on 
reducing the total variance explained (Misangyi et al., 2006). As such, in contrast to the 
unconditional means model, rather than examining the amount of variance attributable to 
each level, the unconditional growth model estimates the variance explained by year 
effects specifically to determine if the patterns of change vary significantly between firms 
over time (Holcomb et al., 2010).19
Level 1: Ytij = π0ij + π1ij(YEARtij) + etij  (4) 
 This is done by extending the unconditional means 
model to include a YEARtij covariate and its slope coefficient π1ij to the Level 1 equation 
in order to model the change in CSS for firm i in industry j for each period. In a three 
level format, this model is as follows: 
Level 2: π0ij = β00j + r0ij  (5a) 
               π1ij = β10j (5b) 
Level 3: β00j = γ000 + u00j  (6a) 
               β10j = γ100 (6b) 
 The Level 1 unconditional linear growth model in Equation (4) describes the 
linear growth trajectory for CSS (aggregate, breadth or depth)  at time t for firm i in 
industry j. Specifically, firm i in industry j’s CSS score at time t is modeled as a function 
of the intercept (the initial status of firm ij, π0ij), the slope or the growth rate of CSS for 
                                                 
19 Note: This is conceptually very different than modeling year effects with dummy variables, which control 
for environmental jolts that are assumed to affect all firms similarly. Including a time vector in RCM 
models allows for the examination of the individual firm growth trajectories of CSS over time – first as 
fixed and then as varying between firms and industries over time (See Short et al., 2006 for a discussion). 
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firm ij during the study (π1ij), and a time-specific residual term (etij) that captures the 
deviation between a firm’s observed score and its estimated linear trajectory (Peugh & 
Enders, 2005). Because the dependent variable is measured every year and is equally 
spaced, the time variable (YEARtij), which is a Level 1 covariate, uses integer values 
between 0 (at the initial observation in 1991) and 18 (for the final year in the database, 
2009). Centering time in this way “allows the intercept to be interpreted as the estimated 
initial status (i.e., the expected value of the outcome variable when time=0)” (Peugh & 
Enders, 2005: 731) and is a commonly used centering method for time in organizational 
studies (e.g., Holcomb et al., 2010). 
 The Level 2 models describe the individual firm intercepts and slopes as a 
function of their mean intercepts and slopes. Equation (5a), for example, defines the mean 
initial status of CSS for firm i in industry j (intercept) as a function of the mean initial 
status within industry j (β00j), plus a firm deviation (r0ij) from this mean initial status. 
Equation (5b), on the other hand, defines firm ij’s growth rate in CSS as a function of the 
mean growth rate within the industry (β10j), which here is assumed to be fixed.  
 At Level 3, the mean initial status of CSS within industry j, β00j, is modeled as 
function of the overall initial mean status of CSS of all firms (γ000) and a random variance 
(u00j). β10j is the mean growth within industry j, while γ100, is the overall mean growth rate 
of CSS, which again, at this step, is assumed to be fixed.  
 The results for the unconditional linear change model with fixed effects are 
presented in Table 6.6. As can be seen in Model 2a, the grand mean of ACSS is now 
5.6% vs. 8.7% in the unconditional means model. In the unconditional means model, the 
grand mean of 8.7% represented the grand mean in the sample regardless of time. In the 
unconditional linear change model with a fixed time effect, the overall initial mean status 
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of CSS of all firms (γ000) is 5.6% (p <0.000), and can now be interpreted as the average 
initial status of ACSS for all firms at time zero (1991).20
 The unconditional growth models with fixed effects can also be used to assess the 
reduction in the variance component in the temporal variation (etij) at Level 1 to estimate 
the total variance explained specifically by year effects (Singer & Willett, 2003). Here, 
the Level 1 variance component for ACSS was reduced from 21.285 in the unconditional 
means model (Model 1a) to 17.512 (Model 2a). The total variance explained by year 
effects then is 3.773/ (total variance in the unconditional means model) =  
3.773/70.74=0.0536 or 5.3%.  Similarly, BCSS and DCSS also saw a reduction in the 
temporal variation estimate such that the total variance in BCSS explained by the year 
effect is thus 2.0% (0.098-0.093)=0.005/0.249=0.02) and the total variance in DCSS 
explained by the year effect is 5.9% (0.014-0.012=0.002/0.034=0.0588).
 Further, the average rate of 
change for ACSS (γ100) across all firms over the 18 years is 0.353 which is also highly 
significant (p <0.000) supporting a linear growth trajectory as predicted in Hypothesis 1a. 
Models 2b and 2c show similar patterns for both BCSS and DCSS. The average breadth 
of CSS for all firms in 1991 was 0.367 and the average depth of CSS was 0.181, both 
significant (p<0.000); slope coefficients for BCSS and DCSS were also positive and 
significant, supporting a linear growth trend over time as predicted in Hypothesis 1b and 
Hypothesis 1c. 
21
                                                 
20 Note: This is similar to the OLS estimate for time obtained in preliminary tests summarized in Table 6.3. 
 Industry 
effects continue to be marginally significant in the DCSS model (Model 2c). 
21 Note: This is similar to the R2 estimates for the role of time also summarized in Table 6.3. 
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Unconditional Linear Growth Models 
Table 6.6:  Results for Unconditional Linear Means Models with Fixed Effects 
Para-
Meter Model 2a: ACSS Model 2b: BCSS Model 2c: DCSS 
Fixed Effects   Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. SE 
Average initial status (intercept) γ000 5.609***  (0.414) 0.367*** (0.029) 0.180*** (0.009) 
Average linear rate of change (slope) γ100 0.353***  (0.041) 0.012*** (0.002) 0.008*** (0.000) 
Random Effects   VC (SD) VC  (SD) VC (SD) 
Level 1               
   Temporal variation  etij  
17.512*** (4.185) 0.093*** (0.305) 0.012***  (0.109) 
   (within-firm variation of CSS over time)          Level 2               
   Between firm variation in initial status   
   (intercept) r0ij  48.118***  (6.937) 0.143***  (0.379) 0.020***  (0.141) 
Level 3               
   Between industry variation in initial status  
   (intercept)     u00j  1.167*  (1.080) 0.008**  (0.087) 0.000
†  (0.014) 
Goodness of Fit     pm    pm    pm 
Deviance   37484 5 4110 5 -8853 5 
Reliabilities            Reliability of Random Level 1 Coefficient  π0ij 0.980 0.965 0.968 
Reliability of Random Level 2 Coefficient β00j 0.385 0.560 0.198 
n= 6,334 observations, nested within 349 firms, nested within 12 industries           
*** p< .001               
** p<.01               
* p<.05 
† p<0.10               
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  At this point, the deviance statistics from the reference model and the deviance 
statistics from the linear fixed models are compared using a chi-square test of significance 
to assess whether or not the unconditional linear change models with fixed effects are a 
better fit to the data than the unconditional means models. In all cases, the unconditional 
linear change models with fixed effects present a significant improvement in model fit 
over the unconditional means models. For example, the change in deviance statistics 
between the unconditional means model of ACSS (Model 1a) and the unconditional linear 
change model with fixed effects (Model 2a) using a χ2 statistic (38655 at 4 parameters vs. 
37484 at 5 parameters; 1 df) is clearly significant at the p <0.000 level. Both of the 
unconditional linear means models with fixed year effects for BCSS and DCSS also have 
significantly better model fits than their corresponding unconditional means models 
(BCSS: deviance reduction from 4399 – 4110, 1 df; DCSS: deviance reduction from -
8049 to -8853, 1 df – p<0.000). 
 Although the unconditional linear change models with fixed effects are 
informative, in reality, as could be seen in the exploratory descriptive statistics presented 
in section 6.2, it is unlikely that the linear growth slopes for ACSS, BCSS and DCSS are 
actually fixed (or parallel) over time. As such, in order to test if the variance in slopes 
between firms is significant, I next fit an unconditional linear growth model with random 
effects. The equations are similar to those presented in 4-6, however, the YEAR effect is 
now allowed to vary randomly at Level 2 and Level 3 by adding a residual, r1ij, to 
equation 5b so that the linear trend for the slope coefficient can vary randomly between 
firms within industries. Similarly, I add a residual, u10j, to equation 6b to allow the slope 
coefficient to also vary between industries, so that: 
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Level 1: Ytij = π0ij + π1ij(YEARtij) + etij  (7) 
Level 2: π0ij = β00j + r0ij  (8a) 
               π1ij = β10j + r1ij (8b) 
Level 3: β00j = γ000 + u00j  (9a) 
               β10j = γ100 + u10j (9b) 
 The results of the unconditional linear change models with random intercepts and 
random slopes are presented in Table 6.7.  Similar to the unconditional linear growth 
model with fixed effects, the average initial status across all firms in ACSS at time zero 
(1991) was 5.7%. In other words, out of all of the possible strengths a firm could have 
earned for ACSS, the average firm in 1991 was only engaging in approximately 5.7% of 
these activities. Over the study period, the average rate of change or growth in ACSS was 
0.33%, which was also significant (p<0.000). The results in both Table 6.8 and Table 6.9 
thus confirm a significant linear growth trend for ACSS, supporting Hypothesis 1a which 
predicted that the ACSS pursued by firms, on average, will increase linearly over time. 
 Furthermore, Model 3a also confirms that there is a significant variation (p<0.000) 
in the average initial status of ACSS between firms, r0ij, and a significant variation 
(p<0.000) in the linear change rates of ACSS between firms, r1ij, thus also supporting 
Hypotheses 1b and 1c which predicted that firms would differ significantly in their initial 
levels and rates of adoption of ACSS over time.  Interestingly, although not part of the 
models, the correlation between a firm’s initial level of ACSS and their rate of adoption 
of ACSS over time is negative (-0.183) suggesting that firms with a higher average initial 
status of ACSS grow at a slower rate of change than firms with a lower initial status of 
ACSS.  
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Unconditional Linear Growth Models 
Table 6.7:  Results of Unconditional Linear Growth Models with Random Effects 
Para-
Meter Model 3a: ACSS Model 3b: BCSS Model 3c: DCSS 
Fixed Effects   Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) 
Average initial status (intercept) γ000 5.725***  (0.400) 0.373*** (0.027) 0.181*** (0.010) 
Average linear rate of change (slope) γ100 0.333***  (0.036) 0.011*** (0.002) 0.007*** (0.001) 
Random Effects   Variance  (SD) Variance  (SD) Variance  (SD) 
Level 1               
   Temporal variation  etij  
9.306***  (3.051) 0.063*** (0.251) 0.009***  (0.093) 
   (within-firm variation of CSS over time)          Level 2               
   Between firm variation in initial status 
(intercept)  r0ij  38.025***  (6.166) 0.213***  (0.462) 0.021***  (0.146) 
   Between firm linear change rate (slope) r1ij  0.264***  (0.514) 0.001***  (0.032) 0.000***  (0.010) 
Level 3               
   Between industry variation in initial status 
(intercept) u00j  0.499
†  (0.707) 0.002 (0.044) 0.001** (0.021) 
   Between industry linear change rate (slope) u10j  0.005  (0.068) 0.000  (0.004) 0.000  (0.000) 
Goodness of Fit     Parameters   Parameters    Parameters  
Deviance   34570 9 2538 9 -10069 9 
Reliabilities              Reliability of Random Level 1 Coefficients  π0ij 0.950 0.941 0.919 
 π1ij 0.934 0.888 0.860 
Reliability of Random Level 2 Coefficient β00j 0.254 0.192 0.329 
 β10j 0.302 0.305 0.046 
n= 6,334 observations, within 349 firms, within 12 industries           
*** p< .001; ** p<.01; * p<.05;  † p<0.10           
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 As in previous models, the industry components continue to be very small and in 
these models, largely insignificant with very low reliabilities; specifically, the between 
industry variance in initial status, u00j, for ACSS is only marginally significant (p<0.100) 
and the reliability of estimating the random coefficient at this level, β00j, is only 0.254. 
Similarly, the between industry variance in the linear rate of change, u10j, was not 
significant and the reliability of the β10j estimate was also very low (0.302). As such, 
despite the descriptive exploratory graphs that appeared to suggest that industries do 
differ in their initial status and their rates of change in ACSS over time, these variances 
are not, on the whole, statistically significant.  
 This suggests that the observed patterns in firm ACSS growth trajectories are not 
all clustered around an industry mean in a manner that demonstrates that significant 
patterns in the growth trajectories are due to industry effects. Rather, we can find high 
initial status and high growth parameters in all industries just as we can find low initial 
status and low growth across all industries (it is not that these effects are industry 
specific). This is not to say that industry characteristics may not moderate the relationship 
between firm characteristics and CSS, but rather that there is little systematic variation 
attributable to nesting firms within industry effects specifically and that it will be difficult 
to model this variation with between-industry measures (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002).22
 Table 6.7 also shows the results for the unconditional linear growth models with 
random effects for the breadth (Model 3b) and depth (Model 3c) of corporate social 
strategy over time. Again, we can see that the average linear change in growth of BCSS 
 
                                                 
22 For example, the variance estimate for the between industry linear change rate is 0.005 with a standard 
deviation of 0.068 (non-significant). This indicates that firms within industries that have growth rates that 
are one standard deviation above average are expected to increase their ACSS at the rate of 0.333+0.068 or 
0.401. Clearly, there is not sufficient variability in the between industry slopes to reliably estimate their 
effects on firm-level adoption of ACSS. 
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was positive and significant (γ100 = 0.011, p<0.000), as was the average linear change in 
growth of DCSS (γ100 = 0.007, p<0.000), thus supporting Hypotheses 1b and 1c as well.  
Similarly, Models 3b & 3c also show that there is significant variation in both the 
intercepts and slopes between firms for both BCSS and DCSS, thus supporting 
Hypotheses 2b and 2c as well as Hypotheses 3b and 3c. The same negative correlation 
between intercepts and slopes was also observed, as was the insignificance and low 
reliabilities of the industry effects.  A summary of all of the Hypotheses tests results are 
also presented in Table 6.20 at the end of this chapter. 
 Once again, the model fit statistics of the unconditional linear change models with 
random effects are compared to the unconditional linear change models with fixed effects 
to ensure that model fit is improving. Across all outcome measures, ACSS, BCSS and 
DCSS, the deviance chi-square tests are significant (p<0.000), suggesting that the models 
with random slopes are indeed more representative of the data than the model with fixed 
slopes across time. Hypotheses 1-3 are thus fully supported. 
  
6.3.2   Step 2:  Determine the Function of Time 
 The next step in the model comparison approach is to determine if the significant 
linear trend found in Steps 1 is indeed the correct estimate for the function of time on 
CSS, as compared to a quadratic, cubic or other higher order polynomial curve. At this 
stage, given that a) the overall variance attributable to industry effects was found to be 
very small, b) the reliabilities of the random estimates for industry effects are also very 
small and c) that the variance components attributable to industry effects in the 
unconditional linear growth models with random effects were either marginally 
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significant or not significant, the three level model is reduced to two levels, with years 
nested in firms, but not firms nested in industries (the subscript j has been removed from 
the models). Because the linear trend was found to vary significantly between firms, the 
models retain parameters that allow the slopes to vary. The models to be estimated then 
become: 
Level 1: Yti = π0i + π1i(YEARti) + π2i(YEARti)2 + π3i(YEARti)3 + eti  (10) 
Level 2: π0i = β00 + r0i  (11a) 
               π1i = β10 + r1i (11b) 
               π2i = β20 + r2i (11c) 
               π3i = β30 + r3i (11b) 
These equations were tested hierarchically, adding the quadratic and the cubic 
trends in a step-wise fashion and assessing improvements in model fit as well as trade-
offs regarding model parsimony vs. complexity.23
 Table 6.8 presents the results of the step-wise tests of higher order polynomial 
growth curves for ACSS. Note that Model 4a is slightly different from the final linear 
growth model with random effects from Step1 given the change to a two level model (the 
 Here, π0i is once again the initial level 
of CSS of firm i at time t, however, π1i now captures the instantaneous growth rate for 
firm i at time t, while π2i captures the curvature or acceleration/deceleration in each 
growth trajectory. In the cubic model, π3i captures the change in the rate of change and 
helps distinguish if, in the case that a quadratic model is significant, the 
acceleration/deceleration in the growth trajectories persists or if there may in fact be a 
another inflection point where the trend reverses (Singer & Willett, 2003).  
                                                 
23 Note that the statistical program used to create the .mdm files was now HLM2 (vs. HLM3 for the 3-level 
models); FML is retained given hypothesis testing around the model fixed-effects components. 
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1.7% variance attributable to industry effects is now partitioned within and between 
firms). In addition, while Model 4a and 4b include the random effects of linear and 
quadratic terms, a model with random cubic effect, r3i, failed to run. Hence, a fixed cubic 
effect model is presented.   
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Higher Order Change Trajectories: 
ACSS 
Table 6.8:  Comparison of Fitting Alternative Polynomial Change Trajectories to ACSS over Time 
Para- 
meter 
Model 4a:  
Linear Growth 
Model 4b:             
Quadratic  Growth 
Model 4c:             
Cubic Growth (Fixed) 
Fixed Effects   Coefficient (SE) Coefficient (SE) Coefficient (SE) 
Average initial status (intercept) β00 5.719***  (0.341) 5.590***  (0.318) 4.941***  (0.325) 
Average rate of change (linear) β10 0.340***  (0.029) 0.383***  (0.059) 0.854***  (0.109) 
Average rate of change (quadratic) β20     -0.003  (0.003) -0.069***  (0.013) 
Average rate of change (cubic) β30         0.003***  (0.000) 
Random Effects   Variance (SD) Variance (SD) Variance (SD) 
Level 1               
   Temporal variation (within firm over 
time) eti  9.305***  (3.050) 7.036***  (2.653) 6.927***  (2.632) 
Level 2               
   Between firm variation in initial status 
(intercept) r0i 38.482***  (6.203) 32.053***  (5.662) 32.186***  (5.673) 
   Between firm linear change rate (linear 
slope) r1i 0.269***  (0.519) 0.985***  (0.992) 0.996***  (0.998) 
   Between firm (quadratic rate of change) r2i     0.003***  (0.055) 0.003***  (0.055) 
   Between firm (cubic rate of change) r3i         -  - 
Goodness of Fit     Parameters   Parameters   Parameters 
Deviance   34573 6 33551 10 33467 11 
Reliabilities           Reliability of intercept coefficient  π0i 0.951 0.912 0.914 
Reliability of slope coefficient π1i 0.935 0.824 0.827 
Reliability of quadratic slope coefficient π2i  0.827 0.829 n= 6,334 observations, within 349 firms 
*** p< .001; ** p<.01; * p<.05;  † p<0.10 
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 As can be seen in Table 6.8, the linear rate of change in ACSS over time remains 
significant in all models. Model 4a is simply the baseline model established in Step 1 (the 
unconditional linear growth model with random slopes yet without the industry level 
nesting). Model 4b introduces both fixed and random quadratic growth parameters. The 
fixed effect is not significant (β20= -0.003, p >0.05), suggesting that the average value of 
the quadratic growth rates between firms is indistinguishable from zero. However, the 
variance components associated with the quadratic growth curve model were significant 
(r2i=0.003, p<.000) suggesting that there are statistically significant variations in the 
quadratic rates of change across firms in the sample (Singer & Willett, 2003).  
Furthermore, the difference in deviance statistics from Model 4a to Model 4b suggest a 
significant improvement in fit (1,022 at 4 df, p<0.000). As such, further models may 
retain the quadratic fixed effect as it may be possible to predict some of this variation 
with the addition of explanatory covariates (Singer & Willett, 2003). 
 Model 4c estimates a cubic growth model which adds one more fixed effect (as 
noted above, the model with random effects failed to run). In this model, all the fixed 
effects are significant. Coupled with a significant reduction in the goodness of fit test (84 
at 1 df), this suggests that firm change in ACSS over time should be treated as though it 
follows a cubic trajectory – first increasing linearly (β10=0.825, p<0.000), then continuing 
to increase, albeit at a decelerated rate (β20= -0.069, p<0.000) and finally the change in the 
rate of change accelerating again (β30 =0.002, p<0.000). This mirrors the preliminary 
descriptive plot found in Figures 6 and implies that there was indeed a greater rate of 
adoption of social and environmental initiatives earlier on in the panel, tempering off in 
the middle and then accelerating again in the last few years. 
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 Tables 6.9 and 6.10 demonstrate similar results for BCSS and DCSS. The models 
with cubic growth functions with random effects here did not run as well.  As such, the 
cubic fixed models are presented.  In both cases, the cubic growth models with fixed 
effects for the cubic function had the best model fits, although the absolute value of the 
parameter estimates for the quadratic and cubic functions were very small.   
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Higher Order Change Trajectories: 
BCSS 
Table 6.9:  Comparison of Fitting Alternative Polynomial Change Trajectories to BCSS 
Para- 
meter 
Model 5a:             
Linear Growth 
Model 5b:             
Quadratic  Growth 
Model 5c:                     
Cubic Growth (Fixed) 
Fixed Effects   Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) 
Average initial status (intercept) β00 0.376***  (0.256) 0.370***  (0.025) 0.312***  (0.026) 
Average rate of change (linear) β10 0.012***  (0.002) 0.014** (0.005) 0.056***  (0.009) 
Average rate of change (quadratic) β20     -0.000  (0.000) -0.006***  (0.001) 
Average rate of change (cubic) β30         0.000***  (0.000) 
Random Effects   Variance (SD) Variance (SD) Variance (SD) 
Level 1               
   Temporal variation (within firm over 
time) eti  0.063***  (0.251) 0.049***  (0.221) 0.043***  (0.219) 
Level 2               
   Between firm variation in initial status 
(intercept) r0i 0.215***  (0.464) 0.197***  (0.444) 0.197***  (0.444) 
   Between firm linear change rate (linear 
slope) r1i 0.001***  (0.032) 0.006***  (0.078) 0.006***  (0.079) 
   Between firm (quadratic rate of change) r2i     0.000***  (0.004) 0.000***  (0.004) 
   Between firm (cubic rate of change) r3i         - -  
Goodness of Fit     pm   Pm   pm 
Deviance   2548 6 1681 10 1586 11 
Reliabilities          Reliability of intercept coefficient  π0i 0.941 0.902 0.904 
Reliability of slope coefficient π1i 0.890 0.807 0.812 
Reliability of quadratic slope coefficient π2i   0.815 0.817 n= 6,334 observations, within 349 firms 
*** p< .001; ** p<.01; * p<.05;  † p<0.10 
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Higher Order Change Trajectories: DCSS 
Table 6.10:  Comparison of Fitting Alternative Polynomial Change Trajectories to DCSS 
Para-
meter 
Model 6a:       
Linear Growth 
Model 6b:             
Quadratic  Growth 
Model 6c:                     
Cubic Growth (Fixed) 
Fixed Effects   Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) 
Average initial status (intercept) β00 0.181***  (0.008) 0.174***  (0.008) 0.162***  (0.008) 
Average rate of change (linear) β10 0.007***  (0.001) 0.009** (0.002) 0.018***  (0.003) 
Average rate of change (quadratic) β20     -0.000  (0.000) -0.001**  (0.000) 
Average rate of change (cubic) β30         0.000**  (0.000) 
Random Effects   Variance (SD) Variance (SD) Variance (SD) 
Level 1               
   Temporal variation (within firm over time) eti  0.009***  (0.093) 0.007***  (0.084) 0.007***  (0.084) 
Level 2               
   Between firm variation in initial status 
(intercept) r0i 0.022***  (0.147) 0.019*** (0.140) 0.022***  (0.140) 
   Between firm linear change rate (linear 
slope) r1i 0.000***  (0.010) 0.001***  (0.026) 0.001***  (0.027) 
   Between firm (quadratic rate of change) r2i     0.000***  (0.001) 0.000***  (0.001) 
   Between firm (cubic rate of change) r3i           Goodness of Fit     pm   Pm   pm 
Deviance   -10068 6 -10730 10 -10758 11 
Reliabilities          Reliability of intercept coefficient  π0i 0.920 0.863 0.864 
Reliability of slope coefficient π1i 0.861 0.768 0.770 
Reliability of quadratic slope coefficient π2i   0.769 0.771 
n= 6,334 observations, within 349 firms 
*** p< .001; ** p<.01; * p<.05;  † p<0.10 
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6.3.3   Step 3:  Estimating the Error Structure 
 Up until this point, the equations estimated have assumed that the Level 1 
residuals (eti) are independent, have a mean of zero and a constant variance for all 
occasions (Heck, Thomas & Tabata, 2010).  However, in longitudinal datasets this type of 
simple error structure is unlikely given repeated measures within each firm that are likely 
highly correlated to each other (Hox, 2010; Singer & Willett, 2003). Although 
“incorrectly adopting the default error structure does not appear to bias fixed effects 
estimates in many cases” (Peugh & Enders, 2005: p. 736), it may impact the significance 
of random effects, especially in longitudinal research.  As such, it is strongly 
recommended to test different Level 1 covariate structures which may theoretically better 
fit the data (Bliese & Ployhart, 2002; Singer & Willett, 2003).  
 Singer and Willett (2003) recommend testing a total of six different error 
covariance structures: unstructured, compound symmetric, heterogeneous compound 
symmetric, first order autoregressive (AR1), heterogeneous autoregressive and Toeplitz. 
These models are then compared to those established in Step 2, with smaller deviance 
statistics indicating a better fit and thus included in the final model to be retained prior to 
adding explanatory covariates in Steps 4 and 5.  
 However, each error structure imposes a distinct set of assumptions on the 
residual covariance matrices which may or may not be of theoretical interest. In this case, 
the first order autoregressive error structure (AR1) is theoretically the most likely error 
structure to occur in longitudinal studies (e.g., Hausknecht et al., 2008). The AR1 error 
structure allows residuals within firms to be correlated from occasion to occasion (ρ), but 
with diminishing correlations over time (ρ at time 1, ρ2 at time 2, ρ3 at time 3 etc.). 
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Theoretically and statistically, this type of error structure for the Level 1 residuals is most 
likely representative of the data used in this study, as the Level 1 variance is assumed to 
be independent across firms, σ2, but correlated within firms (Heck et al., 2010).  Using 
just the first five occasions for ease of presentation, a first order autocorrelation matrix is 
estimated as follows: 
  
 
  
 In order to test if an AR1 error structure improved the fit of the final cubic growth 
models established in Step 2, the models were rerun using a hierarchical multivariate 
level model (HMLM) vs. the HLM2 procedure used in Step 3, as HMLM allows for the 
hypothesis tests for different level 1 variances (HLM2 does not).24
 The cubic growth models with AR1 error structures for ACSS (7a), BCSS (7b) 
and DCSS (7c) are presented in Table 6.11.  As can be seen from this table, the 
magnitudes of the fixed effects are relatively similar to the unconditional cubic growth 
 The primary 
disadvantage with HMLM (vs. HLM2), however, is that this method does not provide 
covariance estimates required for hypotheses testing in Steps 4 and 5. As such, the error 
structure is assessed at this time for exploratory purposes only and the implications 
revisited after the effects of the covariates have been tested in HLM2. 
                                                 
24 HLM2 imposes a homogeneous error structure on all models, and allows for comparison tests using a 
heterogeneous sigma squared model for the level-1 variances only. In this case, the heterogeneous error 
structures for ACSS, BCSS and DCSS were not statistically superior to the more parsimonious 
homogeneous variances used in the reference models (p>0.05). The remaining error structures suggested by 
Singer & Willett (2003) were instead tested by repeating steps 1 & 2 (Models 1-6c) in SPSS 18 Linear 
Mixed program which allows for the specification of different error structures. Of the six error structures, 
only the linear change models with the AR1 error structures for ACSS, BCSS and DCSS converged and in 
all cases, the model fits using an AR1 error structure were significantly better than the linear change models 
with homogenous error structures. 
 1 ρ ρ2 ρ3 ρ4 
 ρ 1 ρ ρ2 ρ3 
σ2 ρ2 ρ 1 ρ ρ2 
 ρ3 ρ2 ρ 1 ρ 
 ρ4 ρ3 ρ2 ρ 1 
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models with random effects for the linear and quadratic parameters and fixed effects for 
the cubic parameter established in Step 2, however, the standard errors are generally 
smaller in the ARI models. Importantly, there is a significant improvement in the overall 
model fit (for ACSS, the deviance reduction is from 33467 in the homogenous sigma 
squared model to 31612 in the AR1 model at 1df, p<0.000), suggesting that the AR1 
structure is, in fact, the better model for this longitudinal data set.  
 As noted above, HMLM does not provide variance components comparable to 
those assessed in Models 6a-c. However, it does partition the within firm variance 
component into a constant variance component, σ2, and the correlation between any two 
adjacent occasions, ρ which is informative. The ρ estimate which ranges from 0.62 for the 
DCSS model (7c) and 0.73 in the ACSS model (7a) indicates a very high degree of 
covariance between measurement occasions (the second lag correlation for ACSS would 
be 0.732 or 0.53, the third lag correlation would be 0.733 or 0.39 etc.) suggesting that the 
methods that do not account for this violation of the i.i.d. assumption are in danger of 
making Type I errors (failure to account for autocorrelation can lead to underestimated 
standard errors and thus inflated t-values)(Bliese & Ployhart, 2002).   
 Given the magnitude of the covariation in measurement occasions, the AR1 error 
structure is preferred over the baseline models to test for overall model fit. However, no 
substantive differences in the intercept and growth parameters were detected (e.g. growth 
parameters that were no longer significant in the AR1 models). As such, I can proceed to 
modeling the predictor variables using the homogenous error structure assumed by HLM2 
(Short et al., 2006) so that differences in variance components can be directly compared 
and pseudo R2 statistics computed. Similar to Misangyi et al. (2006), the issue of AR1 
error structures will be revisited as the last step in the model building process.  
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Final Unconditional Cubic Growth 
Models 
Table 6.11:  Unconditional Cubic Growth Models with AR1 Level 1 Error Structure 
Para-
meter Model 7a: ACSS Model 7b: BCSS Model 7c: DCSS 
Fixed Effects   Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) 
Average initial status (intercept) β00 5.033***  (0.308) 0.318***  (0.025) 0.164***  (0.008) 
Average rate of change (linear) β10 0.764***  (0.095) 0.050***  (0.007) 0.017***  (0.003) 
Average rate of change (quadratic) β20 -0.054*** (0.012) -0.005*** (0.001) -0.001** (0.000) 
Average rate of change (cubic) β30 0.002*** (0.000) 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000** (0.000) 
Random Effects   VC (SE) VC (SE) VC (SE) 
Level 1               
   Temporal variation (within firm over 
time), eti :  
                                                      AR1 
diagonal 
σ2 14.547  (1.200) 0.088  (0.006) 0.011  (0.019) 
                                                      AR1 rho ρ 0.729  (0.021) 0.672  (0.020) 0.616 (0.019) 
Goodness of Fit     Parameters   Parameters   Parameters 
Deviance   31612 12 12 12 -12150 12 
n= 6,334 observations, within 349 firms 
*** p< .001; ** p<.01; * p<.05;  † p<0.10 
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6.3.4   Step 4 and Step 5:  Adding Time-Variant Variables to the Level 1 Models and 
Adding Time-Invariant Variables to the Level 2 Models 
 Broadly speaking, the steps taken thus far essentially determine the relationship 
between CSS and time, concluding that (a) there is a small but significant linear increase 
in CSS (all forms) over time, (b) firms differ in terms of their initial level of CSS and (c) 
that the linear growth patterns vary significantly between firms but (d) not substantially 
between industries. Furthermore, we know that (e) while the quadratic growth function is 
non-significant, (f) there may be a possible cubic function to the role of time on CSS 
adoption, but that (g) the absolute value of these parameters are very small. Lastly, we 
know that (h) when an auto-correlated error structure is included in the Level 1 cubic 
growth models, overall model fit improves significantly. 
 These findings are clearly an advance over traditional cross-sectional designs, yet 
the significant variance component parameters suggest that a non-trivial amount of 
variance is still to be explained in all models (Bliese & Ployhart, 2002).  Steps 4 and 5 in 
the RCM procedure therefore allow for hypothesis testing regarding why firms vary in 
terms of their intercept values (initial levels of CSS) as well as why firms have different 
slopes (rates of adoption of CSS over time) by adding predictor variables to the baseline 
equations established in Steps 1-3.  
 To begin, I first add all of the firm level control variables to the models in HLM2. 
Although the control variables have been measured at each time point across all 19 years 
of the study and are thus technically time-variant (e.g. the measure of firm size is 
recorded in every year for every firm), theoretically, it could be argued that the firm size, 
past performance, risk and R&D intensity are more likely to explain differences between 
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firms, than differences within firms over time and could therefore also be modeled as 
time-invariant predictors at Level 2. In order to determine at which level of the equations 
to enter the control variables, Misangy et al. (2006) and Holcomb et al., (2010) suggest 
running an ICC analysis on each independent variable in order to determine if the amount 
of variance in each measure can be attributed primarily to within firm effects (across 
time, or transient effects) and thus should be modeled as time-variant at Level 1, or 
whether the variance in each measure resides primarily between firms (or a cross-
sectional/stable effect), and thus modeled through aggregating observations over time and 
entering these as time-invariant predictors at Level 2. Simultaneously, HLM2 also 
provides the reliability of estimating the random Level 1 coefficient, π0i, (also referred to 
as ICC(2)) which is, in effect, an estimate of the reliability of the aggregate measure 
(Misangyi et al., 2006). The results of these analyses are presented in Table 6.12 below.  
 
Control 
Variable 
Table 6.12:  Results of ICC Analysis of Control Variables 
Variance 
across 
time 
(within-
firms) 
Variance 
between 
firms 
Total 
Variance 
% of 
variance 
within 
firms 
% 
variance 
between 
firms 
Reliability 
ICC(2) 
Size 0.071*** 0.458*** 0.529 13.1% 86.9% 0.991 
Past 
Performance 0.004
*** 0.002*** 0.006 68.6% 31.4% 0.892 
Risk 0.007*** 0.011*** 0.019 38.6% 61.4% 0.966 
R&D Intensity 0.001*** 0.015*** 0.016 6.1% 93.9% 0.996 
N=6334 
  
 As illustrated in Table 6.12, for three out of the four control variables (Size, Risk 
and R&D Intensity), the majority of the variance resides between firms, rather than within 
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firms over time (from 61%-94%). In contrast, the bulk of the variance in past financial 
performance resides within the firm over time (69%). This suggests that past performance 
should be entered as a time-variant variable at Level 1 and the remaining control variables 
can be entered into the equations as time-invariant variables at Level 2 (they have a stable 
effect on ACSS over time). The high reliabilities of π0i also suggest that aggregation of 
these control variables is justifiable (Misangyi et al., 2006). As such, firm size, risk and 
R&D intensity are aggregated for each firm over the time span of the study and their firm 
level averages modeled at Level 2. The control models then become: 
Level 1: Yti = π0i + π1i(YEARti) + π2i(YEARti)2+ π3i(YEARti)3 +  
                       π4i (PAST PERFORMANCEti) + eti  (12) 
Level 2: π0i = β0i + β01(SIZEti) + β02(RISKti) + β03(RDINTti) + r0i  (13a) 
               π1i = β10 + β11(SIZEti) + β12(RISKti) + β13(RDINTti) + r1i (13b) 
               π2i = β20 + r2i (13c) 
               π3i = β30 (13d) 
               π4i = β40 (13e) 
 
Note that the effects of cubic growth, π3i, and past performance, π4i, on CSS are 
set as fixed as no random errors are included in equations (13d and e).    In this manner, 
all of the control variables (except past performance) are modeled as predictors of the 
initial levels and linear growth rates of CSS between firms and these effects are allowed 
to vary between firms. Only past performance is modeled as a predictor of CSS within 
firms.  
Prior to this analysis, all of the control variables were centered around their grand 
mean before being entered in equations 12-13e. The centering of variables in multi-level 
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models is a critical step in that it effects the meaning and interpretation of coefficients 
(Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). By grand-mean centering all of the control variables, the 
intercept in equation 12, π0i, can be interpreted as the expected outcome for an “average” 
firm at the mean of all control variables (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). In other words, the 
intercept, π0i, represents the mean CSS across time for firm i, adjusted for the effect of 
past-performance which is simultaneously modeled as the outcome in equation 13a 
adjusted for the stable effects of size, risk, and R&D intensity expected to explain 
between-firm variance (Misangyi et al., 2006).  
 Having theoretically and statistically determined at which level to enter the 
control variables, a similar procedure was followed in order to determine the appropriate 
level at which to enter the predictor variables around executive orientation. Given that the 
unit of analysis is the firm (as discussed in Chapter 4), it is critical to the models whether 
the effect of executive orientation on the initial status and rate of change in CSS over time 
is predicted to occur primarily within the firm over time, or between firms over time 
(Ployhart et al., 2002). Entering the executive orientation variables as time-variant at 
Level 1 would examine the within-firm change process as a reflection of CEO 
characteristics, while entering the predictor variables as time invariant at Level 2 answers 
questions regarding inter-firm differences in CSS change patterns that are attributable to 
executive orientation. Given that the latter best reflects the hypotheses set forth in this 
thesis, the executive orientation variables are first modeled at Level 2, as predictors of 
between-firm differences in initial levels and rates of adoption of CSS over time. 
Alternate model specifications are considered in the discussion section as post-hoc 
analyses. 
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 To confirm if aggregation of the executive orientation variables is statistically 
reliable, similar to the analysis of variance decomposition of the control variables, ICC(1) 
and ICC(2) analyses were also performed on the CEO characteristics variables. As shown 
in Table 6.13 below, although the within-firm and the between-firm variances are 
relatively equal, the reliability of aggregating the executive orientation variables are very 
high. As such, there is statistical support for the theoretical rationale of modeling 
executive orientation as a between firm predictor of level and rates of adoption of CSS. 
 
Predictor Variable 
Table 6.13:  Results of ICC Analysis of Predictor Variables 
Variance 
across 
time 
(within-
firms) 
Variance 
between 
firms 
Total 
Variance 
% of 
variance 
within 
firms 
% 
variance 
between 
firms 
Reliability 
Political Liberalism 1.128 1.768*** 3.048 42.0% 58.0% 0.966 
Output Function 0.097 0.133*** 0.230 42.2% 57.8% 0.961 
Functional Breadth 0.404 0.400*** 0.804 50.3% 49.7% 0.947 
International Exp. 0.092 0.097*** 0.188 48.9% 51.1% 0.950 
MBA 0.114 0.125*** 0.239 47.7% 52.3% 0.948 
JD/LLB 0.049 0.046*** 0.095 51.6% 48.4% 0.941 
Age 28.203 18.579*** 46.793 60.3% 39.7% 0.922 
Gender 0.009 0.009*** 0.018 50.0% 50.0% 0.945 
Tenure as CEO 35.613 27.854*** 63.467 56.1% 43.9% 0.934 
Tenure at firm 87.745 75.905*** 163.650 53.6% 46.4% 0.940 
N=6334 
 
The full models for the hypothesis testing then become:  
Level 1: Yti = π0i + π1i(YEARti) + π2i(YEARti)2+ π3i(YEARti)3 +  
                       π4i (PAST PERFORMANCEti) + eti  (14) 
Level 2: π0i = β0i + β01(SIZEti) + β02(RISKti) + β03(RDINTti) + β04(POLITICAL 
LIBERALISMti) + β05(OUTPUTFUNCTIONti) + β06(FUNCTIONALBREADTHti) + 
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β07(INTERNATIONALEXPti) + β08(MBAti) + β09(JDLLBti) + β010(AGEti) + 
β011(GENDERti) + β012(TENUREINROLEti) + β013(TENUREATFIRMti) + r0i  (15a) 
               π1i = β10 + β11(SIZEti) + β12(RISKti) + β13(RDINTti) + β14(POLITICAL 
LIBERALISMti) + β15(OUTPUTFUNCTIONti) + β16(FUNCTIONALBREADTHti) + 
β17(INTERNATIONALEXPti) + β18(MBAti) + β19(JDLLBti) + β110(AGEti) + 
β111(GENDERti) + β112(TENUREINROLEti) + β113(TENUREATFIRMti) + r1i (15b) 
               π2i = β20 + r2i (15c) 
               π3i = β30 (15d) 
               π4i = β40 (15e) 
Again, the effects of quadratic growth are allowed to vary randomly, however, the 
cubic growth parameter, π3i, and the past performance estimate, π4i, on CSS are set as 
fixed and no random errors are included in equations (15d and e).  Similarly, all of the 
predictor variables were centered around their grand mean before being entered in 
equations.25
                                                 
25 Although dichotomous variables are usually not centered, because the executive orientation variables 
were aggregated at the level of the firm, these variables were no longer dichotomous, but rather represented 
the ‘average’ for a particular CEO attribute over the 19 year period for a particular firm. As such, grand 
mean centering is the appropriate method to facilitate interpretation of the results. 
 The intercept in equation 14, π0i, can now be interpreted as the expected CSS 
outcome for an “average” firm at the mean of all control and predictor variables 
(Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002). In other words, the intercept, π0i, represents the mean CSS 
across time for firm i, adjusted for the effect of past-performance over time which is 
simultaneously modeled as the outcome in equation 15a adjusted for the stable effects of 
firm and executive orientation expected to explain between-firm variance (Misangyi et 
al., 2006). The linear slope is also simultaneously modeled as the outcome in equation 
15b as predicted by firm and executive characteristics. 
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Because the hypotheses testing proceeds in a step wise fashion, including the 
predictors to the base line equations and testing for changes in variance components using 
pseudo R2 statistics and changes in overall model fit using chi-square tests of the deviance 
statistics, rather than continue to report ACSS, BCSS and DCSS together, the effects of 
the predictors are modeled against the base line in a separate table for each dependent 
variable. Table 6.14, therefore, reports the results for the ACSS models, while Table 6.15 
and 6.16 present the results for BCSS and DCSS models respectively.   
Note that because HLM2 does not allow for any missing data at Level 2, two sets 
of CEO models were estimated in all subsequent analyses.  First, “full” models with all of 
the 6,334 observations nested in 349 firms were run to test Hypotheses 4-11. These 
models omit the education variables (MBA and legal degrees) which had 5.6% missing 
data as described in Table 6.1. Rather than lose the data on the principle covariates of 
interest in testing executive orientation, a second set of “reduced” models (with 6,232 
observations in 343 firms) that include the education variables were run to test 
Hypotheses 12-15.26
                                                 
26 Note that the variance components and the deviance statistics for the CEO Model 2 are compared to a 
reduced baseline cubic growth and control model not reported here for space considerations.   
 The full and reduced models are labeled CEO Model 1 and CEO 
Model 2 on the following pages and the effect on sample size noted at the bottom of the 
Tables. 
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Firm Level Models of ACSS 
Table 6.14:  Growth Model Parameter Estimates of Predictors of ACSS 
Para 
meter 
Model 8a:   
Baseline Cubic Growth 
Model 
Model 8b:  
Control Model 
Model 8c:  
CEO Model 1 
Model 8d:  
CEO Model 2 
Fixed Effects   Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) 
For intercept (initial status, π0i):          Average initial status (intercept) β00 4.941*** (0.325) 4.953*** (0.317) 4.957*** (0.312) 4.922*** (0.315) 
Size β01   2.062*** (0.530) 2.213*** (0.571) 2.395*** (0.580) Risk β02   -1.103 (2.780) -2.040 (2.867) -1.826 (2.891) R&D Intensity β03   2.176 (2.569) 0.450 (2.749) 0.584 (2.774) Political liberalism β04     0.451* (0.212) 0.441* (0.219) Output function β05     1.747* (0.886) 1.784* (0.902) Functional breadth β06     0.109 (0.519) 0.043 (0.526) International experience β07     0.850 (1.026) 1.053 (1.036) MBA β08       -0.445 (0.598) JD/LLB β09       0.842 (1.528) Tenure as CEO β010     -0.017 (0.068) -0.011 (0.068) Tenure at the firm β011     0.073* (0.035) 0.072* (0.037) Age β012     -0.141
† (0.078) -0.145† (0.083) 
Gender β013     3.720 (2.859) 3.859 (2.951) For average linear rate of change (π1i)          Average rate of change (linear) β10 0.855***  (0.109) 0.849*** (0.109) 0.848*** (0.108) 0.865*** (0.110) 
Size β11   0.380*** (0.038) 0.374*** (0.039) 0.374*** (0.039) Risk β12   -0.129 (0.217) -0.152 (0.218) -0.119 (0.218) R&D Intensity β13   1.458*** (0.197) 1.356*** (0.205) 1.355*** (0.205) Political liberalism β14     -0.010 (0.017) -0.007 (0.017) Output function β15     0.156* (0.070) 0.139* (0.071) Functional breadth β16     0.067* (0.033) 0.072* (0.033) International experience β17     0.024 (0.075) 0.005 (0.075) MBA β18       0.107
† (0.058) 
JD/LLB β19       -0.151 (0.105) Tenure as CEO β110     -0.008
† (0.005) -0.008† (0.005) 
Tenure at the firm β111     0.007* (0.003) 0.006* (0.003) Age β112     0.001 (0.005) 0.002 (0.005) Gender β113     0.734*** (0.169) 0.733*** (0.169) 156 
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Firm Level Models of ACSS 
Table 6.14:  Growth Model Parameter Estimates of Predictors of ACSS (continued) 
Para- 
meter 
Model 8a:   
Baseline Cubic 
Growth Model 
Model 8b:  
Control Model 
Model 8c:  
CEO Model 1 
Model 8d:  
CEO Model 2 
Fixed Effects (cont’d)   Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) 
For intercept (initial status, π0i):          For average quadratic rate of change (π2i) β20 -0.069*** (0.013) -0.069*** (0.013) -0.069*** (0.013) -0.069*** (0.013) 
For average cubic rate of change (π3i) β30 0.003*** (0.000) 0.002*** (0.000) 0.002*** (0.000) 0.002*** (0.000) 
For slope of past performance (π4i) Β40   1.719** (0.665) 1.672** (0.666) 1.646** (0.672) 
Random Effects   VC (SD) VC (SD) VC (SD) VC (SD) 
Level 1                Temporal variation (within firms) eti 6.928***  (2.630) 6.916***  (2.630) 6.915***  (2.630) 7.000***  (2.645) 
Level 2                   
   Between firm variation in initial status  r0i 32.186***  (5.673) 30.440***  (5.517) 28.988***  (5.384) 29.042 ***  (5.389) 
   Between firm linear change rate  r1i 0.996***  (0.998) 0.897***  (0.947) 0.876***  (0.936) 0.893***  (0.945) 
   Between firm quadratic change rate r2i 0.003***  (0.055) 0.003***  (0.055) 0.003***  (0.055) 0.003***  (0.055) 
Total Variance   40.113  38.259  36.782  36.938  Variance Explained (R2)     4.6%  8.3%  9.0%  Change in variance explained (∆R2)      3.9%  3.8%  Goodness of Fit     pm  pm  pm  pm Deviance   33467 11 33183 18 33117 34 32647 38 
Reliabilities            Reliability of intercept coefficient  π0i 0.914  0.909  0.904  0.905  Reliability of slope coefficient π1i 0.827  0.812  0.808  0.811  Reliability of quadratic slope coefficient π2i 0.829  0.830  0.829  0.831  
Models 8a-8c: n= 6,334 observations within 349 firms; Model 8d: n=6,232 observations within 343 firms 
*** p< .001; ** p<.01; * p<.05;  † p<0.10 
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Table 6.14 presents the results for the hypotheses testing regarding the predictors 
of initial levels and growth of ACSS over time. Model 8a, the baseline cubic growth 
model, is identical to Model 4c which was established in Step 2 as the reference model. 
Model 8b adds the control variables, Model 8c adds the executive orientation variables 
(not including education) and Model 8d adds the education variables using the reduced 
sample.  
The control model (Model 8b) provides a statistically better fit than the 
unconditional cubic growth model (χ2= 284 at 7df, p<0.000) and explains approximately 
4.6% of the variance in ACSS, largely between firms. The overall average initial status 
for ACSS is largely unchanged at 4.953 % (from 4.941% in the baseline model) which 
can be interpreted as the initial level of ACSS for firms at the average level of past 
performance, size, risk and R&D intensity.  
With regards to the initial status of ACSS in 1991, only size and past financial 
performance are statistically significant predictors (both p<0.05). Specifically, the initial 
status for larger firms was 2.06% higher than the average firm, or 7% in 1991 (vs. 5% on 
average). Similarly, firms with above average past financial performance have an 
estimated starting ACSS level of about 6.672% (4.953%+1.719%), confirming prior 
studies that have shown a modest positive relationship between past CFP and CSP (e.g., 
Waddock & Graves, 1997). However, the effects of risk and R&D intensity on initial 
levels of ACSS were not significant. The latter result in particular is contrary to prior 
studies that have shown a positive relationship between R&D intensity and CSP 
specifically (e.g., McWilliams & Siegel, 2000). 
More interesting, perhaps, is the relationship between the control variables and the 
rate of change in ACSS over time. Here, the average instantaneous growth in ACSS 
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(which varies randomly across firms) is 0.849% and is statistically significant (p<0.000). 
Firm size appears to be a significant predictor in the rate of change in ACSS (β11=0.380, 
p<0.000) such that larger firms grew in ACSS at a higher rate of change than firms at the 
mean level of firm size (1.2% rather than 0.85 %). As opposed to its effect on initial 
status, the effect of R&D intensity on the linear rate of change was significant, such that 
the ACSS of firms with R&D intensity above the mean grew at a rate of 2.3 % (vs. 
0.85%). This is an important nuance in the debate surrounding the relationship between 
R&D intensity and CSP (Padgett & Galán, 2010). While the two do not appear to be 
related cross-sectionally at time 0 (1991), it appears as though R&D intensity is a strong 
predictor of the rate of adoption of ACSS over time. 
Despite the addition of the control variables, the significant variance components 
suggest that there is still significant residual variance in the initial intercept and the slope 
(both, p<0.000) to be explained and that analysis can proceed to Model 8c and 8d for 
direct tests of the hypotheses. Several of the CEO level control variables showed 
significant relationships with the initial level of ACSS. In particular, firms with CEOs 
that have longer tenures at the firm, showed higher initial levels of ACSS (β011=0.073, 
p<0.05), while firms with older CEOs had lower initial levels of ACSS (β012=0.141, 
p<0.10). As can be seen in the first CEO model (full sample), firms that are run by CEOs 
with a liberal worldview do have a higher initial level of aggregate corporate social 
strategy (β04=0.451, p<0.05) thus supporting Hypothesis 4a.  Furthermore, firms led by 
CEOs with functional backgrounds predominantly in output functions (e.g. marketing, 
sales) also have significantly higher initial levels of ACSS (β05=1.747, p<0.05) supporting 
Hypothesis 6a. Functional breadth and international experience, however, do not appear 
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to affect initial levels of ACSS so that Hypotheses 8a and 10a are not supported in these 
models. 
The models for the linear slope of ACSS, on the other hand, had different results. 
While tenure at the firm continued to be positive and significant (β111=0.007, p<0.05), 
tenure in the role of CEO was negatively and marginally significantly related to the rate 
of adoption of ACSS at the firm level (β110=-0.008, p<0.10). Here, gender becomes a 
highly statistically significant predictor of the rate of adoption such that firms with above 
average levels of female CEOs grew at a rate 0.734% higher than the average firm (or at a 
linear rate of 1.582% vs. 0.848%). Model 8c, however, fails to provide support for 
Hypothesis 5a, that firms run by CEOs with a liberal worldview have a higher rate of 
adoption of ACSS over time. Rather, firms led by CEOs from output functions 
(β15=0.156, p<0.05) and with greater functional breadth (β16=0.067, p<0.05) appear to 
predict steeper adoption of ACSS over time (Hypotheses 7a and 9a are supported).  On 
the whole, however, the CEO executive orientation model demonstrates a significant 
improvement over both the baseline model (χ2= 350 at 23df, p<0.000) and the control 
model (χ2= 66 at 16df, p<0.000) explaining an additional 3.9% of the variance for a total 
of pseudo R2 of 8.3%. 
In order to test the effects of CEO educational background, all executive 
orientation variables were entered in CEO Model 2 with the slightly smaller sample size 
(Model 8d). All of the main effects established in Model 8c hold. However, the effects of 
an MBA education or law education were not significant predictors of a firm’s initial 
status of ACSS, although firms run by CEOs with MBA did marginally predict the linear 
rate of adoption of ACSS over time (β85=0.107, p<0.10), albeit in the opposite direction 
of that hypothesized. As such, I find no support for Hypotheses 12a, 13a, 14a and 15a 
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which predicted that CEOs with MBAs and law degrees would have lower initial levels of 
ACSS and slower rates of adoption of ACSS over time. Similar to Model 8c, however, 
the full CEO executive orientation model demonstrated a significant improvement over 
both the baseline model (χ2= 351 at 27df, p<0.000) and the control model (χ2= 70 at 20df, 
p<0.000) explaining an additional 3.8% of the variance over the control model27
The hypotheses tests for BCSS and DCSS are reported in Tables 6.15 & 6.16 
below. 
 for a 
total of pseudo R2 of 9.0% over the baseline. 
 
                                                 
27 Note: This is similar to the 4% OLS pooled estimate of CEO effects reported in Section 6.1. 
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Firm Level Models of BCSS 
Table 6.15:  Growth Model Parameter Estimates of Predictors of BCSS 
Para 
meter 
Model 9a:   
Baseline Cubic Growth 
Model 
Model 9b:  
Control Model 
Model 9c:  
CEO Model 1 
Model 9d:  
CEO Model 2 
Fixed Effects   Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) 
For intercept (initial status, π0i):          Average initial status (intercept) β00 0.312*** (0.026) 0.326*** (0.026) 0.316*** (0.025) 0.317*** (0.026) 
Size β01   0.149*** (0.038) 0.164*** (0.039) 0.170*** (0.040) Risk β02   0.175 (0.222) 0.111 (0.227) 0.106 (0.228) R&D Intensity β03   0.378
† (0.202) 0.233 (0.219) 0.225 (0.221) 
Political liberalism β04     0.027 (0.017) 0.024 (0.018) Output function β05     0.135* (0.068) 0.134
† (0.069) 
Functional breadth β06     -0.004 (0.038) -0.006 (0.034) International experience β07     0.074 (0.083) 0.086 (0.084) MBA β08       -0.024 (0.064) JD/LLB β09       0.115 (0.121) Tenure as CEO β010     -0.001 (0.005) -0.001 (0.005) Tenure at the firm β011     0.004 (0.003) 0.004 (0.003) Age β012     -0.010 (0.006) -0.012
† (0.006) 
Gender β013     0.271 (0.233) 0.279 (0.237) For average linear rate of change (π1i)          Average rate of change (linear) β10 0.056***  (0.009) 0.054*** (0.009) 0.054*** (0.009) 0.054*** (0.009) 
Size β11   0.012*** (0.002) 0.011*** (0.002) 0.011*** (0.003) Risk β12   -0.007 (0.016) -0.007 (0.016) -0.004 (0.016) R&D Intensity β13   0.064*** (0.013) 0.067*** (0.015) 0.067*** (0.015) Political liberalism β14     -0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) Output function β15     0.000 (0.005) 0.000 (0.005) Functional breadth β16     0.005* (0.002) 0.006* (0.003) International experience β17     -0.004 (0.006) -0.005 (0.006) MBA β18       0.007 (0.005) JD/LLB β19       -0.015* (0.007) Tenure as CEO β110     -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) Tenure at the firm β111     0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) Age β112     0.000 (0.000) 0.001 (0.000) Gender β113     0.004 (0.021) 0.004 (0.020) 162 
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Firm Level Models of BCSS 
Table 6.15:  Growth Model Parameter Estimates of Predictors of BCSS (continued) 
Para- 
meter 
Model 9a:   
Baseline Cubic 
Growth Model 
Model 9b:  
Control Model 
Model 9c:  
CEO Model 1 
Model 9d:  
CEO Model 2 
Fixed Effects (cont’d)   Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) 
For intercept (initial status, π0i):          For average quadratic rate of change (π2i) β20 -0.006*** (0.001) -0.006*** (0.001) -0.006*** (0.001) -0.006*** (0.001) 
For average cubic rate of change (π3i) β30 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000*** (0.000) 
For slope of past performance (π4i) Β40   0.135* (0.065) 0.131* (0.065) 0.133* (0.065) 
Random Effects   VC (SD) VC (SD) VC (SD) VC (SD) 
Level 1                Temporal variation (within firms) eti 0.048***  (0.219) 0.048***  (0.218) 0.048***  (0.218) 0.048***  (0.219) 
Level 2                   
   Between firm variation in initial status  r0i 0.197***  (0.444) 0.186***  (0.432) 0.178***  (0.422) 0.179***  (0.424) 
   Between firm linear change rate  r1i 0.006***  (0.079) 0.006***  (0.078) 0.006***  (0.078) 0.006***  (0.078) 
   Between firm quadratic change rate r2i 0.000***  (0.004) 0.000***  (0.004) 0.000***  (0.004) 0.000***  (0.004) 
Total Variance   0.251  0.241  0.232  0.234  Variance Explained (R2)     4.4%  7.6%  7.5%  Change in variance explained (∆R2)      3.3%  2.9%  Goodness of Fit     pm  pm  pm  pm Deviance   1586 11 1396 18 1362 34 1372 38 
Reliabilities            Reliability of intercept coefficient  π0i 0.904  0.898  0.894  0.895  Reliability of slope coefficient π1i 0.812  0.809  0.807  0.809  Reliability of quadratic slope coefficient π2i 0.817  0.818  0.818  0.818  
Models 8a-8c: n= 6,334 observations within 349 firms; Model 8d: n=6,232 observations within 343 firms 
*** p< .001; ** p<.01; * p<.05;  † p<0.10 
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Firm Level Models of DCSS 
Table 6.16:  Growth Model Parameter Estimates of Predictors of DCSS 
Para 
meter 
Model 10a:   
Baseline Cubic Growth 
Model 
Model 10b:  
Control Model 
Model 10c:  
CEO Model 1 
Model 10d:  
CEO Model 2 
Fixed Effects   Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) 
For intercept (initial status, π0i):          Average initial status (intercept) β00 0.162*** (0.008) 0.162*** (0.008) 0.162*** (0.008) 0.160*** (0.008) 
Size β01   0.048*** (0.012) 0.046** (0.013) 0.053** (0.013) Risk β02   -0.092 (0.072) -0.127
† (0.073) -0.116 (0.074) 
R&D Intensity β03   0.032 (0.060) 0.006 (0.065) 0.001 (0.066) Political liberalism β04     0.014* (0.005) 0.015* (0.006) Output function β05     0.031 (0.022) 0.035 (0.022) Functional breadth β06     0.013 (0.013) 0.011 (0.013) International experience β07     0.023 (0.024) 0.030 (0.024) MBA β08       -0.014 (0.021) JD/LLB β09       0.025 (0.034) Tenure as CEO β010     -0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) Tenure at the firm β011     0.003** (0.001) 0.003* (0.001) Age β012     -0.004* (0.001) -0.004* (0.001) Gender β013     0.055 (0.061) 0.059 (0.063) For average linear rate of change (π1i)          Average rate of change (linear) β10 0.018***  (0.003) 0.018***  (0.003) 0.018***  (0.003) 0.018***  (0.003) 
Size β11   0.005*** (0.000) 0.006*** (0.001) 0.006*** (0.001) Risk β12   0.001 (0.005) 0.002 (0.005) 0.002 (0.005) R&D Intensity β13   0.020*** (0.004) 0.019*** (0.005) 0.019*** (0.005) Political liberalism β14     -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) Output function β15     0.003
† (0.002) 0.002 (0.002) 
Functional breadth β16     0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) International experience β17     -0.000 (0.002) -0.001 (0.002) MBA β18       0.002 (0.001) JD/LLB β19       -0.003 (0.002) Tenure as CEO β110     -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) Tenure at the firm β111     0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) Age β112     0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) Gender β113     0.018** (0.006) 0.018** (0.006) 164 
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Table 6.16:  Growth Model Parameter Estimates of Predictors of DCSS (continued) 
Para- 
meter 
Model 10a:   
Baseline Cubic 
Growth Model 
Model 10b:  
Control Model 
Model 10c:  
CEO Model 1 
Model 10d:  
CEO Model 2 
Fixed Effects (cont’d)   Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) 
For intercept (initial status, π0i):          For average quadratic rate of change (π2i) β20 -0.001** (0.000) -0.001** (0.000) -0.001** (0.000) -0.001** (0.000) 
For average cubic rate of change (π3i) β30 0.000** (0.000) 0.000** (0.000) 0.000** (0.000) 0.000** (0.000) 
For slope of past performance (π4i) Β40   0.055* (0.021) 0.053* (0.021) 0.053* (0.022) 
Random Effects   VC (SD) VC (SD) VC (SD) VC (SD) 
Level 1                Temporal variation (within firms) eti 0.007***  (0.084) 0.007***  (0.084) 0.007***  (0.084) 0.007***  (0.084) 
Level 2                   
   Between firm variation in initial status  r0i 0.019***  (0.140) 0.019***  (0.135) 0.017***  (0.131) 0.017***  (0.130) 
   Between firm linear change rate  r1i 0.002***  (0.027) 0.001***  (0.026) 0.001***  (0.026) 0.001***  (0.026) 
   Between firm quadratic change rate r2i 0.000***  (0.001) 0.000***  (0.001) 0.000***  (0.001) 0.000***  (0.001) 
Total Variance   0.027  0.026  0.025  0.025  Variance Explained (R2)     4.5%  8.9%  8.9%  Change in variance explained (∆R2)      4.6%  3.6%  Goodness of Fit     pm  pm  pm  pm Deviance   -10759 11 -10886 18 -10948 34 -10733 38 
Reliabilities            Reliability of intercept coefficient  π0i 0.864  0.855  0.847  0.845  Reliability of slope coefficient π1i 0.770  0.766  0.765  0.764  Reliability of quadratic slope coefficient π2i 0.771  0.771  0.771  0.771  
Models 8a-8c: n= 6,334 observations within 349 firms; Model 8d: n=6,232 observations within 343 firms 
*** p< .001; ** p<.01; * p<.05;  † p<0.10 
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Lastly, to test for the moderating effects of industry norms and managerial 
discretion predicted in Hypotheses 16-18, I created 36 interaction terms as predictors 
moderating both the initial levels and the rates of adoption of CSS over time as well as 
moderating the effects of the executive orientation variables on the initial rates and 
adoption of CSS over time. However, given the small and largely insignificant industry 
effects found in Step 1, at this stage it is unlikely that significant moderating effects will 
be detected.  Regardless, I proceed with the formal testing of Hypotheses 16-18 by 
modeling the following equations (using high discretion environments (HD) as an 
example):  
Level 1: Yti = π0i + π1i(YEARti) + π2i(YEARti)2+ π3i(YEARti)3 +  
                       π4i (PAST PERFORMANCEti) + eti  (16) 
Level 2: π0i = β0i + β01(SIZEti) + β02(RISKti) + β03(RDINTti) + β04(POLITICAL 
LIBERALISMti) + β05(OUTPUTFUNCTIONti) + β06(FUNCTIONALBREADTHti) + 
β07(INTERNATIONALEXPti) + β08(MBAti) + β09(JDLLBti) + β010(TENUREINROLEti) + 
β011(TENUREATFIRMti) + β012(AGEti) + β013(GENDERti) + β014(HIGH DISCRETIONti) 
+ β015(HDti X POLITICAL LIBERALISMti) + β016(HDti X OUTPUTFUNCTIONti) + 
β017(HDti X FUNCTIONALBREADTHti) + β018(HDti X INTERNATIONALEXPti) + 
β019(HDti X MBAti) + β020(HDti X JDLLBti) +r0i  (17a) 
               π1i = β10 + β11(SIZEti) + β12(RISKti) + β13(RDINTti) + β14(POLITICAL 
LIBERALISMti) + β15(OUTPUTFUNCTIONti) + β16(FUNCTIONALBREADTHti) + 
β17(INTERNATIONALEXPti) + β18(MBAti) + β19(JDLLBti) + β110(AGEti) + 
β111(GENDERti) + β112(TENUREINROLEti) + β113(TENUREATFIRMti) + β114(HIGH 
DISCRETIONti) + β115(HDti X POLITICAL LIBERALISMti) + β116(HDti X 
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OUTPUTFUNCTIONti) + β117(HDti X FUNCTIONALBREADTHti) + β118(HDti X 
INTERNATIONALEXPti) + β119(HDti X MBAti) + β120(HDti X JDLLBti) + r1i (17b) 
               π2i = β20 + r2i (17c) 
               π3i = β30 (17d) 
               π4i = β40 (17e) 
 All variables where standardized prior to being entered into Equations 16 -17e.  
Table 6.17 presents the results of the moderation tests for ACSS. Model 11a is a 
replication of Model 8d (albeit, with standardized coefficients) and serves as the baseline 
model. Model 11b adds the direct effect of high discretion industry as well as the six 
interaction effects for each executive orientation variable under study, while Model 11c 
presents the results for the moderation effects of industry mean ACSS on the relationship 
between executive orientation and ACSS.28
 As predicted, the results for the moderation tests were either small or insignificant 
given the minimal variance found attributable to industry effects in Step 1. However, 
although the impact on initial levels and the rate of adoption of ACSS does not appear to 
be greater in high discretion industries (χ2= 13 at 14 df, p>0.05), there is a small, but 
significant improvement in the model that accounts for the moderating role of industry 
norms (χ2= 29 at 14 df, p<0.05).  Given the insignificant results for the effect of 
managerial discretion (Model 11b), Hypotheses 16a and 17a are not supported and I focus 
instead on the results of Model 11c for industry norms.
  
29
                                                 
28 For ease of presentation only the full model with all executive orientation variables is presented (n=6232 
observations nested in 343 firms) 
 
29 Note: I also tested for the moderating effect using an alternate 3-level model specification in HLM3, 
which re-introduces separate equations at Level 3 (rather than standardizing and creating interaction 
variables). The non-significance of the results hold. 
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Table 6.17:  Growth Model Parameter Estimates of Predictors of ACSS with Moderating Effects 
Parameter Model 11a:   CEO Model 
Model 11b:  
Managerial Discretion 
Model 11c:  
Industry Mean ACSS 
Fixed Effects   Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) 
For intercept (initial status, π0i):        Average initial status (intercept) β00 4.922*** (0.315) 4.632*** (0.425) 4.921*** (0.308) 
Size β01 1.627*** (0.394) 1.792*** (0.429) 1.189*** (0.405) 
Risk β02 -0.199 (0.315) -0.265 (0.315) -0.102 (0.329) 
R&D Intensity β03 0.072 (0.341) -0.081 (0.337) -0.289 (0.348) 
Political liberalism β04 0.597* (0.296) 0.430 (0.462) 0.475† (0.292) 
Output function β05 0.664* (0.336) 0.815† (0.475) 0.547† (0.313) 
Functional breadth β06 0.028 (0.342) 0.491 (0.509) -0.045 (0.332) 
International experience β07 0.356 (0.331) 0.199 (0.464) 0.336 (0.315) 
MBA β08 -0.162 (0.307) -0.746† (0.307) -0.253 (0.295) 
JD/LLB β09 0.187 (0.339) 0.369 (0.532) 0.147 (0.322) 
Tenure as CEO β010 -0.060 (0.388) -0.081 (0.376) -0.151 (0.363) 
Tenure at the firm β011 0.646* (0.330) 0.724* (0.333) 0.660* (0.330) 
Age β012 -0.652† (0.375) -0.693† (0.363) -0.721† (0.372) 
Gender β013 0.375 (0.287) 0.403 (0.277) 0.319 (0.276) 
High Discretion (HD) β014   0.569 (0.646)   HD x Political liberalism β015   0.355 (0.619)   HD x Output function β016   -0.437 (0.671)   HD x Functional breadth β017   -0.942 (0.647)   HD x International experience β018   0.287 (0.608)   HD x MBA β019   1.162
† (0.618)   HD x JD/LLB β020   -0.375 (0.636)   Industry Mean ACSS  (IMACSS) β014     1.551*** (0.289) IMACSS x Political liberalism β015     -0.059 (0.265) IMACSS  x Output function β016     0.569* (0.287) IMACSS x Functional breadth β017     0.059 (0.274) IMACSS x International experience β018     0.014 (0.244) IMACSS x MBA β019     -0.472
† (0.261) 
IMACSS x JD/LLB β020     0.265 (0.281) 
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Table 6.17:  Growth Model Parameter Estimates of Predictors of ACSS with Moderating Effects (cont’d) 
Parameter Model 11a:   CEO Model 
Model 11b:  
Managerial Discretion 
Model 11c:  
Industry Mean ACSS 
Fixed Effects (cont’d)   Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) 
For average linear rate of change (π1i)        Average rate of change (linear) β10 0.865*** (0.110) 0.877*** (0.113) 0.865*** (0.110) 
Size β11 0.254*** (0.027) 0.253*** (0.028) 0.263*** (0.028) 
Risk β12 -0.013 (0.024) -0.011 (0.024) -0.018 (0.025) 
R&D Intensity β13 0.166*** (0.025) 0.167*** (0.025) 0.172*** (0.026) 
Political liberalism β14 -0.010 (0.024) 0.015 (0.036) -0.011 (0.024) 
Output function β15 0.051* (0.027) 0.064 (0.043) 0.054* (0.026) 
Functional breadth β16 0.046* (0.022) 0.049 (0.034) 0.052* (0.022) 
International experience β17 0.002 (0.024) 0.037 (0.036) 0.001 (0.024) 
MBA β18 0.039† (0.021) 0.045 (0.035) 0.043* (0.021) 
JD/LLB β19 -0.033 (0.023) -0.051 (0.032) -0.031 (0.023) 
Tenure as CEO β110 -0.044† (0.027) -0.043 (0.027) -0.041 (0.027) 
Tenure at the firm β111 0.057* (0.024) 0.059* (0.024) 0.057* (0.024) 
Age β112 0.010 (0.024) 0.007 (0.024) 0.014 (0.024) 
Gender β113 0.071*** (0.016) 0.078*** (0.017) 0.073*** (0.017) 
High Discretion (HD) β114   -0.024 (0.046)   HD x Political liberalism β115   -0.046 (0.046)   HD x Output function β116   -0.021 (0.056)   HD x Functional breadth β117   -0.003 (0.043)   HD x International experience β118   -0.061 (0.046)   HD x MBA β119   -0.010 (0.045)   HD x JD/LLB β120   0.037 (0.043)   Industry Mean ACSS  (IMACSS) β114     -0.021 (0.023) IMACSS x Political liberalism β115     -0.030 (0.022) IMACSS  x Output function β116     -0.014 (0.026) IMACSS x Functional breadth β117     0.032
† (0.019) 
IMACSS x International experience β118     0.008 (0.023) IMACSS x MBA β119     0.009 (0.021) IMACSS x JD/LLB β120     0.014 (0.023) For average quadratic rate of change (π2i) β20 -0.069*** (0.013) -0.069*** (0.013) -0.069*** (0.013) 
For average cubic rate of change (π3i) β30 0.003*** (0.000) 0.003*** (0.000) 0.002*** (0.000) 
For slope of past performance (π4i) Β40 0.126* (0.052) 0.125* (0.051) 0.127* (0.051) 169 
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Table 6.17:  Growth Model Parameter Estimates of Predictors of ACSS with Moderating Effects (cont’d) 
Para-meter Model 11a:   CEO Model 
Model 11b:  
Managerial Discretion 
Model 11c:  
Industry Mean ACSS 
Random Effects   VC (SD) VC (SD)   
Level 1                Temporal variation (within firms) eti 7.000***  (2.645) 7.000***  (2.645) 7.000***  (2.645) 
Level 2               
   Between firm variation in initial status  r0i 29.042***  (5.673) 28.235***  (5.314) 27.287***  (5.223) 
   Between firm linear change rate  r1i 0.893***  (0.945) 0.898***  (0.947) 0.883***  (0.939) 
   Between firm quadratic change rate r2i 0.003***  (0.055) 0.003***  (0.055) 0.003***  (0.055) 
Total Variance   36.938  36.136  35.173  Variance Explained (R2)   9.0%  10.4%  12.3%  Change in variance explained (∆R2)    n/s  4.8%  Goodness of Fit     pm   pm   pm 
Deviance   32647 38 32634 52 32618 52 
Reliabilities            Reliability of intercept coefficient  π0i 0.905  0.902  0.899  Reliability of slope coefficient π1i 0.811  0.811  0.809  Reliability of quadratic slope coefficient π2i 0.831  0.831  0.831  
n=6,232 observations within 343 firms 
*** p< .001; ** p<.01; * p<.05;  † p<0.10 
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 As can be seen in Model 11c, the higher the mean ACSS of the industry, the 
higher the initial firm level status of ACSS (β014=1.551, p<0.000). Furthermore, the tests 
for the interaction effects of executive orientation and industry norms indicate that the 
mean industry ACSS does moderate the relationship between two out of the six executive 
orientation variables and the initial level of ACSS: the relationship between CEOs from 
output functions and the initial status of ACSS is stronger when industry mean ACSS was 
high (p<0.05). Furthermore, while there was no direct effect of an MBA education on the 
initial level of ACSS, industry norms do seem to moderate this relationship such that the 
relationship is stronger and marginally significant when the mean ACSS in the industry is 
high (p<0.10). In other words, when industry ACSS is high, the predicted negative 
relationship between firms with CEOs that have an MBA degree and the initial levels of 
ACSS is stronger. However, given that an interaction effect was found for only two of the 
variables, Hypothesis 18a is only partially supported. 
 With regards to the linear rate of adoption of ACSS over time, industry norms do 
not appear to play a direct role (β114=-0.021, p>0.05). In fact, the negative sign suggests 
that it is possible that the higher the industry mean ACSS the slower the rate of adoption 
of ACSS over time (although insignificant). Furthermore, of the interaction effects, 
industry norms appear to only marginally effect the relationship between CEOs with 
greater functional breadth and the rate of adoption of ACSS (p<0.10) although this 
relationship is smaller than the direct effect. Given the lack of significant interactions in 
the predicted direction, Hypothesis 19a is not supported. 
 Tables 6.18 and 6.19 replicate the tests for BCSS and DCSS as dependent 
variables. 
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Table 6.18:  Growth Model Parameter Estimates of Predictors of BCSS with Moderating Effects 
Parameter Model 12a:   CEO Model 
Model 12b:  
Managerial Discretion 
Model 12c:  
Industry Mean BCSS 
Fixed Effects   Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) 
For intercept (initial status, π0i):        Average initial status (intercept) β00 0.317*** (0.026) 0.310*** (0.035) 0.317*** (0.026) 
Size β01 0.115*** (0.027) 0.127*** (0.029) 0.086** (0.028) 
Risk β02 0.011 (0.025) 0.007 (0.025) 0.009 (0.025) 
R&D Intensity β03 0.028 (0.027) 0.021 (0.027) -0.007 (0.028) 
Political liberalism β04 0.032 (0.024) 0.035 (0.036) 0.021 (0.024) 
Output function β05 0.049* (0.026) 0.090* (0.036) 0.051* (0.025) 
Functional breadth β06 -0.004 (0.026) 0.014 (0.036) -0.012 (0.025) 
International experience β07 0.027 (0.027) 0.025 (0.039) 0.028 (0.025) 
MBA β08 -0.009 (0.023) -0.029 (0.035) -0.019 (0.022) 
JD/LLB β09 0.025 (0.027) 0.058 (0.038) 0.019 (0.024) 
Tenure as CEO β010 -0.005 (0.031) -0.004 (0.030) -0.006 (0.027) 
Tenure at the firm β011 0.039 (0.026) 0.041 (0.027) 0.039 (0.025) 
Age β012 -0.053† (0.029) -0.053† (0.028) -0.060* (0.029) 
Gender β013 0.027 (0.023) 0.033 (0.023) 0.028 (0.025) 
High Discretion (HD) β014   0.013 (0.051)   HD x Political liberalism β015   -0.015 (0.051)   HD x Output function β016   -0.085
† (0.050)   HD x Functional breadth β017   -0.039 (0.049)   HD x International experience β018   0.011 (0.049)   HD x MBA β019   0.043 (0.047)   HD x JD/LLB β020   -0.075 (0.049)   Industry Mean BCSS  (IMBCSS) β014     0.126*** (0.022) IMBCSS x Political liberalism β015     -0.012 (0.024) IMBCSS  x Output function β016     0.024 (0.018) IMBCSS x Functional breadth β017     0.005 (0.021) IMBCSS x International experience β018     0.004 (0.019) IMBCSS x MBA β019     -0.027 (0.019) IMBCSS x JD/LLB β020     0.041 (0.019) 
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Table 6.18:  Growth Model Parameter Estimates of Predictors of BCSS with Moderating Effects (cont’d) 
Parameter Model 12a:   CEO Model 
Model 12b:  
Managerial Discretion 
Model 12c:  
Industry Mean BCSS 
Fixed Effects (cont’d)   Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) 
For average linear rate of change (π1i)        Average rate of change (linear) β10 0.054*** (0.009) 0.057*** (0.009) 0.055*** (0.009) 
Size β11 0.007*** (0.002) 0.006*** (0.002) 0.007*** (0.002) 
Risk β12 -0.000 (0.002) -0.000 (0.002) -0.000 (0.002) 
R&D Intensity β13 0.008*** (0.002) 0.009*** (0.002) 0.008*** (0.002) 
Political liberalism β14 -0.001 (0.002) -0.001 (0.003) -0.001 (0.002) 
Output function β15 -0.000 (0.002) -0.004 (0.003) -0.000 (0.002) 
Functional breadth β16 0.004* (0.002) 0.004 (0.002) 0.004* (0.002) 
International experience β17 -0.002 (0.002) -0.000 (0.003) -0.002 (0.002) 
MBA β18 0.002 (0.002) 0.002 (0.003) 0.002 (0.002) 
JD/LLB β19 -0.003* (0.002) -0.005* (0.002) -0.003† (0.002) 
Tenure as CEO β110 -0.002 (0.002) -0.002 (0.002) -0.001 (0.002) 
Tenure at the firm β111 0.001 (0.002) 0.001 (0.002) 0.001 (0.002) 
Age β112 0.003 (0.002) 0.003 (0.002) 0.003† (0.002) 
Gender β113 0.000 (0.002) 0.000 (0.002) 0.000 (0.002) 
High Discretion (HD) β114   -0.005 (0.004)   HD x Political liberalism β115   0.001 (0.004)   HD x Output function β116   0.008* (0.004)   HD x Functional breadth β117   -0.000 (0.003)   HD x International experience β118   -0.003 (0.003)   HD x MBA β119   0.001 (0.004)   HD x JD/LLB β120   0.004 (0.003)   Industry Mean BCSS  (IMBCSS) β114     -0.001 (0.002) IMBCSS x Political liberalism β115     -0.001 (0.002) IMBCSS  x Output function β116     -0.001 (0.001) IMBCSS x Functional breadth β117     0.000 (0.001) IMBCSS x International experience β118     0.000 (0.002) IMBCSS x MBA β119     0.001 (0.002) IMBCSS x JD/LLB β120     -0.002 (0.001) For average quadratic rate of change (π2i) β20 -0.006*** (0.001) -0.006*** (0.001) -0.006*** (0.001) 
For average cubic rate of change (π3i) β30 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000*** (0.000) 0.000*** (0.000) 
For slope of past performance (π4i) Β40 0.010* (0.005) 0.010* (0.005) 0.010* (0.005) 173 
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Table 6.18:  Growth Model Parameter Estimates of Predictors of BCSS with Moderating Effects (cont’d) 
Para-meter Model 12a:   CEO Model 
Model 12b:  
Managerial Discretion 
Model 12c:  
Industry Mean BCSS 
Random Effects   VC (SD) VC (SD)   
Level 1                Temporal variation (within firms) eti 0.048*** (0.219) 0.048*** (0.219) 0.048*** (0.219) 
Level 2            Between firm variation in initial status  r0i 0.180*** (0.424) 0.176*** (0.419) 0.167*** (0.408) 
   Between firm linear change rate  r1i 0.006*** (0.078) 0.006*** (0.078) 0.006*** (0.078) 
   Between firm quadratic change rate r2i 0.000*** (0.004) 0.000*** (0.004) 0.000*** (0.004) 
Total Variance   0.234  0.230  0.221  Variance Explained (R2)   7.5%  9.1%  12.6%  Change in variance explained (∆R2)    1.6%  5.6%  Goodness of Fit         Deviance   1373 38 1358 52 1329 52 
Reliabilities         Reliability of intercept coefficient  π0i 0.895  0.893  0.888  Reliability of slope coefficient π1i 0.809  0.808  0.808  Reliability of quadratic slope coefficient π2i 0.818  0.819  0.818  
n=6,232 observations within 343 firms 
*** p< .001; ** p<.01; * p<.05;  † p<0.10 
 
 
174 
  
175 
Firm Level Models of ACSS 
Table 6.19:  Growth Model Parameter Estimates of Predictors of DCSS with Moderating Effects 
Parameter Model 13a:   CEO Model 
Model 13b:  
Managerial Discretion 
Model 13c:  
Industry Mean DCSS 
Fixed Effects   Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) 
For intercept (initial status, π0i):        Average initial status (intercept) β00 0.159*** (0.008) 0.157*** (0.011) 0.159*** (0.008) 
Size β01 0.036*** (0.009) 0.037*** (0.009) 0.023** (0.009) 
Risk β02 -0.013 (0.008) -0.014 (0.008) -0.010 (0.008) 
R&D Intensity β03 0.000 (0.008) -0.003 (0.008) *0.004 (0.007) 
Political liberalism β04 0.019* (0.008) 0.017 (0.011) 0.017* (0.008) 
Output function β05 0.013 (0.008) 0.019 (0.011) 0.006 (0.007) 
Functional breadth β06 0.007 (0.008) 0.018 (0.011) 0.004 (0.008) 
International experience β07 0.010 (0.007) 0.000 (0.009) 0.010 (0.007) 
MBA β08 -0.005 (0.007) -0.021† (0.010) -0.006 (0.007) 
JD/LLB β09 0.005 (0.007) 0.000 (0.012) 0.004 (0.007) 
Tenure as CEO β010 -0.005 (0.009) -0.005 (0.008) -0.007 (0.008) 
Tenure at the firm β011 0.024* (0.008) 0.026* (0.008) 0.024** (0.008) 
Age β012 -0.017* (0.008) -0.018* (0.007) -0.019* (0.008) 
Gender β013 0.006 (0.006) 0.005 (0.006) 0.003 (0.005) 
High Discretion (HD) β014   0.006 (0016)   HD x Political liberalism β015   0.009 (0.016)   HD x Output function β016   0.005 (0.016)   HD x Functional breadth β017   -0.023 (0.016)   HD x International experience β018   0.018 (0.013)   HD x MBA β019   0.030
† (0.016)   HD x JD/LLB β020   0.011 (0.014)   Industry Mean DCSS  (IMDCSS) β014     0.046*** (0.007) IMDCSS x Political liberalism β015     0.001 (0.006) IMDCSS  x Output function β016     0.018** (0.007) IMDCSS x Functional breadth β017     0.005 (0.007) IMDCSS x International experience β018     -0.001 (0.006) IMDCSS x MBA β019     -0.012
† (0.007) 
IMDCSS x JD/LLB β020     -0.003 (0.008) 
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Table 6.19:  Growth Model Parameter Estimates of Predictors of DCSS with Moderating Effects (cont’d) 
Parameter Model 13a:   CEO Model 
Model 13b:  
Managerial Discretion 
Model 13c:  
Industry Mean DCSS 
Fixed Effects (cont’d)   Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) Coeff. (SE) 
For average linear rate of change (π1i)        Average rate of change (linear) β10 0.019*** (0.003) 0.018*** (0.003) 0.018*** (0.003) 
Size β11 0.004*** (0.001) 0.004*** (0.001) 0.004*** (0.001) 
Risk β12 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000) 
R&D Intensity β13 0.002*** (0.001) 0.002*** (0.001) 0.002*** (0.001) 
Political liberalism β14 -0.001 (0.001) -0.000 (0.001) -0.000 (0.001) 
Output function β15 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.001* (0.001) 
Functional breadth β16 0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.000) 
International experience β17 -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) -0.000 (0.000) 
MBA β18 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 
JD/LLB β19 -0.001 (0.000) -0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) 
Tenure as CEO β110 -0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) 
Tenure at the firm β111 -0.000 (0.001) -0.000 (0.001) -0.000 (0.001) 
Age β112 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 0.001 (0.001) 
Gender β113 0.002** (0.000) 0.002** (0.000) 0.002** (0.000) 
High Discretion (HD) β114   0.000 (0.001)   HD x Political liberalism β115   -0.000 (0.001)   HD x Output function β116   -0.002 (0.001)   HD x Functional breadth β117   0.001 (0.001)   HD x International experience β118   -0.002 (0.001)   HD x MBA β119   -0.000 (0.001)   HD x JD/LLB β120   -0.001 (0.001)   Industry Mean DCSS  (IMDCSS) β114     -0.001** (0.000) IMDCSS x Political liberalism β115     -0.000 (0.000) IMDCSS  x Output function β116     -0.000 (0.000) IMDCSS x Functional breadth β117     -0.001 (0.000) IMDCSS x International experience β118     -0.000 (0.000) IMDCSS x MBA β119     0.000 (0.000) IMDCSS x JD/LLB β120     0.001 (0.001) For average quadratic rate of change (π2i) β20 -0.001** (0.000) -0.001** (0.000) -0.001** (0.000) 
For average cubic rate of change (π3i) β30 0.000** (0.000) 0.000** (0.000) 0.000** (0.000) 
For slope of past performance (π4i) Β40 0.004* (0.001) 0.004* (0.001) 0.004* (0.001) 176 
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Firm Level Models of ACSS 
Table 6.19:  Growth Model Parameter Estimates of Predictors of DCSS with Moderating Effects (cont’d) 
Para-meter Model 13a:   CEO Model 
Model 13b:  
Managerial Discretion 
Model 13c:  
Industry Mean DCSS 
Random Effects   VC (SD) VC (SD)   
Level 1                Temporal variation (within firms) eti 0.007 (0.084) 0.007 (0.084) 0.007 (0.084) 
Level 2            Between firm variation in initial status  r0i 0.017 (0.130) 0.016 (0.128) 0.015 (0.126) 
   Between firm linear change rate  r1i 0.001 (0.026) 0.001 (0.026) 0.001 (0.026) 
   Between firm quadratic change rate r2i 0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) 
Total Variance   0.025  0.024  0.023  Variance Explained (R2)   8.4%  12.1%  15.8%  Change in variance explained (∆R2)    4.0%  8.0%  Goodness of Fit         Deviance   -10733 38 -10746 52 -10772 52 
Reliabilities         Reliability of intercept coefficient  π0i 0.845  0.841  0.836  Reliability of slope coefficient π1i 0.764  0.765  0.769  Reliability of quadratic slope coefficient π2i 0.771  0.771  0.771  
n=6,232 observations within 343 firms 
*** p< .001; ** p<.01; * p<.05;  † p<0.10 
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6.4   Post Hoc Tests 
 Given the nature of the hypotheses developed in Chapter 3, alternate formulations 
of the longitudinal multi-level models are conceivable. Although the models built in 
section 6.3 best reflect the theory, I nonetheless conducted several post hoc tests given the 
limited support for the main hypotheses of interest found using RCM.  The results of 
these post hoc tests, using ACSS as a dependent variable for illustrative purposes, are 
described below. 
 Modeling the variance in CEO variables:  In the ICC tests conducted in Step 4 & 
5 of the RCM methodology, the variance in the executive orientation variables 
attributable to transient time factors vs. stable between-firm factors was approximately 
equally split, despite high reliability scores for aggregation (Table 6.13). As such, I tested 
several alternate models, where the CEO variables were entered either as time-variant at 
Level 1 (rather than stable between firm variances at Level 2) in a two-level model and as 
time-invariant in a three-level format where years were nested in CEOs and CEOs were 
nested in firms. 
  Conceptually, these formulations test slightly different research questions than 
those hypothesized. In the models where CEO variables are entered as time-variant at 
Level 1 in a two-level model, the equations test if changes in CEO executive orientation 
within-firms can predict mean levels of CSS. In the models where CEO variables are 
entered as time-invariant in a three-level model, technically the equations create 
independent growth curves for each CEO (rather than each firm) and therefore test if 
differences between CEOs within firms (rather than between firms) influence the initial 
status or rate of adoption of CSS for each CEO. 
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 In the two-level model, where all CEO variables were entered as time-variant, no 
significant results were found between the executive orientation variables and ACSS.  
The stable firm-level effects were similar to those found in the original analysis (that is 
firm size predicts both initial status and rate of adoption of ACSS, while R&D intensity 
predicts only the rate of adoption; past performance is also a significant within-firm 
predictor of ACSS). However, the models did not detect that changes in a firm’s CEO’s 
executive orientation affects ACSS. Given the relative homogeneity of the characteristics 
of CEOs within firms, this finding is not all together surprising. 
 Similarly, in the three-level model, where years were nested in CEOs and CEOs 
nested in firms, the relationship between executive orientation and ACSS was also largely 
insignificant.  While the firm level controls remained the same, only a shift within a firm 
to a CEO with a law degree was marginally negatively related to the rate of adoption of 
ACSS (p<0.10). However, the reliability estimate in the 3 level model for the CEO slopes 
was also very low (0.170), suggesting that there is little overall variance in the rate of 
adoption of ACSS between CEOs in the same firm over time. Furthermore, this model 
construction violates some published guidelines regarding the minimum number of Level 
2 units to be nested in Level 3 units as some firms had only one CEO for the duration of 
the study (the sample for these models was 5,276 observations, nested in 833 CEOs 
within 303 firms). 
 Modeling one CEO per firm: Given this specificity/aggregation trade-off, I also 
created an alternate sample that consisted of only one CEO per firm, thereby eliminating 
the need to model the executive orientation variables as time-variant, yet also eliminating 
the problems associated with low reliabilities and measurement issues of the three level 
models. I first narrowed the time frame of study to 2001-2008 so that I may select just 
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one CEO per firm; I then selected the CEO that was in place for the longest tenure during 
this time frame for each firm. This yielded a sample of 1,787 observations nested in 330 
CEO/Firms.  
 Overall, the full CEO model was a significant improvement over both the null and 
the control models (p<0.05), yielding a pseudo R2 of 48.1%.  The relationships between 
the executive orientation variables and the initial status of ACSS (here, the initial status is 
2001 vs. 1991) were, for the most part, as predicted. CEO political liberalism, output 
function background, international experience, tenure at the firm and gender were all 
positively and significantly related to the intercept, as were the firm control variables of 
size, R&D intensity and past performance. On the other hand, the only marginally 
significant predictor of the rate of adoption of ACSS was the negative impact of a law 
mindset (-0.39, p<0.10).  However, the lack of significant findings in the growth curves is 
not surprising given the much shorter nature of this reduced sample (average of 5 years 
vs. 18 years). The most interesting finding, perhaps, is that in these models, adding the 
CEO executive orientation variables to the control model resulted in a reduction in the 
variance components of 13.8%, suggesting that CEO executive orientation, when 
modeled as one CEO per firm, has a significant effect on ACSS. 
 Alternate moderation modeling. Despite finding little variation at the industry 
level in Step 1, Hypotheses 16-19 were also modeled returning to HLM3. Here, rather 
than use standardized variables and interaction terms as done for Models 11-13, the 
moderation was tested by including industry norms and managerial discretion as Level 3 
cross-level moderators of the initial status and rate of adoption of ACSS. The results of 
these tests were similar to those found in Models 11-13; the hypotheses around 
managerial discretion received no support and the effects of industry norms on the 
181 
 
181 
relationships between executive orientation and ACSS were only partially supported. At 
this stage, an alternate measure for managerial discretion was also tested. Using the 
aggregated standard deviation for the industry ACSS rather than the high/low distinction 
based on the Finkelstein et al. (2009) ratings yielded identical insignificant results. 
 Alternate error structure.  As discussed in section 6.3.3, an important, yet often 
neglected step in RCM is the testing of alternate error structures. HLM assumes a 
homogeneous sigma squared error structure. Using HMLM2, this can be compared to a 
first-order autoregressive error structure using a chi-square test of significance. Here, 
Model 10a was rerun using the AR1 specification in HMLM2. Although the methodology 
requires different specification (e.g., only the linear or polynomial effects of time can be 
entered at Level 1), the model with the AR1 error structure is nonetheless a better fit to 
the data (chi-square=1815, p<0.000).  In this specification, most of the relationships hold, 
however, the effect of output function on the initial status of ACSS is no longer 
statistically significant, neither is tenure at the firm nor age. All of the relationships found 
for the rate of adoption of ACSS, on the other hand, remain as predicted in Model 10a.   
 
6.5   Robustness Checks 
 In addition to the post-hoc analyses, I conducted several robustness checks on the 
final models presented in Section 6.3.  
 Industry. Despite finding little variance in the three level models for industry, I 
nonetheless tested the final model for ACSS (Model 8d) including a full set of industry 
dummies as a robustness check. Using the computer/aero/auto industry as a control, with 
the exception of the refining/rubber/plastic industry (3.493, p<0.05), none of the industry 
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coefficients were significant predictors of either the initial status or rate of adoption of 
ACSS. Furthermore, the main findings remained largely intact, with some minor 
variances in significance estimates. Given the effect of including the industry dummies on 
the number of estimated parameters required (from 38 to 60), the more parsimonious 
model is retained. 
 R&D intensity. As described in the methods section, a full 43% of the firm years 
were missing R&D expenditure information. As is common practice, the missing data 
was coded as zero given that this is likely accurate for many firms (e.g. financial 
companies), however, a missing data dummy was also created (Henderson et al., 2006). 
As a robustness check, Model 8d was rerun including the R&D dummy variable. The 
coefficient for the R&D dummy variable was insignificant and the significance of the 
R&D intensity variable on the rate of adoption of ACSS unaffected. The coding for R&D 
in the analysis is thus deemed robust to this specification. 
Slack resources. It has been argued that a firm’s level of slack resources may also 
determine the degree to which a firm can decide to engage in social issue programs 
(Bansal, 2005) and it has been found to be positively related to CSR in past research 
(Hillman & Keim, 2001; Orlitzky et al., 2003; Waddock & Graves, 1997). The data for 
this variable, however, was not found to be missing at random, but was, again, highly 
correlated to industry membership. As such, rather than lose the information on the 
primary variables of interest, I reran the final models on a reduced sample that included a 
control for slack resources, measured as the ratio of current assets over current liabilities 
(Strike et al., 2006).  This model had 5,515 observations nested in 303 firms and slack 
resources was not found to be a significant predictor of either the initial status or rate of 
adoption of ACSS. However, in these models the effect of political liberalism and age on 
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the initial status of ACSS became insignificant; the remaining relationships held.  Given 
that Model 8d contained more data on the primary variables of interest, the results are not 
modified. 
Past performance. As noted in the descriptive statistics, while skewness was not 
an issue, the past performance variable was nonetheless highly kurtotic. To ensure that 
the kurtosis was not affecting the findings presented herein, Models 8d, 9d and 10d were 
rerun replacing the untransformed past performance measure with a windsorized past 
performance variable. There was no impact of this transformation on the value and 
significance of the main variables of interest. However, given the larger standard errors 
associated with the windsorized past performance measure, the significance of past 
performance on ACSS became insignificant (p=0.11), while the effect of past 
performance on BCSS and DCSS went from significant (p<0.05) to marginally 
significant (p<0.10). The impact on the coefficient for past performance in all three cases, 
however, was minimal. The discussion of firm level antecedents to CSS in Section 7.2 
includes this finding. 
 Lagged explanatory variables. Despite arguing for contemporaneous effects of 
CEO characteristics on CSS, I nonetheless also tested models with lagged explanatory 
variables. All relationships found in Model 8d hold when lagged by one year. 
 Lagged dependent variables. As noted in the methodology section, I also did not 
include any LDVs in my analysis as the method used herein addresses issues of 
autocorrelation explicitly. However, like Strike et al. (2006), I nonetheless ran the 
analyses using lagged measures of ACSS as a robustness check. I first did this by adding 
lagged ACSS to the pooled OLS regressions conducted for the VIFs in Section 6.1. Not 
surprisingly, as predicted, the inclusion of LDVs helped improve overall model fit, yet 
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suppressed the effect of most coefficients of interest (Achen, 2000). When adding a 
lagged measure of ACSS to the time-variant equations in HLM, the reliability of all 
estimates plummeted to near-zero, indicating that the inclusion of an LDV does, in fact, 
remove most, if not all of, the ability to reliably model predictor variables of interest.  
6.6   Summary of Hypotheses Tests 
 Table 6.20 summarizes the results of the hypotheses tests conducted in this 
chapter using the RCM methodology. Overall, of the 57 separate hypotheses, 18 were 
fully supported, 3 were partially supported and the remaining hypotheses were not 
supported. Most notably, a clear linear pattern was detected in the adoption of ACSS, 
BCSS and DCSS over the last 20 years, albeit the overall growth remains relatively small 
(from 5% of total possible strengths in 1991 to just over 12% of total possible strengths in 
2009, on average). As such, despite finding statistically significant variation between 
firms (and surprisingly, not between industries), predicting variation in the initial levels 
and the rates of adoption of firm CSS proved challenging.  
Hypo-
thesis 
Table 6.20:  Summary of Hypotheses Tests using RCM 
Predicted Relationship Result Model(s) 
1a ACSS follows a linear trajectory over time Supported 2a & 3a 
1b BCSS follows a linear trajectory over time Supported 2b & 3b 
1c DCSS follows a linear trajectory over time Supported 2c & 3c 
2a Significant difference in initial level of ACSS Supported 3a 
2b Significant difference in initial level of BCSS Supported 3b 
2c Significant difference in initial level of DCSS Supported 3c 
3a Significant difference in adoption of ACSS Supported 3a 
3b Significant difference in adoption of BCSS Supported 3b 
3c Significant difference in adoption of DCSS Supported 3c 
4a Liberal worldview and initial level of ACSS Supported 8c & 8d 
4b Liberal worldview and initial level of BCSS Not Supported 9c & 9d 
4c Liberal worldview and initial level of DCSS Supported 10c &10d 
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5a Liberal worldview and adoption of ACSS Not Supported 8c & 8d 
5b Liberal worldview and adoption of BCSS Not Supported 9c & 9d 
5c Liberal worldview and adoption of DCSS Not Supported 10c &10d 
6a Output function and initial level of ACSS Supported 8c & 8d 
6b Output function and initial level of BCSS Supported 9c & 9d 
6c Output function and initial level of DCSS Not Supported 10c &10d 
7a Output function and adoption of ACSS Supported 8c & 8d 
7b Output function and adoption of BCSS Not Supported 9c & 9d 
7c Output function and adoption of DCSS Supported 10c  
8a Functional breadth and initial level of ACSS Not Supported 8c & 8d 
8b Functional breadth and initial level of BCSS Not Supported 9c & 9d 
8c Functional breadth and initial level of DCSS Not Supported 10c &10d 
9a Functional breadth and adoption of ACSS Supported 8c & 8d 
9b Functional breadth and adoption of BCSS Supported 9c & 9d 
9c Functional breadth and adoption of DCSS Not Supported 10c &10d 
10a International experience and level of ACSS Not Supported 8c & 8d 
10b International experience and level of BCSS Not Supported 9c & 9d 
10c International experience and level of DCSS Not Supported 10c &10d 
11a International experience and adoption of ACSS Not Supported 8c & 8d 
11b International experience and adoption of BCSS Not Supported 9c & 9d 
11c International experience and adoption of DCSS Not Supported 10c &10d 
12a MBA and initial level of ACSS Not Supported 8d 
12b MBA and initial level of BCSS Not Supported 9d 
12c MBA and initial level of DCSS Not Supported 10d 
13a MBA and adoption of ACSS Not Supported 8d 
13b MBA and adoption of BCSS Not Supported 9d 
13c MBA and adoption of DCSS Not Supported 10d 
14a JD/LLB and initial level of ACSS Not Supported 8d 
14b JD/LLB and initial level of BCSS Not Supported 9d 
14c JD/LLB and initial level of DCSS Not Supported 10d 
15a JD/LLB and adoption of ACSS Not Supported 8d 
15b JD/LLB and adoption of BCSS Supported 9d 
15c JD/LLB and adoption of DCSS Not Supported 10d 
16a Managerial Discretion moderating EO&ACSS Not Supported 11b 
16b Managerial Discretion moderating EO&BCSS Not Supported 12b 
16c Managerial Discretion moderating EO&CCSS Not Supported 13b 
17a MD moderating EO & adoption of ACSS Not Supported 11b 
17b MD moderating EO & adoption of BCSS Not Supported 12b 
17c MD moderating EO & adoption of DCSS Not Supported 13b 
18a Mean ACSS moderating EO & ACSS Partially Supp. 11c 
18b Mean BCSS moderating EO & BCSS Partially Supp. 12c 
18c Mean DCSS moderating EO & DCSS Partially Supp. 13c 
19a MACSS moderating EO & adoption of ACSS Not Supported 11c 
19b MBCSS moderating EO & adoption of BCSS Not Supported 12c 
19c MDCSS moderating EO & adoption of DCSS Not Supported 13c 
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 In summary, models for ACSS, BCSS and DCSS showed similar patterns. On the 
whole, the CEO effect ranged from approximately 3% in the final RCM models (Model 
8d, 9d, 10d) to a robust 14% in the post hoc analysis that isolated the effect of just one 
CEO per firm on ACSS. Firms run by CEO’s with a liberal worldview were consistently 
related to the initial levels of CSS, while firms run by CEOs from output functions appear 
to be related to both initial levels and growth of CSS over time.  The remaining results for 
executive orientation were mixed, with international experience showing no relationship 
to CSS in any RCM model despite a positive and significant relationship in the post hoc 
analysis. Similarly, firms run by CEOs with an MBA mindset did not affect the rate of 
adoption of CSS, while the negative effect of a law mindset found some support in the 
RCM and post-hoc tests.  These results are discussed in detail in the next chapter as they 
relate to the literature covered in Chapter 2 and the theory developed in Chapters 3 and 4. 
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CHAPTER 7:  DISCUSSION 
 
Organizational researchers have long been interested in how managerial cognition 
affects strategic decision making at the firm level (Walsh, 1995).  Herein, I built a model 
of how managerial cognition at the strategic leadership level influences the corporate 
social strategies pursued by the firm.  Rooted in both the upper echelon perspective and 
institutional theory, I argued that an open executive orientation in particular, as reflected 
in a CEO’s political worldview, and variables such as functional background, education 
and international experience affect the selective perception, interpretation and therefore 
choice of the breadth and depth of a firm’s commitment to corporate social strategy. 
Furthermore, I argued that the level of managerial discretion at the industry level as well 
as general industry norms will attenuate the relationship between executive orientation 
and the initial status and rate of adoption of CSS over time, building a longitudinal, multi-
level model of the relationship between executive orientation and corporate social 
strategy. 
The findings of the RCM tests of these relationships, however, were mixed. In this 
chapter I discuss the significance of these results broadly at three levels – individual 
(CEO), firm and industry - moving from more micro to more macro implications. First, I 
review the results of the ‘CEO Effect’ on CSS. Although varied, the findings nonetheless 
offer some interesting nuances into the relationship between an open executive 
orientation and the corporate social strategy pursued by the firm over time (Section 7.1). 
Second, I consider the various important relationships in firm level adoption of ACSS, 
BCSS and DCSS over time that warrant further exploration (Section 7.2). Lastly, perhaps 
the most surprising finding of this research regards the lack of significant variance found 
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in the CSS of firms between industries (Section 7.3).  The implications of these findings 
are discussed in the following sections. 
7.1   Individual Level: The CEO Effect 
Strategy scholars have long debated the degree to which an organization’s CEO 
has the capacity to influence important strategic decisions and firm performance 
outcomes (Child, 1972; Crossland & Hambrick, 2011; Finkelstein et al., 2009; Lieberson 
& O'Connor, 1972; Mackey, 2008; Thomas, 1988). Several streams of research have 
emerged under the ‘does leadership matter’ umbrella:  (1) descriptive studies that seek to 
explain how much CEO’s matter (Mackey, 2008), (2) contingency models that look to 
explain when or where CEO’s matter (Crossland & Hambrick, 2011; Rowe, Cannella, 
Rankin & Gorman, 2005), and (3) upper echelon explorations into how CEO’s matter, or 
stated differently, what particular aspects of executive orientation matter to strategic 
choices made at the firm level (Finkelstein et al., 2009).   
With regards to the first stream of research on how much CEO’s matter, consensus 
with regards to the magnitude of the CEO effect on firm performance has been elusive. 
By “CEO effect”, I mean the “proportion of variance in a firm-level outcome variable that 
is statistically associated with, or can be attributed to, the presence of individual CEOs in 
the sample” (Crossland & Hambrick, 2007p. 769-770). This terminology is often found in 
variance components analysis (VCA) studies of year, industry and firm effects in strategy 
research (e.g., Hough, 2006; McGahan & Porter, 1997; Misangyi et al., 2006; Rumelt, 
1991; Schmalensee, 1985) and can easily be applied to research in CSR as well. 
However, given different theoretical and methodological approaches that underpin 
historical studies on the influence of CEOs (Mackey, 2008), estimates of the CEO effect 
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on firm performance (e.g., ROA) have ranged widely from approximately 5% to 30%, 
depending on time frame, sample and methodology used as summarized in Table 7.1. 
Other studies that have not directly employed VCA, have also examined the CEO effect 
on more specific strategy decisions finding that CEOs influence 3% of the variance in 
acquisitions, 2% in advertising, 1% in R&D and a full 37% of changes in SG&A (selling, 
general & administrative) expenses (Bertrand & Schoar, 2003).  
In this dissertation, the CEO effect on CSS was also captured in several models 
and similarly ranges from 3% to 14% depending on the underlying sampling strategy. In 
the RCM models, including the full set of CEO executive orientation variables reduced 
the unexplained variance in ACSS by approximately 4% (Model 8d). Similarly, the CEO 
effect on BCSS was found to be 2.9% (Model 9d) and for DCSS 3.6% (Model 10d). 
These lower numbers are more in line with Bertrand and Schoar’s (2003) findings 
regarding the CEO effect on particular strategy levers such as advertising and acquisitions 
than with overall firm financial performance figures as described in Figure 7.1. 
Furthermore, these results are also in line with several studies that have included CEO 
predictor variables in models of CSP. For example, Manner (2010) found that CEO 
education and functional background can explain approximately 5% of the variance in 
positive CSP measures, yet had no effect on the negative side of CSP. Similarly, CEO 
international experience and output functional background also add 1.8% to models of 
CSP strengths with no effect on CSP weaknesses (Slater & Dixon-Fowler, 2009).  
In addition, the post-hoc tests revealed that, where the effect of just one CEO per 
firm was modeled on a reduced sample, adding the executive orientation predictors 
reduced the variance components by almost 14% (Section 6.4). This suggests that the 
CEO effect is much more discernable in models where only one CEO per firm is 
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observed, rather than models where CEO effects are aggregated, as is often done in cross-
sectional studies. On the whole, despite a relatively small variance explained, the finding 
of a significant CEO effect in this dissertation (all chi-square tests between models were 
significant), nonetheless provides evidence that CEO’s do matter in determining a firm’s 
initial level and rates of adoption of CSS over time. 
  
191 
Study 
Table 7.1:  Prior Empirical Studies on the CEO Effect (DV: ROA) 
Lieberson & 
O’Connor 
(1972) 
Weiner 
(1978) 
Thomas 
(1988) * 
Wasserman, 
Nohria & 
Anand (2001) 
Crossland & Hambrick 
(2007) ** 
Mackey (2008) 
Sample:                 
CEOs n/a n/a n/a 1384 222 92 
Firms 167  193 12  531 100  51  
Industries 13 1 1 42 n/a 98 
Observations 3,340 3,667 n/a 10,089 1,464 801 
Time Frame 1946-1965 1956-1974 1965-1984 1979-1997 1988-2002 1992-2002 
Method VCA VCA VCA VCA Sequential 
ANOVA 
Simul-
taneous 
ANOVA 
Sequential 
ANOVA 
Simul-
taneous 
ANOVA 
Year Effect 1.8% 2.4% 5.6% 2.6% 4.0% 3.6% 1.0% 0.7% 
Industry Effect 28.5% 20.5% n/a 6.3% 7.7% 11.8% 18.0% 6.2% 
Corporate Effect 22.6% 45.8% 83.2% 25.5% 6.5% 19.1% 29.5% 7.9% 
CEO Effect 14.5% 8.7% 5.7% 14.7% 30.4% 13.4% 12.9% 29.2% 
Error 32.6% 22.6% 5.4% 50.9% 51.4% 52.1% 38.5% 21.8% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
Table adapted and expanded from: Mackey, A. 2008. The effect of CEOs on firm performance, Strategic Management Journal, 29(12), p. 1362.  
* The Thomas (1988) study is the only one that is UK not US based 
**The Crossland & Hambrick (2007) study compares the CEO effect for US, Japanese and German firms; The US data is repeated here for consistency with 
other studies. 
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With regards to the second stream of research examining when or where CEOs 
matter, I modeled the CEO effect on CSS in light of two different situational variables: 
managerial discretion and industry norms. The results for managerial discretion were 
unequivocal: The CEO effect is not stronger in environments characterized by greater 
degrees of latitude of action (chi-square tests for model fit improvements for 11b, 12b and 
13b were all non-significant).  This finding is surprising given the vast amount of 
research that supports stronger associations between CEO variables and firm level 
outcomes in high versus low discretion contexts (Boyd & Gove, 2006; Crossland & 
Hambrick, 2011).  However, given that the overall industry effect was minimal as 
detected in the unconditional means models (Table 6.5), it appears as though there was a 
great deal of variance between firms within industries in general, suggesting overall 
higher degrees of managerial discretion than anticipated. I return to this point in Section 
7.3. 
The results with regards to industry norms were similar. Although some of the 
predicted associations between executive orientation and initial levels of CSS were 
stronger when industry norms were also higher, these findings were not consistent. Again, 
with little industry level distinctions between initial levels and rates of adoption of CSS, it 
was difficult to tease out when the CEO effect may be greater in higher vs. lower mean 
CSS industries. On the whole, however, the non-significant effects of situational factors 
suggests that that the CEO effect is not contingent on the degree of latitude of action in 
their operating environment, nor contingent on the level of ‘peer pressure’ imposed by 
industry norms. This is an important finding in that it supports the strategic choice 
perspective of managerial decision making rather than situational constraint perspectives 
(Child, 1972; Oliver, 1991) . 
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At the core of this dissertation, of course, is the third stream of research into the 
CEO effect, which takes an upper echelon perspective on how CEOs matter to firm level 
outcomes. Having theoretically argued for the importance of an open executive 
orientation on levels and rates of adoption of CSS, the final results were mixed and only 
some of the hypothesized relationships were significant. Figure 7.1 visually depicts the 
final significant RCM results for ACSS, BCSS and DCSS using the coefficients from 
Models 8d, 9d and 10d. The dashed lines represent relationships that found partial support 
in other models. 
in other models. 
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-0.02* 
Figure 7.1:  Empirical Model of Executive Orientation and CSS 
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 The findings of the hypotheses tests of executive orientation on CSS demonstrate 
that not all demographic proxies of an open executive orientation have the same influence 
on a firm’s CSS over time. The strongest and most consistent results were for firms led by 
CEO’s with output (e.g., marketing, sales) functional backgrounds, who were related to 
both the initial levels of ACSS and BCSS, as well as the rate of adoption of ACSS and 
DCSS (partially). This is a similar result to one of the earliest cross-sectional studies in 
this area which found that firms with high CSP scores (amalgamated) were more likely to 
be led by CEOs with backgrounds in output functions (Thomas & Simerly, 1994).  
Furthermore, it is also in line with studies that have used the throughput/output function 
distinction as a proxy for CEO openness to change specifically (Musteen et al., 2006, 
2010).  
 Figure 7.2 visually depicts the effect of firms run by CEO’s with output functional 
backgrounds on ACSS over time using the results from Model 8c with standardized 
coefficients to graph the relationships. As can be seen, the initial level of ACSS in 1991 
for firms run by CEOs with output functional backgrounds is higher than the sample 
mean and the trajectory for the rate of change over time increases as well (there is a slight 
fanning in the tail). 
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Figure 7.2:  Relationship Between CEO Output Functional Background and Firm 
ACSS Over Time 
 
Firms run by CEOs with a liberal worldview were also hypothesized to affect the 
initial levels and the rate of adoption of CSS. However, in this longitudinal study, a 
liberal worldview only affected the initial levels of ACSS and DCSS, with no influence 
on the adoption of broader or deeper social strategies over time. This initial impact, 
however, was significant and, as can be seen in Figure 7.3, makes a substantial difference 
to the growth trajectory of ACSS over time for firms run by CEOs with more liberal 
worldviews. As such, within this sample, firms run by CEOs with liberal worldviews did 
have higher ACSS and DCSS levels between 1991-2009 than firms run by CEOs with 
conservative worldviews. This supports the argument that an open executive orientation 
with regards to social, environmental and other stakeholder issues does in fact make a 
difference to the levels of CSS adopted by the firm over time. 
 
196 
 
196 
 
Figure 7.3:  Relationship Between CEO Political Liberalism And Firm ACSS Over 
Time 
 
Functional breadth, on the other hand, only affects the rates of change of ACSS 
and BCSS, with no direct effect on initial levels of CSS.  This is somewhat contrary to 
Manner’s (2010) recent cross-sectional study that found firms run by CEO’s with greater 
functional breadth had higher levels of CSP. However, the OLS beta estimate for the 
cross-sectional effect of functional breadth on KLD strengths reported in Manner’s study 
(0.09, p<0.05) is not that different from the estimated coefficient for the effect of 
functional breadth reported here (0.07, p<0.05). Because the RCM methodology allows 
for the modeling of the impact of both the intercept and the slope on the overall levels of 
CSS, it could be that cross-sectional studies miss this nuance.  This finding does, 
however, suggest that being exposed to a broader variety of functional areas allows for a 
broader ‘selective’ perception, interpretation and hence choice of social and 
environmental programs over time. Although, as can be seen in Figure 7.4, the overall 
impact of this effect over time is not substantive. 
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Figure 7.4:  Relationship Between CEO Functional Breadth and Firm ACSS Over 
Time 
 
 
With regards to international experience, none of the RCM models supported the 
hypothesis that international experience is positively related to ACSS, BCSS or DCSS 
initially or over time. This is somewhat surprising given recent research that has shown 
that firms run by CEOs that have had some international assignment experience are 
positively related to CSP strengths in particular, at least cross-sectionally (Slater & 
Dixon-Fowler, 2009). Again, this may be an artefact of the longitudinal vs. cross-
sectional study methodology. For example, in the post hoc analyses reported in Section 
6.4, international experience was positively and significantly associated with ACSS in the 
models were only one CEO per firm was measured. Here, the effect of international 
experience on the initial levels of ACSS was both significant and substantial (β=2.73, 
p<0.001) (although no effect on the rate of adoption was detected given the shorter time 
frame of the sample). This coefficient is larger than the effect of CEOs with output 
functional backgrounds (β=2.01, p<0.05) or liberal worldviews (β=0.36, p<0.10) on 
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initial levels of ACSS (in this case, in 2001), supporting the earlier conclusion that 
empirical models that isolate the performance of a single CEO will detect greater ‘CEO 
effects’ as is the case in the Slater and Dixon-Fowler (2009) study. 
Lastly, the influence of educational specialization had mixed effects on CSS. 
Contrary to expected patterns, firms run by CEOs with MBA degrees were marginally 
more, not less, likely to adopt ACSS over time. Yet, as predicted, firms run by CEOs with 
legal degrees were less likely to adopt broader CSS.  Despite arguments that an MBA 
education narrows the scope of training to favour shareholder over stakeholder theories of 
the firm (Ferraro, Pfeffer & Sutton, 2005), it appears as though, on average, this does not 
affect the adoption of social, environmental and other stakeholder programs over time. 
The RCM analyses and the above discussion of the CEO effect thus answer the 
first research question posed in this dissertation:  
1. What is the relationship between executive orientation and the 
corporate social strategy pursued by the firm over time? 
 
I now turn to a discussion of the second research question: 
 
2. How do firm and industry characteristics affect the relationship 
between executive orientation and the corporate social strategies 
pursued by the firm over time? 
 
7.2   Firm Level:  Typologies and Trends 
7.2.1   CSS:  Business as Usual? 
As the first study to have explicitly modeled the individual growth trajectories of 
firm level CSS over time, the relatively small overall improvement in CSS over the last 
19 years is a somewhat surprising finding of this dissertation. In the aggregate, ACSS has 
grown from approximately 5% to 12% of total possible social, environmental and other 
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stakeholder strengths in the past two decades.  The breadth of CSS has also doubled from 
about 0.31 to 0.63 and the depth of CSS from .16 to .32. Although this could be 
considered progress, in absolute terms, the average KLD score for firms has only grown 
from 2 strengths in 1991 to 4 strengths, on average, in 2009.  An entropy measure of 0.31 
corresponds to a presence in just over one CSR category (e.g., community relations) and 
increasing this to 0.63 represents a dispersion from one to two categories (e.g., 
community relations and diversity). Further, within the CSS area that a firm is engaging 
at the deepest level of commitment, in 2009 firms are still only participating, on average,  
in 32% of the total possible initiatives in that area. As such, despite claims that the dawn 
of a new corporate social responsibility era is upon us (Googins et al., 2007; Waddock, 
2008), in empirical fact, this rise has been neither fast, nor great. Rather, it seems as 
though it has been largely business as usual. 
Linking these average scores back to the typology of CSS built in Section 2.3, if 
the depth axis ranges from 0 to 1 and the breadth axis from 0 to 1.63, than the average 
CSS pursued by firms in 1991 is not substantially different than that pursued by firms in 
2009; as can be seen in Figure 7.5, with a DCSS of 0.32 and a BCSS of 0.63, the average 
firm in 2009 is still following a Derivative CSS, as was the case in 1991. 
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Figure 7.5:  Typology of Corporate Social Strategy: 1991-2009 
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 Narrow                             Broad 
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However, the variance in both the initial levels of CSS and the rates of adoption of 
CSS by firms over time has been significant (Tables 6.6 - 6.10). Further, as outlined in 
Table 6.1, the range of firm level CSS is vast, with BCSS from zero to 1.63 (or to a 
presence in every CSR area) and DCSS from zero to one such that some firms are 100% 
committed to a particular social or environmental category.  If we replace the scale of the 
depth and breadth axes with the sample mean (rather than the scale mid point), it becomes 
easier to identify specific firms that fall into more proactive quadrants, following Diffuse, 
Dedicated and Devoted CSS. For example, in 2009, the distribution of the 303 firms in 
the sample would fall within each quadrant as represented in Figure 7.6. 
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Figure 7.6:  Distribution of Firms by CSS Quadrant (Mean Split) – 2009 
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While the largest group of firms is still following a Derivative CSS, and 9% of 
firms remained completely Disengaged in 2009, the variety of approaches to CSS is 
nonetheless apparent. To illustrate, using the Steel/Heavy Manufacturing industry as an 
example (SIC 3200-3599, n=39), the following figure demonstrates how the typology can 
be used to assess the variance in the depth and breath of firm level CSS at a given point in 
time (here 2009). As can be seen below, familiar companies that are generally well 
known for their CSR efforts such as Xerox and Hewlett-Packard, can be found in the 
Devoted CSS quadrant, scoring above the mean on both depth and breadth dimensions. In 
contrast, other firms such as Deere & Company, follow a Diffuse strategy, with limited 
engagement across a broad spectrum of social and environmental areas, while Parker-
Hannifin scores high in only one category illustrating a Dedicated CSS.  While numerous 
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firms also fall into the Derivative quadrant, only Crane & Co. is completely Disengaged 
in this industry in 2009 registering no strengths in any CSR areas. 
 
 
Figure 7.7:  Typology of Corporate Social Strategy – Steel/Heavy Manufacturing 
2009 
 
What then are the firm level determinants of BCSS and DCSS?  On top of the 
open executive orientation predictors outlined in the previous section, several firm-level 
control variables were also found to be significant determinants of the breadth and depth 
of CSS over time.  Specifically, as in previous studies (McWilliams & Siegel, 2000; 
Shropshire & Hillman, 2007; Strike et al., 2006), this dissertation confirms that firm size 
is an important determinant of both the initial levels and rates of adoption of CSS in the 
last two decades (consistent significant, positive relationship with both initial levels and 
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rates of change across all models). Furthermore, although previous research has stressed 
the importance of R&D on CSP (McWilliams & Siegel, 2000; Padgett & Galán, 2010), it 
appears as though R&D intensity is an important predictor of the rate of adoption of CSS 
over time, but is not necessarily related to the initial status of CSS.  
Although there is a lengthy debate with regards to the direction of the causal 
relationship between firm financial and firm social performance (Margolis et al., 2007; 
Waddock & Graves, 1997), in this thesis financial performance was modeled as a firm-
level control variable predicting initial levels and rates of adoption of ACSS, BCSS and 
DCSS over time. In all models in this dissertation, this relationship was found to be 
positive, substantial and significant. However, as noted in the robustness checks, the 
positive CFP-CSP link uncovered in this thesis should be used with some caution, as the 
significance levels vary under alternate specifications of the independent variable. 
Furthermore, past performance was modeled as a direct within-firm time-variant 
determinant of CSS, rather than as a predictor of intercepts or slopes at Level 2 which 
could also affect interpretation.  
Left unanswered in this dissertation is how different types of CSS (Disengaged, 
Derivative, Dedicated, Diffuse or Devoted) may in turn affect firm financial performance. 
This is a question of some importance that has recently surfaced as part of the CSP-CFP 
debate, which has moved beyond answering questions regarding whether CSR matters, to 
calls for a better understanding of how CSR makes a difference to firm level outcomes 
(Barnett, 2007; Brammer & Millington, 2008; Margolis & Walsh, 2003; Mazutis, 2010; 
Orlitzky et al., 2003). Although beyond the scope of this dissertation, this discussion 
nonetheless points to some interesting future research where the full causal link 
(executive orientation →  CSS  →  firm performance), can be tested empirically.   
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7.2.2  CSS: Linear and Non-Linear Trends over Time 
In addition to findings at the firm level pertaining to the typology, there were also 
interesting nuances with regards to the patterns of change observed in firm level adoption 
of CSS over time. The hypotheses and models developed herein were based on the 
assumption that the relationship between firm level CSS and time would be linear and 
positive. In fact, results revealed that, while the overall linear growth pattern holds over 
time, a small, yet statistically significant cubic trend could be detected (Figures 6.1-6.4; 
Tables 6.8-6.10). Although no hypotheses were generated to predict this pattern, several 
possible explanations are feasible given that the final models still contained a significant 
amount of unexplained variance. 
First, it is possible that the growth in the scope and scale of stakeholder, social and 
environmental issues facing organizations has not been merely cumulative (Waddock, 
2008; Waddock et al., 2002), but rather that this growth has been cyclical; as a result, the 
adoption of CSS initiatives at the firm level that tackle these issues has also been cyclical. 
In-line with the issue life-cycle approach (Rivoli & Waddock, 2011) outlined in Section 
3.1, it is possible that as the importance of some issues have faded, others emerged, which 
could explain the slight deceleration in the rate of adoption of ACSS, BCSS and DCSS 
that occurred around the year 2000 and then the quickening of the rate of adoption around 
the year 2004.  
Alternately, the cubic trend could be the result of other macro-environmental 
factors that affected all firms in the sample equally. For example, it is possible that firm-
level corporate social strategy somewhat mirrors the national policies of the political 
party in office, in four or eight year trends. Similarly, macro environmental jolts such as 
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the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in late 2002, which was accompanied by a 
rush of ethics programs and transparency initiatives, could also explain the rise in CSS 
seen beginning in 2004.  This discussion, however, is speculative and these questions are 
left for future research. 
7.3   Industry Level:  Isomorphism - What Isomorphism? 
The last level of analysis yielding interesting results in this dissertation pertains to 
the role of the institutional field, often operationalized at the industry level (Hambrick et 
al., 2004). Research in CSR has long contended that industry matters in shaping firm 
level social, environmental and other stakeholder relationships (Waddock & Graves, 
1997). Similarly, institutional theorists stress the importance of field level processes such 
as mimetic, coercive and normative isomorphism that affect the rate of adoption of new 
practices such as CSR within industries (Campbell, 2007; Hoffman, 1999; Matten & 
Moon, 2008). Yet, in this thesis, the level of variance attributable to between industry 
factors ranged from 0% (DCSS) to 2.8% (BCSS) with the overall variance in ACSS 
determined by industry at only 1.7% (as reported in the unconditional means models in 
Table 6.5). This suggests that, contrary to the popular assumption that industry 
membership determines the degree to which firms will engage in CSR activities (Chen, 
Patten & Roberts, 2008), firms within industries actually have a great deal of latitude in 
terms of how they choose to respond to social, environmental and other stakeholder 
issues. 
As can be seen in the individual firm growth curves modeled by industry and 
presented in Appendix D, rather than reflecting isomorphism over time (where less 
variance is observed as time progresses), the patterns in the growth curves remain wildly 
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variant around the mean throughout the 1991-2009 time frame of this study for every 
industry. This effect can also been seen in Table 7.2 which details both the mean levels of 
ACSS and the standard deviations in ACSS from 1991-2009 grouped by industry.  While 
the mean ACSS for all industries has increased during this time span, so too has the 
standard deviation. This effect is also visually depicted in Figure 7.8. 
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Industry/Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Avg.
Mining/Construction Mean 2.38 3.21 3.97 3.87 3.43 4.09 4.31 4.53 5.17 4.67 5.42 4.84 4.88 4.10 4.55 5.25 6.93 8.82 9.05 4.87
St. Dev 3.12 3.09 3.40 2.50 2.49 3.38 2.67 3.50 4.18 3.52 5.15 4.25 3.95 3.37 4.29 4.92 4.98 6.32 6.52 4.27
N 14 15 14 15 16 16 16 16 16 15 16 16 16 16 16 14 14 14 13
Food/Textiles/Apparel Mean 5.31 5.71 7.41 8.47 9.54 8.76 8.33 7.47 7.47 8.06 8.61 8.60 8.85 8.85 9.72 11.25 11.64 12.06 12.69 8.81
St. Dev 5.45 5.35 6.55 7.04 7.76 7.68 7.18 5.72 5.81 6.59 7.48 7.41 7.41 7.80 8.33 9.16 9.24 10.71 10.61 7.68
N 23 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 23 23 20 19
Forrest/Paper/Publishing Mean 4.80 5.31 5.68 5.10 6.05 6.90 7.87 8.19 8.84 8.54 8.28 8.28 7.52 7.81 9.19 10.59 12.09 11.66 11.55 8.08
St. Dev 5.79 6.86 6.72 6.05 6.12 6.44 7.07 7.62 7.53 7.76 7.14 6.81 6.91 7.27 7.98 9.13 8.91 10.08 10.06 7.72
N 27 30 30 31 32 32 32 32 32 32 31 30 32 32 32 30 27 28 28
Chemicals/Pharma Mean 5.79 6.89 7.11 8.32 9.17 9.53 10.16 10.34 10.89 11.32 11.98 12.63 12.01 12.34 13.88 14.39 15.46 16.44 16.36 11.28
St. Dev 6.58 6.63 6.95 7.33 8.40 8.15 8.56 8.22 8.31 8.72 9.38 9.80 9.68 10.27 11.44 11.22 11.10 10.79 11.03 9.55
N 32 36 37 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 37 36 38 38 38 37 35 34 32
Refining/Rubber/Plastic Mean 6.88 10.05 11.11 11.52 12.90 12.32 10.84 11.82 13.30 14.29 15.24 15.67 14.29 14.29 16.02 14.71 15.29 15.88 15.88 13.15
St. Dev 3.96 6.66 6.42 5.22 5.89 4.82 5.43 5.21 5.78 6.86 5.73 7.78 7.41 9.52 11.70 11.16 12.02 12.92 12.92 7.72
N 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 6 5 5 5
Steel/Heavy Manufacturing Mean 5.56 6.05 6.32 6.14 6.45 6.81 7.23 7.40 8.07 7.92 8.74 8.83 8.52 8.20 10.08 10.74 11.25 12.52 12.44 8.36
St. Dev 6.77 6.72 6.99 6.03 6.53 7.73 8.12 8.67 9.24 8.50 9.63 9.21 9.25 9.19 9.67 11.02 10.01 10.66 10.68 8.91
N 38 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 40 37 38 40 40 40 40 40 39 39
Computers/Auto/Aero Mean 4.22 5.43 5.96 6.56 7.39 7.79 8.51 8.45 9.54 9.44 9.56 9.73 9.63 10.63 11.77 12.78 13.81 14.02 13.64 9.37
St. Dev 4.34 5.20 6.04 5.82 6.14 6.84 7.22 7.39 8.09 7.72 8.55 8.77 8.90 10.34 11.16 12.06 12.75 12.68 12.14 9.21
N 57 58 59 60 62 62 62 60 60 60 61 61 61 60 60 58 56 56 55
Transportation Mean 8.15 8.42 7.07 6.74 6.74 6.27 6.58 6.90 8.78 8.48 9.39 8.39 9.06 8.13 9.09 8.53 10.70 9.63 9.63 8.23
St. Dev 6.94 7.96 7.67 7.13 7.42 7.20 6.97 6.72 7.92 7.05 7.57 7.32 7.28 6.94 8.16 7.52 6.48 5.28 5.28 6.90
N 10 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 10 10 10 9 10 11 11 11
Telephone/Utilities Mean 5.25 6.27 7.12 8.44 8.93 9.66 10.90 10.88 9.81 10.27 11.01 10.80 10.38 10.25 9.67 8.82 9.56 10.29 10.29 9.38
St. Dev 4.87 5.62 6.70 7.42 7.97 8.50 8.37 8.43 8.32 8.05 8.61 8.68 7.09 7.25 5.69 5.44 5.43 6.72 6.72 7.28
N 24 26 26 26 26 25 25 26 26 25 23 23 25 25 26 25 24 24 24
Wholesale/Retail Mean 4.25 4.34 5.51 5.58 6.27 6.70 6.51 6.51 5.96 6.11 5.95 6.26 5.76 6.00 6.96 7.79 8.20 9.01 9.28 6.43
St. Dev 4.48 5.12 5.56 5.87 6.40 7.51 6.84 6.43 5.31 5.66 5.34 4.69 5.11 5.55 5.39 5.74 6.81 7.69 7.51 6.05
N 34 35 37 37 36 36 36 36 37 36 37 34 38 38 37 34 33 32 32
Financial Mean 6.28 7.68 8.47 8.49 8.21 10.14 11.08 11.10 11.75 11.04 12.19 12.40 12.79 11.93 12.58 12.71 12.65 14.29 13.24 11.07
St. Dev 5.95 7.54 7.33 6.25 6.65 7.85 7.98 8.57 9.47 8.01 7.97 9.13 9.27 9.58 9.31 9.31 9.43 10.52 10.16 8.66
N 23 27 28 30 33 33 33 32 32 32 32 32 32 33 33 31 30 28 26
Hotel/Entertainment/Services Mean 3.91 5.37 5.19 4.52 5.07 5.58 5.75 6.90 7.55 7.46 7.62 7.42 8.48 9.53 10.15 11.76 12.85 13.00 13.00 7.90
St. Dev 7.46 7.36 7.82 7.05 6.73 7.82 8.18 8.93 10.72 10.64 10.01 9.07 8.96 9.54 11.22 12.82 14.32 14.52 14.52 10.29
N 18 20 20 20 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 20 21 20 20 19 19 19 19
Yearly Averages Mean 5.01 5.90 6.48 6.78 7.34 7.83 8.30 8.41 8.88 8.89 9.30 9.41 9.22 9.37 10.40 11.10 11.90 12.55 12.42 8.89
St. Dev 5.59 6.21 6.59 6.43 6.88 7.44 7.60 7.69 8.09 7.89 8.30 8.38 8.29 8.82 9.39 9.97 10.13 10.59 10.42 8.48
Table 7.2:  Growth in Mean Levels and Standard Deviations of ACSS over Time by Industry 
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Figure 7.8:  Growth in Mean Levels and Standard Deviations of ACSS over Time 
(Yearly Averages) 
 
 
Given that DiMaggio and Powell (1983) argue that “the effect of institutional 
isomorphism is homogenization, the best indicator of isomorphic change is a decrease in 
variation and diversity, which could be measured by lower standard deviations of the 
values of selected indicators in a set of organizations” (p. 155), the growth of standard 
deviations around ACSS can be seen as evidence of increased heterogeneity, not 
homogeneity, at the industry level with regards to adoption of social, environmental and 
other stakeholder initiatives.30
This is not unlike the findings of Hambrick, Finkelstein, Cho and Jackson (2004) 
who found that, contrary to DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) ‘iron cage’ hypothesis, the 
degree of field level heterogeneity in the last twenty years has in fact increased, rather 
 
                                                 
30 Appendix E contains the tables and graphs for BCSS and DCSS. While the standard deviations in these 
charts do not show as marked an increase over time as ACSS, it is clear nonetheless that the 
homogenization of BCSS and DCSS over time by industry is also not occurring. 
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than decreased. These authors argue that the macro level determinants of institutional 
isomorphism predicted by DiMaggio and Powell have failed to materialize. Instead, in the 
period between 1980-2000, “goal ambiguity has been reduced, industry has become less 
structurated, dealings with the state have declined, resource dependence has diffused, 
legitimate alternative models have proliferated, and managerial backgrounds have 
become more diverse” (Hambrick et al., 2004: p. 326) resulting in more heterogeneous 
industries at the turn of this century than anticipated. As a consequence, this 
heterogeneity, they argue, has also increased the overall level of managerial discretion 
across industries. 
To illustrate, if industry membership was a significant determinant of firm level 
CSS and isomorphic practices were in place, one might expect to observe growth curves 
more in line with the hypothetical model in Figure 7.9, with greater initial levels of 
variation, yet increasing similarity over time (decreasing standard deviations around the 
mean).  Further, the levels of CSS would vary significantly by industry. 
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Figure 7.9:  Hypothetical Expected Growth in Mean Levels and Variation of ACSS 
over Time by Industry in the Presence of Industry Effects and Isomorphism 
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 Rather, what this dissertation has shown is that the actual linear growth 
trajectories between industries are not statistically different from each other such that no 
one industry can be said to have a higher level or rate of adoption of ACSS over time than 
another (Figure 7.10). Furthermore, instead of increased isomorphism over time, the 
degree of variation between firms within industries has instead increased over time 
(Figure 7.11).31
 
 
 
Figure 7.10:  Actual Linear Growth in Mean Levels of ACSS over Time by Industry 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
31 Note: Linear vs. cubic OLS growth curves shown for ease of illustration. 
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Figure 7.11:  Actual Linear Growth in Mean Levels of ACSS over Time by 
Company 
 
In summary, although the preliminary testing for patterns of change (Section 6.2) 
suggested that industries may differ with regards to their initial levels and rates of change 
of CSS over time, these variances were not consistently significant and none of the 
random effects of the between industry linear rates of change were significant (Tables 6.5 
to 6.7). In addition, compared to the variation between firms within industries, the 
industry level variations were also not substantive. As such, while I anticipated that both 
the industry level of managerial discretion and industry norms would strengthen the 
relationship between executive orientation and CSS, with only 0.0 - 2.8% of the variance 
attributable to industry, these hypotheses found only very limited support. These findings 
do, however, directly answer part of the second research question posed in the 
introduction of this dissertation:  How do industry characteristics affect the relationship 
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between executive orientation and the CSS pursued by the firm over time? It appears that 
the answer is:  They don’t. 
There may be several reasons for this counterintuitive finding. First, despite 
institutional arguments that suggest firms operating in particular industries may face 
different degrees of coercive, mimetic or normative isomorphic pressures (Campbell, 
2007), extant research has previously found support for the heterogeneity of firm 
responses to CSR issues, even within the same industry (Aragón-Correa & Sharma, 2003; 
Hambrick et al., 2004; Sharma et al., 1999; Sharma & Vredenburg, 1998).  Second, most 
studies that have invoked the institutional argument in the CSR domain, nonetheless have 
tested for industry effects using cross-sectional not longitudinal designs (Shropshire & 
Hillman, 2007), thus excluding a critical element of institutional theory – the role of time.  
Lastly, most of the research on institutional effects on firm level CSR have used 
composite scores for CSR that include both negative and positive CSR activities (e.g., 
Padgett & Galán, 2010). These amalgamated scores may mask important differences 
regarding the institutional determinants of corporate social responsibility vs. corporate 
social irresponsibility (CSiR). While the first two of these arguments have been 
developed elsewhere in this thesis, the last point merits some further discussion. 
7.3.1   Institutional Pressures: The difference between CSR and CSiR 
Within the CSR arena, the paradox of forces that drive industries towards 
homogeneity (firms striving for legitimacy) vs. heterogeneity (firms striving for 
differentiation) (Hambrick et al., 2004) may be partially explained by the divergent 
conceptualizations of CSR (aggregate or disaggregate approaches) as discussed in 
Chapter 2.  Research that has relied primarily on aggregate measures of CSP in particular 
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have often included both negative and positive CSR ratings in combination (e.g., Padgett 
& Galán, 2010). As discussed, these amalgamated scores for CSS present several 
conceptual as well as methodological issues (Strike et al., 2006).   
Yet, one important assumption buried within this approach to CSR that has been 
less discussed, is the assumption that a firm’s negative and positive approach to CSR lie 
on the same continuum and thus share similar antecedents or outcomes (McGuire, Dow & 
Argheyd, 2003). While this assumption has some attractive heuristic properties, a great 
deal of the logic underlying institutional arguments toward homogeneity implicitly 
invokes explanations for corporate social irresponsibility (CSiR), not corporate social 
responsibility. In contrast, CSS, as conceptualized in this dissertation, is the strategic 
choice to engage in social, environmental or other stakeholder issues and has thus been 
modeled exclusively as firm engagement in CSR strengths (not concerns) as 
recommended by recent research (Mattingly & Berman, 2006; Strike et al., 2006). The 
lack of evidence for an industry effect may therefore be a reflection of the methods 
employed which in turn sheds interesting new light on existing research. 
To illustrate, the common assumption that industry is an important predictor of 
CSR can be found in one of the earliest rationalizations for industry effects on firm level 
CSP where the focus was explicitly on the potential negative implications of industry 
association that stated: “depending on its characteristics, an industry may or may not 
experience significant problems in a given social arena” (Waddock & Graves, 1997: p. 
309, emphasis added). Similarly, it has been argued that firms in manufacturing 
industries, by definition, face more environmental issues and product safety issues than 
firms in service-oriented companies and, as a result, will be more corporately socially 
responsible (Chen et al., 2008). Chatterji and Toeffel (2010) also found that firms in 
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highly regulated industries are more likely to improve their environmental performance 
after being poorly rated. While these industry effects may be true, the underlying 
institutional mechanisms at play may be, in reality, serving to mitigate negative 
externalities, rather than to promote positive CSR outcomes.  
The legitimacy argument that is central to institutional theory explanations for a 
firm’s “license to operate” also rests primarily on assumptions pertaining to CSiR, not 
CSR. For example, it has been argued that firms in industries that have greater visibility 
or that are more consumer-facing, may attract greater public scrutiny and are therefore 
held to higher standards of corporate citizenship (Brammer & Millington, 2004; Gardberg 
& Fombrun, 2006; Seifert, Morris & Bartkus, 2004). Legitimizing institutional pressures 
guide firms to avoid “poor social and environmental ratings [that] can harm a company’s 
performance and reputation” (Chatterji, Levine & Toffel, 2009: p. 126). These arguments, 
however, do not necessarily transpose to pressures to pursue positive CSR programs. 
This mirrors the long debate in business ethics about a firm’s negative vs. positive 
responsibilities. Negative duties refer to an organization’s responsibility to ‘do no harm’, 
with respect to stakeholders or the natural environment. In contrast, a firm’s positive 
duties refer to obligations that reflect a commitment to help others achieve some good 
(Swanson, 1995). It is possible that isomorphic pressures, as envisioned and endorsed by 
institutional theorists, may have differential effects on industry level consensus regarding 
CSR vs. CSiR issues. For example, coercive isomorphic pressures seem to work through 
legislative and regulatory mechanisms to ensure protection of primarily negative rights. 
Through the use of sanctions and fines, firms are encouraged not to pollute, not to 
discriminate and not to abuse human rights. Yet, there are fewer coercive mechanisms 
that encourage firms to support positive duties (e.g., corporate philanthropic contributions 
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to the community are not legislated) and attempts to regulate are often met with great 
opposition (e.g., affirmative action).  Mimetic and normative isomorphism may also 
affect CSR and CSiR differentially. 
Deephouse (1999), for example, argued that managers in an industry: 
  “develop cognitive consensus about the strategies that will lead to 
success. Called 'industry recipes' by strategists, these strategic norms 
resemble the governance structures, institutional logics, and institutional 
templates of institutional theory. Strategic norms can develop about 
different scope and resource commitments, such as diversification and 
innovation.” (Deephouse, 1999: p.152) 
 
It would be logical to assume that these strategic norms would also develop about 
the legitimate scope of resource commitments around CSR issues. However, this 
dissertation did not find support for ‘strategic norms’, ‘industry recipes’ or ‘cognitive 
consensus’ around CSS as CSR strengths. Rather, it is possible that industry recipes about 
appropriate courses of action have only developed around CSiR which represents a 
‘stronger situation’, than around positive CSR initiatives, which may continue to present 
as a ‘weak situation’ that allows for greater variability in firm responses (Mischel, 1977; 
Mullins & Cummings, 1999). As McGuire, Dow and Argheyd (2003: p. 341) argued: 
“variables that encourage ‘exemplary’ corporate performance may differ from those that 
discourage dubious social performance”. It is feasible, then, from an institutional theory 
perspective, that pursuing broader or deeper CSS does not offer the same legitimizing 
benefits to a firm as does avoiding CSiR. 
As such, normative isomorphic pressures may play a larger role as a determinant 
of CSiR, rather than as a predictor of more positive conceptualizations of CSR, such as 
CSS as argued in this dissertation. Strategic similarity may exist within the CSiR of firms 
between industries, where coercive, normative and mimetic isomorphic pressures serve to 
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constrain the range of acceptable firm behaviours (Deephouse, 1999), rather than 
promote proactive engagement in CSS. Yet, an empirical test of this argument is left to 
future research.  
Having reviewed the findings of this thesis at multiple levels – the individual CEO 
effect, firm level CSS and industry level observations about isomorphism, I now turn to a 
necessary discussion about the study’s limitations as well as possible directions for future 
research. 
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CHAPTER 8: LIMITATIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
  
 As with all studies, this research project is not without limitations. First, the 
longitudinal archival method itself, although designed to be as robust as possible, 
nonetheless only indirectly tests the relationships between executive orientation and 
corporate social strategy. Research conducted in the upper echelon tradition has often 
been criticized for an overreliance on demographic proxies for testing the underlying 
mechanisms between managerial cognitions and strategic choices (Boal & Hooijberg, 
2000; Cannella & Monroe, 1997). However, the study designed here is meant to address 
some of the prior limitations by taking both a longitudinal and  multi-level approach, 
integrating several new measures of executive orientation, as well as explicitly modeling 
the role of external forces on strategic decision making thus heeding the call for more 
contextualized models of positional strategic leadership (Carpenter et al., 2004).  
This limitation, however, opens up many avenues for future research. For 
example, despite the low anticipated response rates at the CEO level, one might consider 
a survey methodology to more directly test some of the proposed relationships regarding 
openness to change/experience with existing values scales (Schwartz, 2005), personality 
inventories (Judge & Bono, 2000) or attitude towards change measures (Musteen et al., 
2006). Similarly, content analysis of company communications, books, speeches or press 
stories may also allow for testing of managerial cognitions (e.g., Nadkarni & Barr, 2008) 
especially underlying theories regarding CEO’s openness to experience or tolerance for 
ambiguity (Cannella & Monroe, 1997; Mullins & Cummings, 1999). A deep qualitative 
exploration of executive openness to change using structured or semi-structured 
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interviews with CEOs about their perceptions and interpretations of CSR issues in 
particular would likely continue to yield interesting insights (e.g., Cannella & Monroe, 
1997; Sharma et al., 1999). One could also envision assessing executive openness to 
experience/change in experiential learning exercises and simulations. Testing the 
hypothesized relationships with alternate methodologies would thus help triangulate the 
findings of this study as well as continue to delve into the ‘black box’ of executive 
cognitions (Cannella & Monroe, 1997). 
Another possible limitation of this dissertation regards the exclusive focus on the 
CEO, rather than the larger unit of the top management team (TMT) or the broader 
governing unit of the board of directors (BOD). Although some researchers in this area 
have advocated for the study of TMTs instead of CEOs as superior predictors of firm 
level strategies (e.g., Bantel & Jackson, 1989; Carpenter et al., 2004), others “highlight 
the pitfalls of using aggregate units of analysis when studying the influence of corporate 
elites on corporate strategy” and suggest “a return to the simple CEO unit of analysis” 
(Jensen & Zajac, 2004: p.507 & p.521) as the CEO unit of analysis appears to provide 
adequate predictive validity (Jensen & Zajac, 2004).  
This debate, however, also provides very interesting directions for future research: 
Would the same relationships between executive orientation and corporate social strategy 
hold for the members of the TMT? How would the heterogeneity of executive 
orientations in the TMT affect the breadth, depth or overall nature of CSS pursued by the 
firm over time?  What is the role of the BOD in shaping the CSS of the firm? Does CEO 
duality matter? Similarly, how important is CEO, TMT and BOD congruence on 
openness to change in determining the corporate social strategies pursued? Including the 
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important roles of the TMT and the BOD in future studies thus also warrants more 
focused attention. 
The nature of the variables tested herein also present a limitation in and of 
themselves given that they necessarily present only an incomplete picture of an open 
executive orientation. Although recent work has suggested that openness can be measured 
as a combination of age, tenure and educational experience (Datta et al., 2003), how other 
proxies for an open executive orientation (functional background, breadth of experience, 
international experience etc.) may combine as either a formative or a reflexive construct 
has yet to be determined. In addition, one can envision other potential experiences that 
may also capture the domain of openness as an executive orientation, such as experience 
across different organizations, or different industries, as well as experience as an outside 
director on other BODs, especially not-for profit organizations (Geletkanycz & 
Hambrick, 1997). Given that the hypothesized relationships between the predictor 
variables and the dependent variables in this study showed different levels of empirical 
support, a worthwhile future endeavour may include a finer-grained analysis of the 
factors that determine an open executive orientation and a subsequent, more 
parsimonious, test of CEO openness (as one variable) on CSS. 
Furthermore, the study design necessitated aggregation of the CEO level variables 
at the firm level. Although not found in the post-hoc analyses, it is nonetheless possible 
that differences within firms on CEO openness to change that may accompany CEO 
succession occasions could accelerate or decelerate the rate of adoption of CSS within 
firms. For example, Datta et al. (2003) found that new CEO openness to change was 
negatively related to a strategic persistence in a sample of CEO successions in the US 
manufacturing industry, also finding that industry level managerial discretion attenuates 
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this effect. Clustering techniques could be used to isolate ‘ideal’ types of incoming CEOs 
and their effect on subsequent adoption of CSS further tested using alternate statistical 
methodologies, such as logistic regression. 
Lastly, the dataset used herein also necessarily limits the generalizability of the 
findings to large, public firms in a U.S. context. Yet, Crossland and Hambrick (2007) 
found that it is precisely in this context that variance in firm performance can be most 
directly attributed to a firm’s chief executive (vs. German or Japanese contexts, for 
example). In the US, CEOs have a far greater latitude of action; on a national level (not 
just an industry level) American CEOs enjoy a greater degree of managerial discretion, 
and as such, the US allows for the best context in which to perceive the CEO effect on 
firm level outcomes. However, research has also suggested that “executive open-
mindedness toward change” is something that varies by country (Geletkanycz, 1997) and 
thus, despite the small potential to find significant effects on corporate social strategy, an 
international context would nonetheless be an interesting avenue for future studies.  
In the end, the limitations of this study present many possible directions for future 
research in this area. In addition, the data collected also offers a wide variety of 
extensions to the current dissertation. For example, the relationship between executive 
orientation and the depth measure of CSS may vary depending on the type of CSR 
activity. To illustrate, it is possible that CEO openness to change values are related to a 
deeper commitment to social issues such as diversity (e.g., programs that promote 
women, minorities or gay/lesbian rights), while CEO conservation values are related to a 
deeper commitment to social issues such as community relations (e.g. philanthropic 
giving). For example, out of several types of CSR, Lerner and Fryxell (1994) only found 
support for their hypotheses around CEO community orientation which was positively 
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related to corporate philanthropy. Should this be the case here, then the relationship 
between an open executive orientation and ACSS and DCSS might be dampened, 
possibly explaining the lack of support for many of the hypothesized relationships. 
Disaggregating the CSS measures thus may yield further interesting findings. 
Similarly, as discussed in Section 7.3.1 the nature of the relationships proposed 
and tested herein focused exclusively on CSS as a strategic choice to implement positive 
CSR programs. No relationships were hypothesized regarding the relationship between 
executive orientation and social, environmental or other stakeholder weaknesses. 
However, this data has been gathered, allowing not only for future investigations into the 
antecedents and outcomes of corporate social irresponsibility as well, but also for broader 
longitudinal investigations into the degree of variability of CSiR between industries that 
would allow for a more direct test of DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) iron cage hypothesis. 
New studies with regards to the different paths to greater CSS may also be undertaken 
that directly test the stages approach to CSR (Maon et al., 2010). For example, the 
database could be used to study if firms first engage in CSS by mitigating negative 
externalities, then build a deep CSS in a particular area, before moving into different, 
broader categories, or if other evolutionary paths are more predominant. Must a firm go 
through stages, or can some firms be ‘born Devoted’? What role does executive 
orientation play in these different trajectories? 
Although not formally hypothesized, the RCM analyses also demonstrated some 
interesting findings regarding some of the CEO level control variables that also point to 
interesting avenues for future research. For example, gender was positively and 
consistently associated with the rate of adoption of ACSS and DCSS over time (although 
not a factor in BCSS) as has been found in other studies (Manner, 2010). Furthermore, the 
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effect of CEO tenure on ACSS suggested that the longer the CEO tenure at the firm, the 
higher the rate of adoption of ACSS, yet the greater the tenure in the role, the lower the 
rate of adoption of ACSS. This paradox might be partially explained by stewardship 
theory, which proposes that executive and organizational motives can be aligned and need 
not adhere to the negative assumptions that underlie agency theoretic approaches to 
governance (Davis, Schoorman & Donaldson, 1997). A stewardship theory of CSS may 
thus also be a future extension. 
Lastly, the executive biographies used in this dissertation have also been coded for 
other potentially interesting factors that may effect issue perception, interpretation and 
strategic choice regarding CSS including: founder status, elite education, political 
intensity, worldview stability, military experience amongst others. Although no theories 
have been developed regarding these variables and CSS, the database includes the 
possibility to engage in theory development around these relationships as well as other 
important firm level outcomes such as strategic persistence, conformity, change and 
deviance. 
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CHAPTER 9: CONTRIBUTIONS 
This thesis yielded three primary results at the CEO, firm and industry levels. 
First, the CEO effect on CSS ranges between 3-14% and evidence supports that some 
aspects of an open executive orientation are indeed important determinants of initial 
levels and rates of adoption of CSS over time.  Specifically, firms with higher initial 
levels of ACSS are led by CEOs with more liberal worldviews and output functional 
backgrounds, while the rate of adoption of ACSS is also predicted by CEOs with output 
functional backgrounds as well as breadth of functional experience. The predicted effects 
of CEO international experience and educational specialization on CSS, however, did not 
materialize. The findings also reveal that the overall firm level of CSS has not grown 
substantively over the last two decades, with most firms in 2009 still engaging in a 
Derivative CSS (shallow/narrow). Furthermore, unlike previous studies that confound 
negative and positive CSR, this dissertation demonstrates that industry membership is not 
an important determinant of the strategic choice of positive CSS, nor are institutional 
pressures moderating factors in the executive orientation – CSS relationship.    
This thesis thus makes several important theoretical contributions in the CSR, 
upper echelons and institutional theory domains (Section 9.1). Furthermore, it provides 
methodological contributions (Section 9.2), as well as yields important implications for 
practice (Section 9.3). These specific contributions are detailed below. 
9.1   Contributions to Theory 
9.1.1   Contributions to Theory:  CSR  
The model of executive orientation and corporate social strategy tested here is a 
direct response to Margolis and Walsh’s (2003) call to reorient CSR research away from 
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theories that simply attempt to justify a firm’s response to CSR from an economic 
perspective. Instead, the authors suggested that we should embrace the antimony inherent 
in the economics vs. ethics debate and assume that “instrumental efficiency and human 
beneficence, wealth maximization and the amelioration of social misery, and shareholder 
rights and stakeholder rights all matter” (p. 283-284). Only then, can we build a 
normative theory of the firm that acknowledges these competing tensions and objectively 
assesses how firms are actually addressing these trade-offs.  
Margolis and Walsh (2003) suggest that “a starting point for building such a 
theory requires a systematic descriptive inquiry into corporations’ responses to calls for 
an expanded role” (p.284) which includes deepening our understanding of how 
companies perceive external stimuli, how they generate and evaluate response options, 
how they select and implement a course of action and evaluate the consequences of these 
efforts. This dissertation directly contributes to such a systematic descriptive inquiry by 
examining how executive orientation in particular affects the choice of corporate social 
strategy pursued by firms in different industries over time, finding that the CEO effect 
ranges from 3-14% and that different dimensions of an open executive orientation are 
important predictors of both initial levels and rates of adoption of ACSS, BCSS and 
DCSS. 
This dissertation also contributes to the literature on CSR by introducing a new 
typology of CSS which differs from existing conceptualizations of CSR in several ways. 
First, it allows for a finer-grained conceptualization of types of corporate social strategy 
pursued by the firm. Where stakeholder management and social issue participation 
models have previously been considered together (everything that lies “beyond economic 
and legal requirements of the firm”), here I make the distinction that they may not be 
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perceived as equivalent by the CEO of the firm. CEOs may choose to pursue (or not 
pursue) very different CSS depending on the nature of the stakeholder or social issue 
under consideration. Second, I highlight the role of choice in determining the depth and 
breadth of corporate social strategy pursued. Previous research has treated CSP as an 
achieved state without considering the endogenous choices made to arrive at this state 
(Barnett, 2007). By including the choice of narrow vs. broad CSS, as well as shallow vs. 
deep CSS, I incorporate the idea that investing in CSR is a strategic choice akin to other 
resource commitment decisions (Waldman & Siegel, 2008). Lastly, by marrying the depth 
of the CSS with the breadth of CSS, this typology moves beyond just a simple low/high 
dichotomy of CSP. Rather, it allows for a more nuanced appreciation for firms that are 
engaging in Disengaged, Derivative, Dedicated, Diffuse and Devoted CSS thus allowing 
for future normative explorations into positively deviant or even supererogatory corporate 
social strategies. 
Importantly, by applying this typology to the growth of CSS over time, I find that, 
despite increasing calls for businesses to address society’s mounting concerns, in the last 
twenty years there has actually been little substantive growth in the adoption of CSR 
initiatives by large US firms.  Although the overall mean levels of ACSS have more than 
doubled, from 5% in 1991 to 12% in 2009 (with similar patterns for BCSS and DCSS), 
most firms in 2009 are still engaging in a Derivative CSS when it comes to social, 
environmental and other stakeholder issues. Although significant variance exists in firm 
responses over time, on the whole, the ‘call for an expanded role’ has largely been met 
with ‘business as usual’. 
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9.1.2   Contributions to Theory:  Upper Echelons 
This research also addresses the multiple calls for inquiry into the relationship 
between strategic leadership and corporate social responsibility (Agle et al., 1999; Basu & 
Palazzo, 2008; Laplume et al., 2008; Maon et al., 2008; Rose, 2007; Thomas & Simerly, 
1994; Waldman et al., 2006a; Waldman & Siegel, 2008; Waldman et al., 2006b; Wood, 
1991). Despite an astounding body of literature on the effects of CEO and TMT 
psychographic and demographic experiences on firm financial performance, no 
systematic inquiry into their effects on firm social performance over time has been 
conducted to date. Rather, there are only a select handful of cross-sectional analyses 
regarding executive orientation and CSR (e.g., Manner, 2010; Slater & Dixon-Fowler, 
2009). This research thus heeds Wood’s call “to know more about how managers 
perceive choices in their organizational and societal environments” (Wood, 1991: p. 702) 
that affect the strategic choice of CSS. 
In particular, this research also introduces a new measure of CEO worldview 
which has hitherto not been applied in the study of upper echelons and was found here to 
be a significant determinant in both initial and overall levels of ACSS and DCSS over 
time. Rooted in extensive research in the fields of political science and psychology, the 
ideological social cognitions that divide liberal vs. conservative orientations are readily 
applicable to the study of executives and executive decision making.  Barnett specifically 
isolated cognition as a key determinant of CSR activity “that helps explain enduring 
nonoptimal supplies of CSR by some firms” (Barnett, 2007: p. 812) and the finding that 
CEO worldviews, as a reflection of openness to change and experience, can impact levels 
of CSS over time is thus an important contribution.  
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Walsh (1995) provides a useful framework for evaluating research on managerial 
and organizational cognition which is pertinent to this thesis; he suggests that researchers 
in this domain build theories that:  (1) uncover the content and structure of cognitions, (2) 
relate the use of managerial cognitions to consequences of substantive organizational 
importance (e.g., the deployment of a firm's resources), (3) explore the developmental 
origins of the cognitions and (4) be sensitive to group, organization, and even industry 
levels of analysis (p.282). 
With regards to Walsh’s (1995) first requirement, this dissertation investigates the 
specific content and structural attributes of executive orientation used by CEOs when 
evaluating complex and ambiguous issues involving CSR. At the individual level, 
cognitive content includes individual level knowledge structure representations (e.g., 
screens, filters, frames of reference and other ‘givens’), use (e.g., selective perception, 
strategic choice) and development (e.g., functional experience, educational 
specialization).  The model of an open executive orientation and CSS built and tested here 
is based on previous research which has clearly established CEO cognitive 
representations, use and development arguing that CEO psychological and demographic 
experiences shape the filters used in the selective perception process resulting in 
variations in strategic choices around CSR issues.  The model also incorporates research 
on the structural attributes of cognitions. By suggesting that the cognitions of certain 
CEOs are more open as a result of different psychological attributes such as openness to 
change values or personality traits such as openness to experience, the structural attributes 
of an open executive orientation were found in CEOs liberal worldview, output functional 
backgrounds and breadth of functional experiences.  
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With regards to Walsh’s (1995) remaining requirements for theories of managerial 
cognition, in this thesis, I have developed multiple hypotheses that specifically relate the 
use of managerial cognitions to ‘consequences of substantive organizational importance’ 
(CSS) as well as uncovered the developmental origins of the relevant attributes of 
executive orientation that are likely to impact this relationship. Lastly, the model of 
executive orientation and CSS considered industry level variables that were shown to not 
affect the relationship between executive orientation and CSS thus satisfying all four of 
Walsh’s (1995) guidelines for theories of managerial cognition. 
9.1.3   Contributions to Theory:  Institutional Theory 
 Despite an extensive body of research that suggests that firm strategies tend to 
resemble one another due to isomorphic pressures towards conformity (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983), this study found that, when it comes to CSS, variability, not similarity, 
within industries is the norm. As argued in Section 7.3, this thesis therefore also 
contributes to institutional theory in that it highlights the potential that CSR and CSiR 
may follow different evolutionary paths rooted in divergent coercive, normative or 
mimetic pressures affecting firm responses to negative vs. positive responsibilities.  It is 
possible, therefore, that pursing CSS may not yield the same legitimacy benefits as 
avoiding CSiR, explaining the lack of evidence for isomorphism over time found in this 
thesis. 
 The lack of industry effects, both in explaining overall variance, as well as in 
moderating the relationship between executive orientation and CSS, also provides support 
for the strategic choice perspective (Child, 1972) over the environmental determinism 
perspective (Hannan & Freeman, 1984). Despite the large body of research that argues 
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that managerial ‘latitude of action’ is restricted in certain industries (Finkelstein et al., 
2009), this was not found to be the case for CSS. Rather, CSS may instead fall into what 
Boyd and Gove (2006) called a “differentiated choice” environment, where firms have 
managed to cultivate discretion despite a highly uncertain context. This dissertation thus has 
the potential to inform institutional theory by integrating managerial discretion and 
isomorphism arguments. 
 As one of the only studies of which I am aware that has mapped firm level growth 
in CSS over time, this dissertation also contributes to institutional theory by explicitly 
modeling a key variable implicit in theories of homogeneity or heterogeneity of firm 
responses over time – time itself.  Questions regarding strategic change, persistence, 
deviance and conformity all require longitudinal designs to accurately capture the 
dynamic nature of rates of change over time. This dissertation thus answers the multiple 
calls for more explicit, longitudinal investigations into the institutional drivers of the CSR 
development process within and between organizations (Brammer & Millington, 2008; 
Maon et al., 2010; Short et al., 2006).  
9.2   Contribution to Methods 
This research also answers calls for more multilevel investigations of 
organizational phenomena in general (Bamberger, 2008; Bies, Bartunek, Fort & Zald, 
2007; Cannella & Holcomb, 2005; Hitt et al., 2007; Kozlowski & Klein, 2000). Empirical 
tests of upper echelon models have typically been conducted at a single level of analysis 
(Cannella & Holcomb, 2005) while corporate social responsibility necessarily “involves 
an examination of corporate social agency at multiple levels of analysis: the micro level 
(focusing on psychological and social psychological bases), the meso level (involving 
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relational and network issues), and the macro level (involving political, economic, 
institutional and societal dynamics)” (Bies et al., 2007: p. 789). The longitudinal, multi 
level model built here is thus a contribution to multi-level theorizing and the use of RCM 
in HLM6 to test the hypotheses is a contribution to multi-level methods which have only 
just recently gained momentum in strategy research (e.g., Misangyi et al., 2006). 
In addition, researchers have suggested that there is a paucity of longitudinal 
studies not only in the upper echelon literature (Cannella & Holcomb, 2005), but in the 
CSR literature as well (Agle et al., 1999). Rather, many empirical investigations rely on 
cross-sectional data that make the study of change problematic (Shropshire & Hillman, 
2007) or measure only the effect of short-term change in CSP, such as from time t to time 
t+1 (Ruf, Muralidhar, Brown, Janney & Paul, 2001). By examining the corporate social 
strategies of firms over 19 years, I contribute methodologically to research in this area 
through growth curve modeling and direct tests of the patterns of change within CSS over 
time. Following the guidelines set forth for longitudinal, random coefficient modeling 
(Bliese & Ployhart, 2002; Ployhart & Vandenberg, 2010; Raudenbush & Bryk, 2002; 
Singer & Willett, 2003), this thesis brings this new methodology into the upper echelon, 
CSR and institutional literatures. 
Lastly, by introducing new measures such as CEO liberal worldview as well as the 
breadth (entropy) and depth (specialization) of CSS, this research also adds to 
measurement of both executive orientations in the upper echelon field as well as to 
corporate social performance in the CSR literature. 
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9.3   Implications for Practice 
Within the context of today’s ethical scandals, a deeper understanding of 
individual, firm and industry level determinants of socially responsible strategies also has 
important implications for practice. The calls for more ethical and more responsible 
leadership as well as more enlightened corporate citizenship are pronounced (Paine, 2003; 
Googins et al., 2007) and arguments have been made that a new corporate social 
responsibility institutional environment has arrived (Waddock, 2008). Furthermore, a 
recent study revealed that 93% of CEOs believe that sustainability issues, defined as 
human rights, labour relations, environmental and governance issues, will be critical to 
the future success of their businesses (UNGC & Accenture, 2010). Yet, little guidance is 
available to help executives navigate the increasing calls to mitigate societal ills 
(Margolis & Walsh, 2003; Peloza, 2009), leading to a proliferation, not homogenization, 
of firm responses to CSR issues over time. 
This dissertation thus contributes directly to practice by introducing a new 
typology of CSS that can be used to help assess a firm’s current CSS profile as compared 
to key competitors in their organizational field. As done in Figure 7.7, the breadth and 
depth of one’s CSS can be mapped and compared to other firms in the industry. If some 
strategies are presumed to proffer some form of competitive advantage, either through 
direct revenue benefits from differentiation and cost advantages, or through indirect 
means such as reputation or insurance, executives in organizations may look to firms 
engaging in more Dedicated or Devoted CSS for best practices.  
Furthermore, CEOs interested in accessing the market for capital now inherent in 
SRI funds, may use the typology to make strategic choices to either increase the depth of 
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their engagement in a particular CSS or broaden the scope of their CSS efforts into new 
social, environmental or other stakeholder issues.  For example, Chatterji and Toffel 
(2010) claim that fifteen of the world’s top twenty five institutional financial managers 
use the KLD rating system specifically, representing over $10B in investment capital. 
Furthermore, Choi and Wang (2009) demonstrated that positive stakeholder relations (as 
measured by the aggregate KLD score) in particular help create and sustain economic 
rents for the firm over time. These results suggest that executives pay close attention to 
SRI funds both in terms of access to capital as well as for the potential benefit to financial 
performance; the typology presented in this dissertation can thus serve as a useful 
strategic decision making tool in the CSR arena. 
Traditional strategic arguments have also been made regarding the necessity of fit 
between a firm’s strategy and changes in their operating environment (Porter, 1980; 
Wiersema & Bantel, 1992).  The overall growth in CSS over time, while still relatively 
small, nonetheless suggests that there are advantages to be had “by aligning 
organizational factors with stakeholder needs and by recognizing the ongoing dynamic 
nature of those demands”; the typology derived herein can thus also help executives 
ensure alignment and “improve a firm’s responsiveness to external forces and changing 
expectations.” (Shropshire & Hillman, 2007: p. 83).  
Furthermore, this dissertation can also help managers understand their personal 
role in shaping the CSS of their firms by providing support for the strategic choice view 
that CEOs have an important influence on the strategic decisions taken at the firm (Child, 
1972). Given that industry level factors were not found to be a significant influence on the 
initial levels or rates of adoption of CSS over time, situational determinism is a less 
tenable rationale for inaction. In conjunction with parallel research that has demonstrated 
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the negative financial consequences to a Disengaged CSS in particular (Mazutis, 2010, 
2011), increasing one’s self-awareness about the nature of the relationship between 
executive orientation and CSS thus also has important implications for the firm. 
Although previous research has suggested that individual worldviews, knowledge 
structures or cognitive paradigms are relatively fixed (Carpenter and Fredrickson, 2001), 
there is some evidence that self-reflection itself can be an experience that changes the 
representations of stimuli in cognitive structures (Schmidt, McAdams & Foster, 2009; 
Walsh, 1995).  This suggests that if CEOs have an increased awareness of the impacts of 
an open executive orientation on CSS, this act of self-reflection may in and of itself affect 
the filtering process of strategic choice under conditions of bounded rationality. Such a 
broadened perspective of the consequences of executive orientation may thus potentially 
serve to broaden executive perceptions of potential strategic choices regarding corporate 
social strategies available to the CEO and to the firm.  
The results of this dissertation thus also have implications for recruiting and 
promotion practices within firms that are embracing the call for greater corporate 
engagement in addressing pressing stakeholder and social issues (Margolis and Walsh, 
2003). Should the question of proactive CSR become an agenda item in the boardroom, 
for cost, benefit, reputation, insurance, access to capital or any other reason, CEO hiring 
committees may be wise to consider the characteristics of an open executive orientation 
required for deeper or broader engagement in CSS. Ensuring fit between executive 
orientation and organizational goals is a critical function of the board of directors (Datta 
& Rajagopalan, 1998). 
Lastly, this research has the potential to also contribute to policy, by explicitly 
modeling the role of institutional norms and managerial discretion in the variation of CSS 
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pursued by firms in different industries. Given that no support was found for industry 
level moderators of the executive orientation → CSS relationship, policy makers are in 
the unique position to be able to introduce regulations or other controls which may move 
the levels and rates of adoption of CSS of entire industries in a positive direction. 
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CHAPTER 10: CONCLUSION 
 
In a recent dialogue in Leadership Quarterly, Siegel (2008) argued that: “a firm's 
decision to engage in social responsibility should be viewed as a strategic choice...as an 
investment decision” (Waldman & Siegel, 2008). Similarly, I have argued herein that a 
firm’s decision to pursue a broad or deep corporate social strategy is a strategic decision 
which is at the discretion of a firm’s senior executives and that this decision will be 
influenced by the executive orientation of the CEO.  
Having developed a theoretical model that proposes how CEO worldview, 
functional background, educational background and international experience which are 
reflective of an open executive orientation are related to corporate social strategy over 
time, this research bridges the strategic leadership and CSR literatures, answering the 
numerous calls for greater research into this relationship. The primary contributions of 
this research are therefore threefold. First, I make a contribution to the upper echelon and 
CSR literatures by making the link between CEO executive orientation and corporate 
social strategies explicit. Second, I fill a gap in the CSR literature that has largely 
bypassed the important role of the CEO in determining a firm’s response to social issues 
and that has been largely bereft of longitudinal and multi-level theories of the 
determinants of CSS. Lastly, I test the relationship between strategic leadership and CSS 
empirically using RCM and new methodologies (HLM), thus also making a contribution 
to methods in the field. In so doing, this research project provides new insights into why 
CEOs and firms differ with respect to the social issues they choose to pursue and the 
nature of the strategies they use to address these issues. 
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This study of executive orientation and corporate social responsibility is thus 
motivated by a broader research agenda that is aimed at uncovering the determinants of 
positively deviant or even supererogatory corporate social strategies. By looking into the 
executive orientations that might affect corporate response to societal ills, I construct 
detailed CEO and firm profiles of organizations that have chosen Dedicated or Devoted 
CSS despite the challenge of “promoting social justice in a world in which this 
shareholder wealth maximization paradigm reigns” (Margolis & Walsh, 2003; p. 273). 
The shareholder primacy norm is thus central not only to the research question 
probed herein, but also to the researchers themselves working in this domain. Despite the 
fact that the study of economics was originally intended to provide theories of social not 
individual welfare maximization, a recent review of all the management literature in the 
last 45 years showed that the majority of all empirical work has focused on financial 
performance as a dependent variable, with human welfare as an outcome dropping from 
32% of all publications in 1978 to 19% in 1999 (Walsh, Weber & Margolis, 2003). Walsh 
et al. (2003) outlined the path management scholarship has taken to this “imbalanced 
research agenda” and called for researchers to return to the roots of the Academy of 
Management’s mandate, as defined over fifty year ago (p.859): 
“The general objective of the Academy shall be therefore to foster: a) a 
philosophy of management that will make possible the accomplishment 
of the economic and social objectives of an industrial society with 
increasing efficiency and effectiveness: the public’s interests must be 
paramount in any such philosophy, but adequate consideration must be 
given to the legitimate interests of capital and labor. . . . 
. . . Editor’s preface, Journal of the Academy of Management, 1958, 1(1): 
5–6.”  
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It was therefore the intention of this research project to heed this historical 
interpretation of the purpose of management scholarship and help refocus the strategy 
lens away from what Ghoshal (2005) described as the negative self-fulfilling ‘ideology-
based gloomy vision’ of existing economic theories of the firm. In the end, having 
developed a theoretical model and tested the hypothesized relationships between an open 
executive orientation and CSS, I hope to have contributed to a better understanding of the 
relationship between strategic leadership and the observable variations in CSS pursued by 
firms over time. In so doing, I have uncovered a significant CEO effect as well as detailed 
the characteristics of an open executive orientation that, despite the pervasiveness of the 
shareholder primacy norm, have allowed some firms to choose, nonetheless, to engage in 
greater levels and rates of adoption of CSS over time. 
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APPENDIX A:  List of Studies using KLD Data 
 
Study Sample Size and Timing Methods Construct Operationalization Main Findings 
CSR as Independent Variable      
Graves & 
Waddock (AMJ, 
1994) 
n=453 firms; 
1990 
regression, cross-
sectional 
Corporate Social 
Performance (CSP) 
8 dimensions (5 'stakeholder 
relations' categories: community, 
employee relations, environment, 
product and diversity + 3 'external 
pressure': military contracting, 
nuclear power and involvement in 
South Africa), scale of -2 to +2; 
weighted 
High CSP values are positively 
related to high levels of institutional 
ownership 
Turban & 
Greening (AMJ, 
1996) 
n=160 firms; data 
from 1992-1993 
regression, cross-
sectional 
Corporate Social 
Performance (CSP) 
5 dimensions: community, diversity, 
employee relations, environment, 
product quality; Sum (-2 to +2 scale) 
CSP is related to a firm's reputation 
and attractiveness as an employer, 
suggesting that a firm's CSP may 
provide a competitive advantage in 
attracting applicants. 
Waddock & 
Graves (SMJ, 
1997) 
n=469 firms; 
1990 
regression, cross-
sectional 
Corporate Social 
Performance (CSP) 
8 dimensions (5 'stakeholder 
relations' categories: community, 
employee relations, environment, 
product and diversity + 3 'external 
pressure': military contracting, 
nuclear power and involvement in 
South Africa), scale of -2 to +2; 
weighted 
CSP positively related to prior 
financial performance; CSP 
(communities and environment) lead 
to better financial performance 
Agle, Mitchell 
& Sonnenfeld 
(AMJ, 1999) 
n=80 firms; 1996-
1997 (avg) 
correlation, 
regression, cross-
sectional 
Corporate Social 
Performance (CSP) 
4 measures of corporate social 
performance: employee relations, 
(including diversity), community 
relations, environment, and 
products; five-point scale ranging 
from -2 to +2; plus one overall 
measure of CSP, which was the 
aggregate of the four measures 
Stakeholder attributes (power, 
legitimacy, urgency) affect the 
degree to which top managers give 
priority to stakeholders; But CEO 
values have no moderating effect 
and there is no relationship between 
stakeholder salience and 
performance. 
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Study Sample Size and Timing Methods Construct Operationalization Main Findings 
CSR as Independent Variable  (cont’d)     
Berman, Wicks, 
Kotha, Jones 
(AMJ, 1999) 
n= 486 firm year 
observations; 81 
Fortune 500 
companies x 6 
years (1991-
1996) 
pooled time series 
model; OLS 
regression 
Stakeholder 
Relationships 
5 dimensions treated separately: 
employee relations, diversity, 
community relations, the natural 
environment, product safety/quality 
Only employee relations and 
product/safety quality are positively 
related to firm financial performance 
Graves & 
Waddock 
(B&SR, 2000) 
n=11 matched 
pairs of Built to 
Last (BTL) 
companies; 1991-
1997 
descriptive 
statistics; t-tests 
Stakeholder 
performance 
5 dimensions: employee relations, 
diversity, community relations, the 
natural environment, product 
safety/quality. Sum of concerns and 
strengths (-2 to +2 scale) 
BTL companies outperform non-
BTL companies on all measures of 
stakeholder and financial 
performance 
McWilliams & 
Siegel (SMJ, 
2000) 
n = 524 firms 
(from 1991-1996) 
correlation, 
regression, cross-
sectional 
Corporate Social 
Performance (CSP) 
 CSP is a dummy variable, with a 
value of 1 if a firm is included in the 
DSI 400 in a given year (for 
having passed the “social screen”); 0 
otherwise. 
CSR has a neutral impact on 
financial performance when R&D is 
controlled for 
Hillman & 
Keim (SMJ, 
2001) 
n= 308 firms, 
multiple 
industries, data 
from 1994, 1995 
and 1996 
correlation, 
regression, cross-
sectional 
Stakeholder 
Management (SM) 
vs. Social Issue 
Participation (SIP) 
SM = employee relations, diversity, 
community relations, the 
environment and product issues; SIP 
= other, alcohol/tobacco/gambling 
exclusionary screens, non-US 
concerns over investment in Burma 
& Mexico. Sum of concerns and 
strengths (-2 to +2 scale) 
SM leads to improved shareholder 
value, while social issue 
participation is negatively associated 
with shareholder value; when 
disaggregated, only community 
relations positively related to MVA 
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Study Sample Size and Timing Methods Construct Operationalization Main Findings 
CSR as Independent Variable  (cont’d)     
Ruf, Muralidhar, 
Brown, Janney 
& Paul (JBE, 
2001) 
n = 496; 1991 - 
1992 
regression; cross-
sectional 
Corporate Social 
Performance (CSP) 
8 dimensions (5 'stakeholder 
relations' categories: community, 
employee relations, environment, 
product and diversity + 3 'external 
pressure': military contracting, 
nuclear power and involvement in 
South Africa), scale of -2 to +2; 
weighted 
Change in CSP is positively 
associated with growth in sales for 
the current and subsequent year 
(short-term benefits from 
improving CSP). ROS positively 
related to change in CSP for the 
third financial period, indicating that 
long-term financial benefits may 
exist when CSP is improved. 
Coombs & 
Gilley (SMJ, 
2005) 
n=406 firms 
(&CEOs); 
unbalanced panel 
1995-2001 (total 
of 2,297 
observations) 
regression with 
panel estimates 
Stakeholder 
Management (SM)   
5 dimensions: employee relations, 
community, diversity, 
environmental impact and product 
safety/quality;  Summed (-2 to +2 
scale) 
Significant, negative main effect of 
SM on CEO salaries (CEO's may 
jeopardize personal wealth by 
pursuing stakeholder issues) 
Bouquet & 
Deutsch (JBE, 
2008) 
n= 4244 firm-
years, 813 firms, 
avg of 5.3 years 
(1991-2003) 
regression Corporate Social Performance (CSP) 
8 dimensions: community relations, 
employee 
relations, environmental 
performance, product 
characteristics, treatment of women 
and minorities, investment in areas 
involved in human rights 
controversies, investment in firms 
that rank poorly on social 
performance;  Summed (-2 to +2 
scale) 
MNEs engaged in intermediate 
levels of CSP achieve 
lower levels of multinationality than 
firms operating at 
either anchor of the social 
performance continuum. 
Garcia-Castro, 
Canela & Arino 
(B&S online, 
2008) 
n=658 firms; 
1998-2005 
multiple year 
regressions 
Stakeholder 
Management 
5 dimensions: employee relations, 
customer/product issues, community 
relations, diversity issues, 
environmental issues); summed; 
equal weights index -1 to +1 
Negative effects of stakeholder 
management on shareholder value in 
the short run but positive effects 
over the long run 
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Study Sample Size and Timing Methods Construct Operationalization Main Findings 
CSR as Independent Variable  (cont’d)     
Hull & 
Rothenberg 
(SMJ, 2008) 
n=69 firms with 
all data available 
from 1998-2001 
regression; cross-
sectional 
Corporate Social 
Performance (CSP) 
All 8 dimensions; weighted 
(categories with more subcategories 
receiving proportionately greater 
weight); Summed 
CSP most strongly affects 
performance in low innovation firms 
and in industries with little 
differentiation 
Choi & Wang 
(SMJ, 2009) 
n = 4,113 firm-
year 
observations; 518 
firms, 11 years 
(1991-2001) 
first-order 
autoregressive 
model; firm fixed 
effects with 
adjustment 
Stakeholder 
relations  
5 dimensions: employee relations, 
diversity, community relations, the 
natural environment, product 
safety/quality. Sum of concerns and 
strengths for each dimension 
separately; aggregate computed as 
average of 5 dimensions 
Good stakeholder relations are 
positively associated with the 
persistence of superior financial 
performance and negatively related 
to with the persistence of inferior 
financial performance; when 
disaggregated, employee relations 
and product quality most critical to 
persistent superior performance , 
diversity and product quality help in 
overcoming inferior financial 
performance more quickly 
Godfrey, Merrill 
& Hansen (SMJ, 
2009) 
n=160 firms with 
data from 1991-
2002 
event study 
CSR Participation: 
ICSR + TCSR 
(Institutional vs. 
Technical CSR) 
6 dimensions (community, corporate 
governance, employee relations, 
environment, diversity, product 
quality); Binary - CSR participation 
= 1 for any positive item and zero 
otherwise; ICSR participation = 1 if 
positive item for any community or 
diversity dimension, 0 otherwise; 
TCSR participation = 1 positive 
item for governance, employee 
relations or product, zero otherwise. 
Single CSR negative level score 
sum of total negative items across 6 
dimensions 
Institutional CSR ("aimed at 
secondary stakeholders or society at 
large) provides insurance like 
benefit, with participation in 
Technical CSR (activities targeting a 
firm's trading partners) yields no 
benefits. 
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Study Sample Size and Timing Methods Construct Operationalization Main Findings 
CSR as Dependent Variable         
Johnson & 
Greening (AMJ, 
1999) 
n= 252 firms; 
1991-1993 SEM 
Corporate Social 
Performance (CSP): 
People dimension 
vs. product quality 
dimension  
split 5 dimensions into 2: people 
dimension (community, employee 
relations, and women and minorities 
ratings) and product quality 
dimension (product quality and 
natural environment ratings). 
Pension fund equity positively 
related to both a people and a 
product quality dimension of CSP, 
but mutual and investment bank 
funds exhibited no direct 
relationship with CSP. Outside 
director representation positively 
related to both CSP dimensions. Top 
management equity positively 
related to the product quality 
dimension but unrelated to the 
people dimension of CSP 
McGuire, Dow 
& Argheyd 
(JBE, 2003) 
n=374 firms; 
1999 
regression; cross-
sectional 
Corporate Social 
Performance (CSP) 
4 dimensions: employee, 
community, product, environmental; 
Strengths and weaknesses separate  
Incentives have no significant 
relationship with strong social 
performance. Salary and long-term 
incentives have a positive 
association with weak social 
performance 
Deckop, 
Merriman & 
Gupta (JOM, 
2006) 
n=313 firms; 
2000-2002 
correlation, 
regression, cross-
sectional 
Corporate Social 
Performance (CSP) 
6 dimensions: employee relations, 
product quality and safety, 
community relations, natural 
environment, human rights, and 
diversity; Summed (0/1 scale) 
Short-term CEO pay focus was 
negatively related to CSP, whereas a 
long-term focus was positively 
related to CSP 
Strike, Bansal & 
Gao (JIBS, 
2006) 
n=2,442 
observations (222 
firms x 10 years - 
1993-2003) 
time-series cross-
sectional data 
analysis; general 
least-square 
(GLS) 
Corporate Social 
Responsibility and 
Corporate Social 
Irresponsibility 
7 qualitative categories: The values 
of strengths were summed to 
represent CSR, and the values of 
concerns were summed to represent 
CSiR (0,1 data) 
Significant, positive linear 
relationship between 
international diversification and 
CSR and CSiR 
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Study Sample Size and Timing Methods Construct Operationalization Main Findings 
CSR as Dependent Variable (cont’d)        
Waldman, 
Siegel & 
Javidan (JOMS, 
2006) 
n=56 firms 
(1991-1996) regression 
Corporate Social 
Responsibility: 
Strategic CSR vs. 
Social CSR   
8 dimensions: Strategic CSR was 
indicated by environmental, product 
quality, other, employee relations, 
and military; Social CSR was 
represented by the community and 
diversity indicators; strengths and 
weaknesses Summed (-2 to +2 
scale) 
CEO intellectual stimulation (but 
not CEO charismatic leadership) is 
significantly associated with  
‘strategic’ CSR 
David, Bloom & 
Hillman (SMJ, 
2007) 
n=218 firms 
(1,307 
shareholder 
proposals); 1992-
1998 
HLM, but report 
OLS regression 
results 
Corporate Social 
Performance (CSP) 
5 dimensions: community, diversity, 
employee relations, environment, 
product quality; Summed 
Shareholder proposal activism 
reduces CSP; managers are more 
likely to settle proposals filed by 
‘salient’ shareholders  
(i.e., those with power, legitimacy, 
and urgency), Settlement with 
salient shareholders, however, also 
reduces CSP. 
Shropshire & 
Hillman (B&S, 
2007) 
n=158 firms, 
1,083 firm-year 
observations 
(1992-1999) 
logistic regression Stakeholder Management 
5 dimensions: employee relations, 
community, diversity, 
environmental impact and product 
safety/quality;  Summed (-2 to +2 
scale) and then measure of 
significant change dummy 1/0 if +/-
2 change in aggregate KLD score 
An industry shift in SM increases 
the likelihood of significant change 
in focal firm SM; organizational 
age, size, risk increase likelihood of 
significant change in SM; level of 
managerial discretion is positively 
associated with significant change in 
SM; owner-manager controlled 
firms less likely to experience broad 
shifts in SM; CEO succession does 
not increase likelihood of SM 
change 
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Study Sample Size and Timing Methods Construct Operationalization Main Findings 
CSR as Dependent Variable (cont’d)        
Chen, Patten & 
Roberts (JBE, 
2008) 
n=384 firms; 
1998-2000 (1,152 
observations) 
chi-squared 
statistics; 
regression 
Corporate Social 
Performance (CSP) 
three dimensions separately and 
summed (employee relations, 
environment, and product safety); 
weaknesses only 
Firms with worse social 
performance in environmental and 
product safety areas (but not 
employee relations) are more likely 
to make charitable contributions and 
their giving is larger than better 
performers 
Slater & Dixon-
Fowler (JBE, 
2008) 
n= 393 firms (& 
CEOs), 2004 
regression, cross-
sectional 
Corporate Social 
Performance (CSP) 
5 dimensions: employee relations, 
community, diversity, 
environmental impact and product 
safety/quality;  both summed (-2 to 
+2 scale) and separate strengths and 
weaknesses 
CEO international assignment 
experience positively related to 
CSP, moderated by functional 
background (marketing & sales) 
both total and strengths; not related 
to negative CSP 
Kacperczyk 
(SMJ, 2009) 
n=878 firms; 
1991-2002 
random effects 
logistic regression 
Corporate Attention 
to Stakeholders 
Strengths across 5 dimensions: 
community, minorities, employees, 
the naturalenvironment, and 
customers; Use binary DV = 1 if 
firm has been rated as having at 
least one strength across the five 
dimensions, 0 otherwise; Also done 
for each dimension separately 
An exogenous increase in takeover 
protection leads to highercorporate 
attention to community and the 
natural environment, but has no 
impact on corporate attention to 
employees, minorities, and 
customers. Additional analyses 
show that firms that increase their 
attention to stakeholders experience 
an increase in long-term shareholder 
value 
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CSR as Dependent Variable (cont’d)        
Bear, Rahman & 
Post (JBE, 
2010) 
n= 51 firms 
(2009) OLS regression CSR 
Used KLD institutional strengths 
(community, diversity) and technical 
strengths (product, government and 
employee issues) 
The number of women on the board 
has a positive relationship with CSR 
strength ratings 
Chatterji & 
Toffel (SMJ, 
2010) 
n=598 firms 
(1999-2004) =  
2,412 firm year 
observations 
OLS regression 
with fixed effects 
Environmental 
Ratings 
Only Environmental category: initial 
ratings poor (only concerns); initial 
ratings good or mixed (either only 
strengths, mixed strengths and 
concerns or no strengths or 
concerns) 
Firms that initially received poor 
KLD ratings subsequently improved 
their environmental performance 
more than other firms, and this 
difference is driven by firms in 
highly regulated industries and by 
firms with more low-cost 
opportunities to exploit. 
Fernández-
Kranz & Santaló 
(JEMS, 2010) 
n=6,206 firm year 
observations 
(3,630 firms 
unbalanced panel: 
1994-2005) 
regressions CSR Performance 
Difference between KLD Strengths 
and Concerns across all areas (56 
CSR ratings) 
Firms in more competitive industries 
have better social ratings 
Manner (JBE, 
2010) 
n=650 firms, 
(&CEOs) 2006 
regression 
(negative binomial 
& poisson); cross-
sectional 
Corporate Social 
Performance (CSP) 
7 dimensions: employee relations, 
community, diversity, natural 
environment, human rights, product 
and corporate governance; both 
summed and separate strengths and 
weaknesses 
CEOs with bachelor degrees in 
humanities, with a breadth of career 
experience and who are female are 
positively related to KLD strengths; 
CEOs with a bachelor degree in 
economics are negatively related to 
KLD strengths; CEO characteristics 
not related to KLD weaknesses 
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CSR as Dependent Variable (cont’d)        
Padgett & Galan 
(JBE, 2010) 
3 models (1991-
2007): 5,799 obs. 
and 1,217 firms,  
2,724 obs.  
and 575 firms 
(manuf. only) 
and, 
3,075 obs. and 
642 firms (non 
manuf.) 
regression (panel 
data; fixed effects) CSR 
Same as Hillman & Keim (2001); 
changed 0/1 to -2 to +2 scale; also 
used log of sum of strengths +1 for 
robustness 
R&D intensity positively affects 
CSR; this relationship is significant 
in manufacturing industries, but 
non-significant in non-
manufacturing industries 
Slater & Dixon-
Fowler (AMLE, 
2010) 
n= 416firms (& 
CEOs), 2004 ANCOVA 
Corporate 
Environmental 
Performance (CEP) 
KLD strengths and weakness for 
environmental category: composite 
score 
Positive relationship between CEOs 
with MBAs and CEP 
Fong (JBR, 
2010) 
n=835 
observations 
between 194 
CEOs in 19 
industries (1991-
1999) 
HLM  Stakeholder Management 
KLD strengths and weaknesses 
summed 
When a CEO is overpaid, SM 
increases; when a CEO is underpaid, 
SM decreases 
CSR as Other         
Mattingly & 
Berman (B&S, 
2006) 
n= 293 firms; 5 
years of data 
1998-2002 
EFA, principal 
components 
Corporate social 
action 
12 measures from 6 social issues: 
communities, diversity, employee 
relations, natural environment, 
product safety/quality, corporate 
governance; Strengths and 
Weaknesses separate (normalized) 
Find four distinct latent constructs 
underlying KLD database 
(institutional strength/weakness; 
technical strength/weakness); 
positive and negative social action 
are both empirically and 
conceptually distinct constructs and 
should not be combined in future 
research 
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CSR as Other (cont’d)         
Garcia-Castro, 
Arino & Canela 
(JBE, 2010) 
n=658 firms; 
1991-2005 
OLS regression, 
fixed effect with 
instrumental 
variable 
Social Performance 
5 dimensions: employee relations, 
product issues, community relations, 
diversity, environmental issues: 
Strengths - Weaknesses; all given 
equal weight 
The endogeneity of social strategic 
decisions could be driving most of 
the empirical findings on the effect 
of social performance on financial 
performance 
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APPENDIX B:  KLD Dimensions and Items 
 
Category Definition 
Community   
Generous Giving  
(COM-str-A) 
The company has consistently given over 1.5% of trailing three-year net earnings before taxes (NEBT) to charity, 
or has otherwise been notably generous in its giving. 
Innovative Giving  
(COM-str-B) 
The company has a notably innovative giving program which supports nonprofit organizations particularly those 
promoting self-sufficiency among the economically disadvantaged. Companies that permit non-traditional 
federated charitable giving drives in the workplace are often noted in this section as well. 
Support for Housing  
(COM-str-C) 
The company is a prominent participant in public/private partnerships that support housing initiatives for the 
economically disadvantaged, e.g., the National Equity Fund or the Enterprise Foundation. 
Support for Education (COM-
str-D) 
The company has either been notably innovative in its support for primary or secondary school education, 
particularly for those programs that benefit the economically disadvantaged, or the company has prominently 
supported job-training programs for youth. KLD began assigning this strength in 1994. 
Indigenous Peoples Relations 
(COM-str-E) 
The company has established relations with indigenous peoples in the areas of its proposed or current operations 
that respect the sovereignty, land, culture, human rights, and intellectual property of the indigenous peoples. KLD 
began assigning this strength in 2000. In 2002 KLD moved this strength rating into the Human Rights area. 
Non-US Charitable Giving 
(COM-str-F) 
The company has established substantial, innovative charitable giving programs outside the U.S. In 2002 KLD 
stopped assigning strengths for Non-U.S. charitable giving in the Non-U.S. category, companies with exemplary 
giving programs outside the U.S. are tracked in the Community area. 
Other Strength  
(Com-str-X) 
The company has an exceptionally strong volunteer program, in-kind giving program, or other particularly strong 
community program. 
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Category Definition 
Corporate Governance   
Limited Compensation 
(CGOV-str-A).  
The company has recently awarded notably low levels of compensation to its top management or its board 
members. The limit for a rating is total compensation of less than $500,000 per year for a CEO or $30,000 per 
year for outside directors. In 1999 the threshold rose to its current level from $400,000 and $25,000, which 
represented a 1997 rise from $200,000 and $15,000. 
Ownership Strength (CGOV-
str-C) 
The company owns between 20% and 50% of another company KLD has cited as having an area of social 
strength, or is more than 20% owned by a firm that KLD has rated as having social strengths. When a company 
owns more than 50% of another firm, it has a controlling interest, and KLD treats the second firm as if it is a 
division of the first. 
Diversity   
CEO (DIV-str-A) The company's chief executive officer is a woman or a member of a minority group. 
Promotion (DIV-str-B) The company has made notable progress in the promotion of women and minorities, particularly to line positions with profit-and-loss responsibilities in the corporation. 
Board of Directors  
(DIV-str-C) 
Women, minorities, and/or the disabled hold four seats or more (with no double counting) on the board of 
directors, or one-third or more of the board seats if the board numbers less than 12. 
Family Benefits 
(DIV-str-D) 
The company has outstanding employee benefits or other programs addressing work/family concerns, e.g., 
childcare, elder care, or flextime. 
Women/Minority Contracting 
(DIV-str-E) 
The company does at least 5% of its subcontracting, or otherwise has a demonstrably strong record on 
purchasing or contracting, with women- and/or minority-owned businesses. 
Employment of the Disabled 
(DIV-str-F) 
The company has implemented innovative hiring programs, other innovative human resource programs for the 
disabled, or otherwise has a superior reputation as an employer of the disabled. 
Progressive Gay/Lesbian 
Policies (DIV-str-G) 
The company has implemented notably progressive policies toward its gay and lesbian employees. In 
particular, it provides benefits to the domestic partners of its employees. KLD began assigning strengths for 
this issue in 1995. 
Other Strength (DIV-str-X) The company has made noteworthy diversity achievements that do not fall under other KLD categories. 
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Category Definition 
Employee Relations   
Strong Union Relations  
(EMP-str-A) The company has a history of notably strong union relations. 
No-Layoff Policy (EMP-str-B) The company has maintained a consistent no layoff policy. KLD has not assigned strengths for this issue since 1994. 
Cash Profit Sharing (EMP-str-
C) 
The company has a cash profit-sharing program through which it has recently made distributions to a majority 
of its workforce. 
Employee Involvement  
(EMP-str-D) 
The company strongly encourages worker involvement and/or ownership through stock options available to a 
majority of its employees, gain sharing, stock ownership, sharing of financial information, or participation in 
management decision-making. 
Strong Retirement Benefits 
(EMP-str-F) The company has a notably strong retirement benefits program. 
Health and Safety Strength. 
(EMP-str-G) 
The company is noted by the US Occupational Health and Safety Administration for its safety programs. KLD 
began assigning strengths for this issue in 2003. 
Other Strength (EMP-str-X) The company has a good employee safety record or demonstrates other noteworthy commitments to its employees’ well being. 
Environment   
Beneficial Products and 
Services (ENV-str-A) 
The company derives substantial revenues from innovative remediation products, environmental services, or 
products that promote the efficient use of energy, or it has developed innovative products with environmental 
benefits. (The term “environmental service” does not include services with questionable environmental effects, 
such as landfills, incinerators,  waste-to-energy plants, and deep injection wells.) Through 1994, “substantial 
revenues” was specified as more than 4% of total revenues. 
Pollution Prevention (ENV-
str-B) 
The company has notably strong pollution prevention programs including emissions reductions and toxic-use 
reduction programs. 
Recycling (ENV-str-C) The company either is a substantial user of recycled materials as raw materials in its manufacturing processes, or a major factor in the recycling industry. 
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Category Definition 
Environment (cont’d)   
Alternative Fuels (ENV-str-D) 
The company derives substantial revenues from alternative fuels. The term “alternative fuels” includes natural 
gas, wind power, and solar energy. The company has demonstrated an exceptional commitment to energy 
efficiency programs or the promotion of energy efficiency. 
Communications (ENV-str-E) 
The company is a signatory to the CERES Principles, publishes a notably substantive environmental report, or 
has notably effective internal communications systems in place for environmental best practices. KLD began 
assigning strengths for this issue in 1996. 
Property, Plant, and 
Equipment (ENV-str-F) 
The company maintains its property, plant, and equipment with above average environmental performance for 
its industry. KLD has not assigned strengths for this issue since 1995. 
Other Strength (ENV-str-X) The company demonstrates a strong environmental attribute not addressed by KLD ratings categories. 
Human Rights   
Positive Record in South 
Africa (HUM-str-A) 
 The company’s social record in South Africa is noteworthy. KLD only assigned strengths in this category in 
1994 and 1995. 
Indigenous Peoples Relations 
(HUM-str-D) 
The company has established relations with indigenous peoples in the areas of its proposed or current 
operations that respect the sovereignty, land, culture, human rights, and intellectual property of the indigenous 
peoples. KLD began assigning this strength in 2000. 
Labor Rights Strength (HUM-
str-G) 
The company has outstanding transparency on overseas sourcing disclosure and monitoring, or has 
particularly good union relations outside the U.S. KLD began assigning this strength in 2002. 
Other Strength (HUM-str-X) The company's non-U.S. operations have been praised for their community relations, employee relations, environmental impact, or product innovation. 
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Category Definition 
Product   
Quality (PRO-str-A) The company has a long-term, well-developed, company-wide quality program, or it has a quality program recognized as exceptional in U.S. industry. 
R&D/Innovation (PRO-str-B) The company is a leader in its industry for research and development (R&D), particularly by bringing notably innovative products to market. 
Benefits to Economically 
Disadvantaged  (PRO-str-C) 
The company has as part of its basic mission the provision of products or services for the economically 
disadvantaged. 
Other Strength (PRO-str-X) No definition 
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APPENDIX C:  Representative Sample of Studies Using Demographic Proxies for Managerial Cognitions 
 
Study Variable Method of Measurement Operationalization Main Findings 
CEO WORLDVIEW       
Tetlock (2000) Ideological worldview 
Survey 
Questionnaire 
Multiple item scale including questions such 
as: "overall, do you consider yourself to be a 
liberal or conservative?", "it is a bad idea to 
mix business goals with concerns for social 
justice", "we need government to protect us 
from the damage to the natural environment 
that results from unregulated markets" 
Sharp cleavages in the stakeholder/shareholder 
debate reflected in political sympathies; 
egalitarians more likely to endorse 
accountability to stakeholders, conservatives 
more likely to endorse an accountability regime 
centered around shareholders. 
Chattopadhyay et al. 
(1999) Executive beliefs Survey   
Normative belief and cause-effect belief 
statements 
Beliefs of upper echelon executive not related to 
functional background but are related to the 
beliefs of other members of the organization's 
upper echelon team 
Nadkarni & Barr 
(2008) 
Managerial 
cognition 
(attention focus 
and causal logic) 
Content Analysis 
Centrality of concepts within letters to 
shareholders (LTS); proactive vs. 
deterministic environment-strategy logics 
Managerial cognition (attention and causal 
logic) mediates the relationship between 
industry velocity and the speed of strategic 
response 
Kaplan (2008) 
Managerial 
cognition 
(attention focus)  
Content Analysis Frequency of word count in LTS 
CEO attention to a new technology is associated 
with subsequent increases in a firm's investment 
in that technical domain 
Dennis et al. (2009) 
CEO attitude, 
perceived 
pressures, moral 
obligation, self-
identity 
Survey Scale items 
Economic attitude, political pressure, moral 
obligation and perceived control over 
philanthropy not related to corporate 
philanthropy 
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Study Variable Method of Measurement Operationalization Main Findings 
CEO FUNCTIONAL EXPERIENCE       
Roth (1995) Functional Experience 
Survey 
Questionnaire; 
cluster analysis 
Functional areas of your career divided into 
4 clusters: broad-based, marketing 
management, technical management, core 
business cluster 
No support that a generalized functional 
background contributes more to firm 
performance in cases of high levels of 
international interdependence. 
Thomas & Simerly 
(1994) 
Functional 
Background Archival Data 
Output (marketing, R&D) vs. throughput 
experience (finance, engineering, 
manufacturing) 
High CSP firms have significantly greater 
proportion of executives with backgrounds in 
output functions; Low CSP firms have a 
significantly greater proportion of executives in 
throughput functions. 
Hermann & Datta 
(2003) 
Functional 
Background Archival Data 
Output (sales/marketing, product R&D and 
entrepreneurship) vs. throughput 
(production, operations, finance, accounting, 
data processing, IS and process R&D) 
No relationship between TMT functional 
heterogeneity and expansiveness of firm's 
global strategic posture 
Beyer et al. (1997) Functional Experience 
Survey as part of 
experiment 
How many years of work experience divided 
by percentage by area; Collapsed into 7 
areas: finance/accounting, HR, 
production/operations, IS, marketing/sales, 
R&D, general management 
Amount of experience in a functional area 
unrelated to that functional area being 
represented in managers' belief structures or 
perceptions 
Beyer et al. (1997) 
Breadth of 
Functional 
Experience 
Survey as part of 
experiment 
Based on Walsh (1988) formula: square root 
of (the sum of the number of years worked 
in a particular functional area divided by the 
total number of years of work experience) 
squared 
Managers' information processing only 
somewhat influenced by functional experience - 
directs attention away from unrelated areas 
rather toward related areas; The more restricted 
the observational goals of decision makers, the 
more selective their perceptions will be 
Geletkanycz & Black 
(2001) 
Functional 
Experience Survey 
Exposure to 8 functional disciplines: 
finance, accounting, HR, 
production/operations, law/general counsel, 
marketing/sales, R&D, general management 
Experience in a functional track is positively 
related to executive commitment to the status 
quo (CSQ) 
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Study Variable Method of Measurement Operationalization Main Findings 
CEO FUNCTIONAL EXPERIENCE (cont’d)     
Geletkanycz & Black 
(2001) 
Functional 
Diversity Survey 
Total number of different functional areas 
respondents reported to have worked over 
the course of their careers 
Functional diversity is negatively related to 
CSQ 
Chattopadhyay et al. 
(1999) 
Functional 
Background Survey 
Number of years executive has spent in each 
of 8 major functional areas: general 
administration, personnel, production and 
operations, R&D, finance, accounting, 
marketing and sales. 
Functional background not related to executive 
beliefs 
Carpenter & 
Fredrickson (2001) 
Functional 
Background Archival Data 
Percentage in marketing, distribution, sales, 
R&D, production, engineering, 
finance/accounting, law, or general. 
TMT functional heterogeneity not related to   
expansiveness of firm's global strategic posture 
CEO EDUCATIONAL EXPERIENCE       
Wiersema & Bantel 
(1992) 
Educational level; 
Educational 
specialization 
Archival Data 
Number of years of schooling; specialization 
of the highest obtained university degree 
categorized as arts, sciences, engineering, 
business/economics, law.  
Firms most likely to undergo strategic change 
have top management teams characterized 
by relatively short organizational tenure, high 
educational level and academic training in the 
sciences. 
Herrmann & Datta 
(2003) Education level Archival Data 
Number of years of schooling (7 point scale: 
1 -high school, 2-attended college, 3-
undergraduate degree, 4-attended graduate 
school, 5 -master's degree, 6- attended 
doctoral program, 7 -doctorate 
Educational level of CEO successors not related 
to preference mode of foreign market entry 
Carpenter & 
Fredrickson (2001) 
Educational 
Background Archival Data Used Wiersema and Bantel 
TMT educational heterogeneity positively 
related to   expansiveness of firm's global 
strategic posture 
Geletkanycz & Black 
(2001) Educational Level Survey Hold an MBA 
No support that MBA degree is negatively 
related to CSQ or that MBA degree moderates 
relationship between functional experience and 
CSQ 
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Study Variable Method of Measurement Operationalization Main Findings 
CEO INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE     
Roth (1995) International Background 
Survey 
Questionnaire 
Likert scale on 2 questions: 1) experience in 
international function or in function with 
international responsibilities, 2) time spent 
on overseas assignments 
CEOs with international experience abroad have 
a stronger positive impact on firm performance 
in the case of high international 
interdependence. 
Herrmann & Datta 
(2003) 
International 
Experience Archival Data 
Total number of years spent abroad on 
assignment, in higher education, and/or in a 
firm's international division 
International experience of CEO successors 
positively associated with preference for full 
control foreign market entry mode 
Carpenter & 
Fredrickson (2001) 
International 
Experience Archival Data 
The percentage of team members' total years 
of experience accrued in international 
assignments. 
international experience of TMT positively 
related to expansiveness of firm's global 
strategic posture 
CEO TENURE         
Thomas & Simerly 
(1994) Tenure Archival Data 
2 measures: 1) number of years in the 
organization, 2) number of years as CEO 
CEOs of high CSP firms have longer tenures in 
the company than CEOs of low CSP firms. 
They have also been in the organization longer. 
Wiersema & Bantel 
(1992) 
Organizational 
tenure Archival Data 
Number of years in the organization; split 
into dummy variable low tenure/high tenure 
Low average organizational tenure of TMT 
positively related to change in corporate 
strategy (diversification) 
Herrmann & Datta 
(2003) Position tenure Archival Data Number of years CEO has held that position 
Position tenure of CEO successors positively 
associated with preference for full-control 
foreign market entry modes 
Henderson, Miller & 
Hambrick (2006) Tenure Archival Data 
Number of years a chief executive has been 
in office. 
CEO tenure has inverted U shape relationship to 
firm performance in stable industries 
but in dynamic industries, CEO tenure and 
performance are negatively related 
(performance deteriorates immediately) 
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APPENDIX D:   ACSS, BCSS and DCSS Growth Curves by Industry 
Mining and Construction 
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APPENDIX D:   ACSS, BCSS and DCSS Growth Curves by Industry - Food, Textiles & Apparel 
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APPENDIX D:   ACSS, BCSS and DCSS Growth Curves by Industry - Forest, Paper, Publishing 
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APPENDIX D:   ACSS, BCSS and DCSS Growth Curves By Industry - Refining, Rubber & Plastic 
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APPENDIX D:   ACSS, BCSS and DCSS Growth Curves by Industry - Steel & Heavy Manufacturing 
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APPENDIX D:   ACSS, BCSS and DCSS Growth Curves by Industry - Computers, Automotive, Aerospace 
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APPENDIX D:   ACSS, BCSS and DCSS Growth Curves by Industry - Transportation 
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APPENDIX D:   ACSS, BCSS and DCSS Growth Curves by Industry - Telephone/Utilities 
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APPENDIX D:   ACSS, BCSS and DCSS Growth Curves by Industry – Wholesale/Retail 
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APPENDIX D:   ACSS, BCSS and DCSS Growth Curves by Industry - Financial 
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APPENDIX D:   ACSS, BCSS and DCSS Growth Curves by Industry - Hotel, Entertainment & Service 
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APPENDIX E:  Growth in Mean Levels and Standard Deviations over Time by Industry 
Industry/Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Avg.
Mining/Construction Mean 0.15 0.18 0.19 0.13 0.17 0.24 0.21 0.12 0.19 0.18 0.19 0.22 0.34 0.23 0.26 0.39 0.56 0.65 0.64 0.27
St. Dev 0.30 0.32 0.32 0.28 0.31 0.38 0.33 0.26 0.35 0.30 0.34 0.36 0.42 0.37 0.41 0.42 0.45 0.55 0.57 0.40
N 14 15 14 15 16 16 16 16 16 15 16 16 16 16 16 14 14 14 13
Food/Textiles/Apparel Mean 0.34 0.35 0.37 0.49 0.56 0.46 0.46 0.42 0.39 0.50 0.49 0.49 0.44 0.41 0.44 0.55 0.58 0.55 0.58 0.46
St. Dev 0.42 0.44 0.44 0.46 0.45 0.47 0.47 0.41 0.42 0.43 0.43 0.47 0.45 0.45 0.46 0.51 0.50 0.61 0.62 0.46
N 23 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 23 23 20 19
Forrest/Paper/Publishing Mean 0.31 0.34 0.35 0.36 0.43 0.43 0.45 0.48 0.56 0.55 0.48 0.45 0.44 0.44 0.55 0.64 0.70 0.60 0.61 0.48
St. Dev 0.49 0.52 0.54 0.54 0.53 0.49 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.50 0.47 0.48 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.55 0.52 0.57 0.57 0.52
N 27 30 30 31 32 32 32 32 32 32 31 30 32 32 32 30 27 28 28
Chemicals/Pharma Mean 0.34 0.46 0.44 0.57 0.59 0.59 0.60 0.59 0.61 0.59 0.60 0.68 0.63 0.62 0.66 0.71 0.77 0.83 0.80 0.61
St. Dev 0.53 0.49 0.50 0.52 0.54 0.51 0.56 0.55 0.54 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.55 0.52 0.51 0.52 0.55 0.54 0.54 0.53
N 32 36 37 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 37 36 38 38 38 37 35 34 32
Refining/Rubber/Plastic Mean 0.40 0.53 0.64 0.79 0.81 0.78 0.52 0.51 0.52 0.59 0.77 0.66 0.74 0.68 0.81 0.77 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.69
St. Dev 0.53 0.54 0.49 0.42 0.46 0.42 0.38 0.37 0.37 0.44 0.44 0.51 0.54 0.65 0.59 0.65 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.49
N 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 6 5 5 5
Steel/Heavy Manufacturing Mean 0.34 0.38 0.36 0.43 0.45 0.43 0.43 0.42 0.44 0.41 0.44 0.45 0.41 0.46 0.57 0.56 0.61 0.69 0.69 0.47
St. Dev 0.51 0.52 0.50 0.54 0.54 0.51 0.51 0.53 0.53 0.48 0.53 0.51 0.47 0.49 0.56 0.57 0.52 0.50 0.50 0.52
N 38 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 40 37 38 40 40 40 40 40 39 39
Computers/Auto/Aero Mean 0.30 0.37 0.38 0.47 0.52 0.51 0.55 0.51 0.56 0.56 0.57 0.61 0.59 0.59 0.66 0.69 0.72 0.72 0.72 0.56
St. Dev 0.39 0.44 0.45 0.46 0.46 0.53 0.53 0.48 0.49 0.48 0.49 0.50 0.53 0.52 0.56 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.56 0.51
N 57 58 59 60 62 62 62 60 60 60 61 61 61 60 60 58 56 56 55
Transportation Mean 0.44 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.48 0.38 0.38 0.39 0.55 0.48 0.54 0.56 0.55 0.42 0.47 0.45 0.70 0.67 0.67 0.50
St. Dev 0.50 0.57 0.57 0.64 0.58 0.48 0.48 0.47 0.51 0.43 0.41 0.45 0.44 0.49 0.50 0.54 0.47 0.40 0.40 0.48
N 10 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 10 10 10 9 10 11 11 11
Telephone/Utilities Mean 0.32 0.46 0.44 0.59 0.58 0.57 0.68 0.68 0.59 0.59 0.62 0.60 0.68 0.58 0.49 0.48 0.59 0.67 0.67 0.57
St. Dev 0.44 0.45 0.49 0.59 0.51 0.53 0.45 0.51 0.46 0.44 0.48 0.46 0.40 0.42 0.41 0.39 0.43 0.39 0.39 0.46
N 24 26 26 26 26 25 25 26 26 25 23 23 25 25 26 25 24 24 24
Wholesale/Retail Mean 0.27 0.26 0.33 0.37 0.39 0.36 0.37 0.34 0.29 0.26 0.27 0.27 0.23 0.21 0.24 0.24 0.28 0.35 0.35 0.30
St. Dev 0.41 0.43 0.50 0.53 0.55 0.54 0.52 0.46 0.45 0.40 0.38 0.39 0.35 0.36 0.37 0.42 0.44 0.46 0.46 0.44
N 34 35 37 37 36 36 36 36 37 36 37 34 38 38 37 34 33 32 32
Financial Mean 0.37 0.42 0.39 0.56 0.50 0.56 0.61 0.57 0.60 0.64 0.70 0.63 0.57 0.53 0.57 0.57 0.52 0.61 0.59 0.56
St. Dev 0.42 0.48 0.46 0.47 0.48 0.40 0.43 0.43 0.43 0.42 0.43 0.48 0.47 0.49 0.46 0.48 0.49 0.51 0.52 0.46
N 23 27 28 30 33 33 33 32 32 32 32 32 32 33 33 31 30 28 26
Hotel/Entertainment/Services Mean 0.22 0.28 0.22 0.21 0.25 0.26 0.26 0.31 0.31 0.25 0.24 0.25 0.25 0.32 0.37 0.50 0.49 0.48 0.48 0.31
St. Dev 0.45 0.49 0.47 0.45 0.43 0.44 0.44 0.48 0.44 0.46 0.43 0.43 0.40 0.47 0.47 0.49 0.49 0.53 0.53 0.46
N 18 20 20 20 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 20 21 20 20 19 19 19 19
Yearly Averages Mean 0.31 0.37 0.37 0.45 0.47 0.47 0.48 0.47 0.48 0.48 0.49 0.50 0.48 0.47 0.52 0.56 0.61 0.64 0.63 0.49
St. Dev 0.44 0.47 0.48 0.51 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.49 0.48 0.47 0.48 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.51 0.52 0.52 0.53 0.53 0.50
BCSS 
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APPENDIX E:  Growth in Mean Levels and Standard Deviations over Time by Industry 
Industry/Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Avg.
Mining/Construction Mean 0.08 0.12 0.15 0.18 0.15 0.16 0.18 0.22 0.23 0.22 0.23 0.22 0.18 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.22 0.25 0.25 0.19
St. Dev 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.09 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.18 0.14 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.13
N 14 15 14 15 16 16 16 16 16 15 16 16 16 16 16 14 14 14 13
Food/Textiles/Apparel Mean 0.16 0.18 0.24 0.24 0.27 0.27 0.28 0.25 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.24 0.24 0.27 0.31 0.31 0.30 0.31 0.25
St. Dev 0.16 0.15 0.21 0.15 0.17 0.22 0.26 0.20 0.12 0.15 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.19 0.18
N 23 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 23 23 20 19
Forrest/Paper/Publishing Mean 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.17 0.19 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.26 0.23 0.23 0.25 0.27 0.32 0.31 0.30 0.22
St. Dev 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.12 0.15 0.13 0.15 0.17 0.17 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.19 0.17
N 27 30 30 31 32 32 32 32 32 32 31 30 32 32 32 30 27 28 28
Chemicals/Pharma Mean 0.17 0.20 0.22 0.22 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.25 0.26 0.28 0.29 0.31 0.30 0.32 0.37 0.35 0.37 0.39 0.39 0.28
St. Dev 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.21 0.24 0.22 0.20 0.18 0.19 0.18
N 32 36 37 38 38 38 38 38 38 38 37 36 38 38 38 37 35 34 32
Refining/Rubber/Plastic Mean 0.23 0.33 0.36 0.29 0.37 0.41 0.34 0.40 0.42 0.43 0.42 0.47 0.38 0.38 0.35 0.31 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.36
St. Dev 0.05 0.13 0.14 0.08 0.11 0.27 0.10 0.14 0.14 0.12 0.10 0.15 0.09 0.16 0.16 0.14 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.15
N 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 6 5 5 5
Steel/Heavy Manufacturing Mean 0.17 0.18 0.20 0.17 0.20 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.23 0.25 0.25 0.26 0.26 0.23 0.29 0.29 0.31 0.34 0.34 0.24
St. Dev 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.14 0.17 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.23 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.20
N 38 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 40 37 38 40 40 40 40 40 39 39
Computers/Auto/Aero Mean 0.14 0.17 0.19 0.20 0.24 0.23 0.24 0.25 0.26 0.28 0.27 0.27 0.25 0.27 0.29 0.30 0.31 0.32 0.32 0.25
St. Dev 0.13 0.15 0.18 0.16 0.16 0.19 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.17 0.21 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.22 0.21 0.19
N 57 58 59 60 62 62 62 60 60 60 61 61 61 60 60 58 56 56 55
Transportation Mean 0.26 0.25 0.19 0.18 0.20 0.20 0.22 0.24 0.25 0.27 0.28 0.24 0.23 0.24 0.27 0.26 0.29 0.29 0.29 0.25
St. Dev 0.10 0.16 0.15 0.13 0.20 0.22 0.21 0.23 0.24 0.22 0.23 0.20 0.16 0.16 0.21 0.20 0.17 0.15 0.15 0.18
N 10 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 10 10 10 9 10 11 11 11
Telephone/Utilities Mean 0.18 0.18 0.20 0.20 0.23 0.24 0.29 0.25 0.25 0.27 0.29 0.30 0.28 0.28 0.30 0.28 0.29 0.28 0.28 0.26
St. Dev 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.16 0.16 0.21 0.16 0.19 0.15 0.17 0.15 0.13 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.17 0.17 0.16
N 24 26 26 26 26 25 25 26 26 25 23 23 25 25 26 25 24 24 24
Wholesale/Retail Mean 0.15 0.15 0.17 0.17 0.20 0.27 0.24 0.19 0.18 0.20 0.20 0.22 0.20 0.21 0.25 0.28 0.28 0.29 0.30 0.22
St. Dev 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.15 0.32 0.27 0.14 0.12 0.15 0.16 0.13 0.15 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.21 0.20 0.18
N 34 35 37 37 36 36 36 36 37 36 37 34 38 38 37 34 33 32 32
Financial Mean 0.25 0.26 0.31 0.24 0.23 0.25 0.28 0.30 0.30 0.27 0.29 0.31 0.33 0.32 0.34 0.33 0.35 0.37 0.34 0.30
St. Dev 0.21 0.21 0.24 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.19 0.20 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.21 0.21 0.19 0.20 0.21 0.19 0.19
N 23 27 28 30 33 33 33 32 32 32 32 32 32 33 33 31 30 28 26
Hotel/Entertainment/Services Mean 0.10 0.16 0.15 0.13 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.22 0.22 0.26 0.26 0.27 0.31 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.21
St. Dev 0.15 0.17 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.17 0.18 0.16 0.22 0.23 0.22 0.21 0.23 0.21 0.20 0.22 0.23 0.21 0.21 0.20
N 18 20 20 20 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 20 21 20 20 19 19 19 19
Yearly Averages Mean 0.16 0.18 0.20 0.19 0.22 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.25 0.26 0.27 0.26 0.26 0.29 0.29 0.31 0.32 0.32 0.25
St. Dev 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.14 0.16 0.20 0.19 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.19 0.19 0.20 0.19 0.18
DCSS 
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